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HEALTH CARE REFORM AND THE CHANGING




If the practice of medicine had not changed in 100 years, today we
would spend no more than one percent of our current health care budget.'
Modem medicine prolongs life on the average, but our societies have become
sicker: in the past, cancer or Alzheimer's disease, for example, were rare
occurrences because individuals died of more acute causes at a much
younger age. Furthermore, the availability and sophistication of treatments
and medical technology have exploded and, as a consequence, so have our
expectations for care, as well as the content of our classification of diseases.2
As one author observed, "Whoever used to have a VW Beetle but now drives
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1. OFFICE OF HEALTH ECONOMICS, TRENDS IN EUROPEAN HEALTH SPENDING (OHE
Briefing No. 14, May 1981), quoted in Walter Krimer, Medizin mufi rationiert werden
[Medical Care Must be Rationed]. 1 MEDIZINRECHT 1 (1996) [hereinafter MEDR].
2. "Before, if you were born lisping, stuttering, cross-eyed or had crooked teeth, you would
take these conditions with you to your grave without ever being bothered nor considered
afflicted with illness." WALTER KRAMER, WIR KURIEREN UNS Zu TODE [WE ARE HEALING
OURSELVES To DEATH] 29, 30 (Ullstein Buchverlage, Berlin, 1997).
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a Cadillac, should not complain that the vehicle has increased in price."3 In
addition, as a consequence of demographic changes, fewer individuals
support a growing elderly segment of the population.4
American health care expenditures have risen over the past several years
to almost 15% of GDP5 (up from 6.5% in 1965) while German expenditures
(3.5% of GDP in 1965) have been stable at around 10.5% (they declined
from 10.5% in 1996 to 10.3% in 1998).6 Members7 and their families,
however, have had to shoulder an increasing share of the burden through
copayments and deductibles in order to help achieve premium stabilitys, one
of the basic principles of the statutory health insurance system.9 In the
United States, managed care helped to stabilize health care expenditures
temporarily, but premiums and costs are moving upward again. 10 In both
3. See KRAMER, id. at 2.
4. In Germany, 20% of health care expenditures are occasioned by the five most common
age-related disease complexes: dementias (including Alzheimer's), stroke, motor control
disorders (such as Parkinson's), geriatric depression and chronic pain. DerAlterungsprozess
ist uns immer noch ein Riitsel [The Enduring Enigma of the Aging Process], SUDDEUTSCHE
ZEITUNG, Nov. 6, 1998, at 14.
5. Gross Domestic Product.
6. Kassen zwischen Rationierung und Rationalisierung [Sickness Funds Between
Rationing and Rationalizing], FRANKFURTER RuNDscHAu, Sept. 9, 1999. This number
combines public health care expenditures for 90% of the population (8% of GDP) and the
privately insured sector (2% of GDP).
7. The terms "members" and "patients" are used interchangeably. The common German
term is "patient" since most of the population receives cradle-to-grave coverage by the
statutory health care system, making everyone a patient as of the first day of life.
8. Beitragssatzstabilitdt. SGB V, Arts. 71, 86. Premiums have remained stable at around
13% and can be adjusted up or down, depending on annual funding requirements. Sickness
fund administrative expenditures fluctuate between 2 to 6% while managed care
organizations spend 30% of the premium dollar on administration. Only 70% remain for the
"medical loss component."
9. In 1999, cost containment measures resulted in a surplus of one billion Deutschmarks
($500 million at the current exchange rate). Andreas Hoffmann, Die Kostenpille [The Cost
Containment Pill], SODDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG, March 7, 2000, at 19.
10. An average cost increase of 12 percent for large employers' health plans is expected
for 2000. More evidence of rising plan costs. 5(3) ON MANAGED CARE 3 (Panel Publishers,
March 2000) (quoting 1999 TOWERS PERRiN HEALTH CARE COST SURVEY).
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countries, legislators and courts are working on finding acceptable solutions
out of the demographic and "medical progress" traps."'
As a consequence, the allocation of health care funds has become a
heatedly debated issue by public opinion and lawmakers in the United States
and Germany. In both countries, there is agreement that unlimited fee-for-
service medicine is no longer financially viable, and a number of cost
containment approaches have been developed. But every resource allocation
measure impacts on medical decision-making and the standard of care. In
the United States, where health care reform has been left mainly to the
market, the standard of care for a majority of the employed population is
determined by managed care organizations (MCOs)12 through the macro and
micro-allocation of health care funds; in Germany, with its tradition of
universal access/universal coverage social health insurance, 13 macro-
allocation and some macro-level standard of care determinations rest with
legislators and corporate entities established under public law14 to represent
11. Die Fortschrittsfalle. As one author observed, "Whatever the Germans have done with
their health care system, they must have "managed" something very well." German health
care expenditures in 1997 amounted to $2,339 per capita compared to $4,090 in the United
States without any correspondingly superior "health status" of its population; the United
States will reach the current German percentage of individuals 65 years or older in 2018-2020
when the baby-boomers retire; and the increased demand for health care since German
unification in 1990 could be roughly compared to the United States absorbing Mexico. Uwe
Reinhardt, 'Mangled Competition' And 'Managed Whatever.' 18 HEALTH AFFAIRS 92
(May/June 1999).
12. Managed Care Organizations (MCOs) are defined here as a prepaid system of health
care, combining insurance with the delivery of medical services. Common examples are
Health Maintenance Organizations (H.M.O.s) integrating all aspects of the delivery of health
care, and Preferred Provider Organizations (PPOs), offering members a limited network of
providers, hospitals included, which have accepted an array of arrangements for reduced fees
in exchange for access to a larger patient base.
13. Gesetzliche Krankenversicherung (GKV). The German health care system with
mandatory membership up to a predetermined level ofpersonal income, spreading risk among
90% of the population, developed out of a communitarian approach to society in the 19 '
century. It is designed to protect individuals as members of a solidarity-based community.
Premiums are shared at 50% between employees and employers through a type ofpayroll tax.
Social law provides for uniform, comprehensive coverage. For a detailed description of the
German health care system, see Ursula Weide, A Comparison ofAmerican and German Cost
Containment in Health Care: TortLiability ofUS. Managed Care Organizations vs. German
Health Care Reform Legislation, 13 TUL. EUR & Civ. L. F. 47, 58 (1998).
14. Kdrperschaften des 6ffentlichen Rechts. The rights and duties of all participants
(providers and patients) in the health care system are codified in Title 5 of the German Social
20001
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providers and health insurers. Micro-level care decisions are still left to
providers. But the paternalistic comprehensive German system limits
individual choice while the market-dominated American approach has
resulted in a large number of uninsured and underinsured individuals and the
loss of much of physician autonomy. In both countries, the current system
of health care delivery is questioned as the practice of medicine is moving
from "advocacy to allocation.5
II. SETTING THE STANDARD OF CARE
A. The United States
The Constitution does not guarantee certain minimum rights of
treatment nor "otherwise impose an affirmative obligation on the state to
ensure that life, liberty or property do not come to harm through other
means." 16 This excludes a right to health care and, hence, any basic
standards for its provision. From the end of the 19 th century roughly until
1960, health law was focused primarily on protecting physician autonomy,
and the quality of care depended on local communities of private
practitioners.17 Beginning in the fifties and sixties, more socially oriented
attitudes developed, recognizing society's responsibility to protect the rights
and interests of all of its members, and to achieve a greater degree of equity.
Law was seen as an instrument to balance the unequal relationships among
patients, providers, and health insurers. This "modestly egalitarian social
contract" lead to the creation of Medicare and Medicaid for two of the most
vulnerable segments of society, the elderly and the poor. Beginning in the
seventies, however, the emphasis shifted to market competition, away from
Code (SGB V).
15. John K. Iglehart, Health Policy Report: The American Health Care System, NEW ENG.
J. MED. 327 (1992). Adolf Laufs, Immer weniger Freiheit drztlichen Handelns [Restricting
Independent Clinical Judgment], 37 NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT 2717, 2718 (1999)
[hereinafter NJW].
16. Collins v. Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 117 (1992), citing DeShaney v. Winnebago
County Dep't of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 196 (1989). The Supreme Court ruled that
substantive due process under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does
not extend to a fundamental right to health care, but that this Clause was intended to limit the
State's power to act. The Court cites the doctrine ofjudicial self-restraint whenever asked
to "expand the concept of substantive due process."
17. This section is based on RAND E. ROSENBLATT ET AL., LAW AND THE AMERICAN
HEALTH CARE SYSTEM, (The Foundation Press Inc., 1997) [hereinafter ROSENBLATT ET AL.].
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the strictures of both government regulation and common law remedies. As
a result, the power of insurance companies, including managed care
organizations, contractually determining standards of care and benefits, was
greatly strengthened. In the nineties, with health care delivery mainly
dominated by large corporations striving to minimize the "medical loss
component" of each premium dollar by limiting coverage and "medically
necessary" benefits, many states have resorted to mandating minimum
benefits to protect patients and providers alike.
1. Tort Liability
a. Which Standard of Care?
In the absence of comprehensive national or state legislation addressing
quality of care and provider qualifications, tort law has helped to define
physicians' duty to exercise "reasonable care." Initially, the "locality rule"
reflected a community-based standard of care. In the sixties and early
seventies, again under the influence of the modestly egalitarian social
contract (and accompanying the civil rights movement), the impact of tort
liability expanded, and judicial decisions protective of patients paved the way
from the locality rule to national standards. Allowances are made for
facilities and practitioners in rural areas without top-of-the-line resources.18
But reliance on local or prevailing standards is not permitted whenever the
physician knows or has reason to know that a procedure has been questioned
as potentially harmful. Practitioners then must exercise their "best
judgment."' 9 In this instance, informed consent is required. 0
Already in 1914, Judge Cardozo stated that "the patient is an
autonomous person with the right to determine what shall be done with his
own body." Without consent, defined as no objection to an announced
intervention, a physician was liable for assault or battery. Today, patients
must be informed of risks they would reasonably consider relevant in order
to be able to participate in decisions regarding their health care.21 "The
patient's right of self-decision shapes the boundaries of the duty to reveal."
18. Hall v. Hillburn, 466 So.2d 856, 871 (Miss. 1985). German courts have adopted the
identical stance.
19. Toth v. Community Hosp. at Glen Cove, 239 N.E.2d 368 (N.Y. 1968).
20. Burton v. Brooklyn Doctors Hosp., 452 N.Y. 2d 875 (1982). In Germany, a large body
of case law addressing informed consent has developed, strengthening patients' rights under
the statutory health insurance system. For further discussion, see infra section II.B.5.e.
21. See ROSENBLATT ET AL., supra note 17, at 900.
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Such ruled the judge in Canterbury v. Spence,2 holding a physician liable for
having violated his duty to warn of a one percent chance of paralysis
following a laminectomy. In this case, a nineteen-year old complaining of
severe back pain was disabled for life. The physician had felt that revealing
risks was not good medical practice as it might deter patients from submitting
to needed surgery.
In the ever-changing world of medical technology, what is to be
considered the applicable standard of care? A case from 1932 established the
foundation for "reasonable prudence" taking precedence over lower industry
or professional standards. Judge Learned Hand in the T.J. Hooper case
23
ruled that whenever protective equipment is available at affordable cost
(here, radios for communications between tug boats to avoid collisions), a
carrier is required to use reasonable prudence by installing the device even
if the industry on the whole does not yet rely on it.24 The prevailing industry
or professional standard was also held to be inadequate in United Blood
Services v. Quintana.25 The court found that had the blood bank exercised
reasonable prudence (or ordinary and reasonable care), taking into
consideration available scientific knowledge, the plaintiff's infection with the
AIDS virus would have been prevented. If donors had been screened
adequately concerning their lifestyle, supplemented by physical examinations
and surrogate blood testing, contaminated samples would not have been
obtained nor processed. In Washington v. Washington Hospital Center,26 a
patient undergoing anesthesia suffered catastrophic brain damage because the
hospital had not installed a carbon dioxide monitor to detect an inadequate
supply of oxygen. Rejecting the locality rule, the court applied the
"reasonably prudent professional" standard, finding that enough scientific
evidence was available at the time of the incident for the hospital to know
that this new device would prevent injuries as sustained in this case. As a
matter of fact, the chief anesthesiologist had submitted a request for such a
22. 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
23. 60 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1932).
24. A comparable contemporary case is the installation of defibrillators on commercial
aircraft. They are available at $3,000 a piece, and airlines have kept statistics for years
reflecting the regular occurrence of heart attacks in the air. Until recently, only the Australian
airline Qantas routinely equipped its aircraft with this easy-to-use, life-saving device until
many American carriers were forced to do likewise by the increasing number of wrongful
death claims against them.
25. 827 P.2d 509 (Colo. 1992).
26. 579 A.2d 177 (D.C. 1990).
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monitor almost a year earlier stating that the hospital otherwise would "fail
to meet the national standard of care."
These cases underscore that if "the natural risk of death or injury is
transformed into potential legal liability; the function of tort liability would
then be to assure the rapid diffusion of new technology."27  How are
practitioners to provide care faced with competing standards in case of a
"respectable minority" or "two schools of thought"? The court in Jones v.
Chidester28 considered the existence of two schools an absolute defense
against medical negligence, and to be determined by the trier of fact relying
on expert testimony.29 Prevailing or customary practices depend on a
quantitative analysis while the acceptance of a procedure by a respectable
minority relies on both quantitative and qualitative considerations. In this
case, a tourniquet was used during surgery to stop the blood flow, and the
plaintiff had complained that this "unacceptable" practice had caused nerve
damage.
b. The Role of Clinical Practice Guidelines
Clearly, ordinary prudence standards depend on the availability and
access to adequate information about ever-changing medical practices.
Clinical practice guidelines (CPGs) are "systematically developed statements
to assist practitioner and patient decisions about appropriate health care for
specific clinical circumstances."3 Guidelines, developed by recognized
scientific organizations and professional medical societies31 according to a
scientifically valid methodology, provide such information. "They improve
the standard of care by restraining risky experimentation by individual
27. See ROSENBLATT ET AL., supra note 17, at 862.
28. 610 A.2d 964, 969 (PA. 1992).
29. German law allows for "respectable minority" practices as well.
30. INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, COMMITTEE ON CLINICAL PRACTICE GUIDELINES, CLINICAL
PRACTICE GUIDELINES: DIRECTIONS FORANEWPROGRAM (M.J. Field, Kathleen N. Lohr, eds.,
Washington, D.C., National Academy Press, 1990).
31. "In the absence of a national policy-making body, professional medical societies are
presently the best authority for promulgating judicially cognizable practice guidelines."
Richard A. Leahy, Rational Health Policy and the Legal Standard of Care: A Call for
Judicial Deference to Medical Practice Guidelines. 77 CAL. L. REv. 1483, 1510 (1989).
Under the German social health insurance code, a quasi-regulatory entity cooperating with
the medical societies is currently preparing to develop additional guidelines. For further
discussion, see section II.B.2.B.a and II.B.4.e.
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providers and by systematizing and operationalizing collective knowledge."32
Practice guidelines, indicating a certain range of clinical options, may be
used to assist practitioners in determining how health conditions can most
effectively be prevented, diagnosed, treated and managed clinically. 33 By
1996, more than 2,000 guidelines had been presented by approximately 75
organizations such as medical societies, the American Medical Association,
and private research organizations.34 A workgroup was created by the
Agency for Health Care Policy and Research (a division of the Public Health
Service) to decide on a methodology for guideline development and their
application to the evaluation of quality of care. Guidelines are to be based
on available medical evidence or professional judgment in case of
insufficient empirical data. Some regional adjustments may be needed to
reflect local population differences. The Institute Of Medicine (chartered by
the National Academy of Sciences) warned, however, that such adaptations
may not be valid if done for self-serving purposes such as perpetuating
unacceptable practices, to promote economic interests, or to exclude certain
categories of practitioners. Furthermore, managed care organizations, "with
their commitment to the bottom line, may make modifications to guidelines
to achieve their best interests and not those of the patients. ,36
Courts can resort to CPGs to determine the applicable standard of care.
Under the Maine demonstration project for the establishment of practice
parameters and risk management protocols,37 such guidelines would serve as
an affirmative defense for the physician abiding by them. The burden of
proof of compliance rests with the provider.38 Guidelines have evidentiary
relevance but are not legally binding and can be challenged. In Bragdon v.
32. See ROSENBLATT ET AL., supra note 17, at 856.
33. AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE POLICY AND RESEARCH, USING CLINICAL PRACTICE
GUIDELINES TO EVALUATE QUALITY OF CARE (AHCPR Publication No. 95-0045, Rockville,
Md., March 1995). Vol. 1 contains a "List of attributes of good practice guidelines" and a
12-point checklist for guideline development, similar to the approach developed by the
German workgroup A,, ZQ. For further discussion, see infra section II.B.2.B.b.
34. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PRACTICE GUIDELINES: MANAGED CARE PLANS
CUSTOMIZE GUIDELINES TO MEET LOCAL INTERESTS 3 (GAO/HEHS-96-95, Washington,
D.C., May 1996).
35. Vol. 2. AHCPR Publication No. 95-0046, supra note 33.
36. See GAO, supra note 34, at 12 (quoting an anonymous expert source on guidelines).
37. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: MAINE'S USE OF PRACTICE
GUIDELINES TO REDUCE COSTS (GAO/HRD-94-8, Oct. 1993).
38. Such a reversal of the burden of proof is hotly contested in Germany.
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Abbott,39 the Supreme Court, ruling that AIDS was covered by the Americans
with Disabilities Act definition of disability, examined the 1993 Center for
Disease Control Dentistry Guidelines outlining the Recommended Infection
Control Practices for Dentistry in order to determine the safety of treating
HIV infected patients in private dental offices. The American Dental
Association had issued a policy statement that such infection control
procedures provided adequate protection for patients and dental personnel.
The Court considered neither the CDC guideline nor the ADA policy
statement to be definitive and objective evidence. It felt that both set out
recommendations without assessing statistical risk, and that the ADA, even
though a professional association and a respected source of information, may
have included considerations of professional responsibility in its policy
statement.
In spite of the considerable efforts of the AHCPR, for example, to lay
out a scientifically sound methodology for developing practice guidelines and
translating them into guidelines for quality of care evaluations, they do not
seem to have had much of an impact on actual standards. One reason may
be that such guidelines can serve two very different purposes: to assist
practitioner's clinical decision-making, and to serve as criteria for quality and
utilization review purposes by entities outside the physician-patient
relationship. Hence, they are often associated with cost control efforts "de-
legitimating" individual physicians by giving more weight to "established"
sources of statistical medical and scientific data.4"
39. 524 U.S. 624, 651 (1998).
40. RAND E. ROSENBLATT, SYLVIA A. LAW, SARA ROSENBAUM, LAW AND THE AMERICAN
HEALTH CARE SYSTEM, 1999-2000 SUPPLEMENT 57 (Foundation Press, 1999). A telling
comment may have been that of a respondent to an informal survey conducted among
managed care organizations about their use of practice guidelines who felt that the AHCPR
guidelines "did not seem to fit his circumstances." MCOs use internal guidelines to deny
benefits for individual patients according to corporation-specific utilization review data while
AHCPR guidelines rely on scientific evidence reflecting prevailing standards of care in order
to support clinically appropriate decision making and do not include economic
considerations. Jane Sisk, How are Health Care Organizations Using Clinical Guidelines?
HEALTH AFFAIRS 90 (Sept./Oct. 1999).
2000]
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c. Hospital Liability
Under the doctrine of charitable immunity laid down in McDonald v.
Massachusetts General Hospital,4' hospitals as "public charities" (wealthy
individuals received medical treatment at home) were largely immune from
malpractice liabilit' because accepting free care was considered an implied
waiver by patients of their rights under tort law.42 (This principle was
extended to paying patients as well, one of the doctrinal flaws of charitable
immunity contributing to its eventual failure.) Hospitals were only held to
exercise due care when selecting medical staff as their agents. Beginning in
the 1940s, and following the analysis in President of Georgetown College v.
Hughes,43 heavily critiquing the inconsistencies of the doctrine, most of the
states eventually eliminated charitable immunity. After a period during
which hospitals were seen as merely providing the required facilities for
physicians and as such held liable only for administrative but not medical
negligence, the theory of respondeat superior began to govern malpractice
actions. Again influenced by the modestly egalitarian social contract
developing in the fifties and sixties, courts increasingly found hospitals liable
for negligence on the part of their agents, including physicians as
independent contractors with hospital privileges as well as employed
technicians and nurses.
Under theories of agency, hospitals are vicariously liable for negligence
on the part of their employees acting within the scope of employment.
Apparent agency is assumed, for example, for physicians working as
independent contractors in emergency rooms. Hospitals, now commercial
ventures instead of charitable institutions-and often advertising their
services-hold physicians out as their providers, and patients look to the
hospital for competent care. Numerous courts have extended this doctrine
to other specialists as well. The Alaska Supreme Court even attributed a
non-delegable duty to a hospital. In Jackson v. Power," the Court ruled that
an acute care hospital had a non-delegable duty to staff its emergency room
with physicians and therefore was not shielded from liability claims when
one of them performed negligent diagnostic services, causing an accident
victim to lose both kidneys. The court compared the duty to provide
41. 120 Mass. 432 (1876).
42. This section is based on Kenneth S. Abraham & Paul C. Weiler, Enterprise Medical
Liability and the Evolution of the American Health Care System. 108 HARV. L. REV. 381
(1994), and on ROSENBLATT ET AL., supra note 17.
43. 130 F.2d 810 (D.C. Cir. 1942).
44. 743 P. 2d 1376 (Alaska 1987).
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competent emergency room physicians to that of airlines to assure the safety
of their passengers.
Corporate liability, adopted by at least twenty-two states,
45
encompasses not only malpractice by those physicians selected by and under
contract with the hospital, but also surgeons and obstetricians, for example,
selected by patients. Hospitals are held liable for negligent credentialing, i.e.
improperly selecting, verifying the credentials, and supervising the quality of
care of those physicians permitted to practice on their premises. Darling v.
Charleston Community Memorial Hospital46 is often cited as the leading case
paving the way for corporate liability. The court, quoting licensing
regulations, accreditation standards, and hospital bylaws as indicators of
custom and, hence, the standard of care, ruled that the jury reasonably could
have concluded that the hospital had certain responsibilities to ensure
adequate treatment. In this case, neither the operating orthopedic surgeon
nor the nursing staff had prevented the necrosis of a broken leg, leading to
amputation. In addition, the current standards of the Joint Commission on
the Accreditation ofHealthcare Organizations and state licensing regulations
require hospitals to check physicians' qualifications before granting them
privileges, and to periodically review their performance.
2. Accreditation
a. Hospitals
Around the turn of the century, physicians commonly received hospital
staff privileges.47 As the number of hospitals and physicians expanded,
hospitals were faced with the necessity of practitioner selection, especially
for surgery. In 1919, the American College of Surgeons (ACS) published
standards for hospitals including adequate staffing of labs and x-ray
departments, also requiring careful selection of physicians and peer review
of the quality of care they provided. Hospitals were considered to owe
adequate service to the community. Without an enforcement mechanism,
however, compliance was entirely voluntary. The Hill-Burton Act, passed
by Congress in 1946, made state licensing of hospitals the prerequisite for the
disbursement of federal funds for hospital construction. State legislation
45. Carol P. Michael, Credentialing Liability in the Managed Care Arena, 35 TORT. &
INS. L. J. 137 (Fall 1999).
46. 211 N.E.2d 253 (Ill. 1965).
47. This section is based in part on ROSENBLATT ET AL., supra note 17.
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adopted many elements of the ACS standards, but enforcement remained
mostly theoretical for lack of resources.
In 1951, a private organization, the Joint Commission on Accreditation
of Hospitals (JCAH) succeeded the ACS standards program. Its board was
composed of representatives of the American Medical Association, the
American Hospital Association, and several specialized professional
organizations.48 Again, compliance with ACS standards was voluntary,
giving this "private regulatory apparatus an often illusory quality' 49 since
almost any physician with a degree from an approved school could be
admitted to practice at a hospital. As some authors have observed, "the
structure of accreditation standards, control committees, and legal
requirements derive from our commitment to unsupervised, private practice
in hospitals."5 Current JCAHO standards hold hospital governing bodies,
including elected and appointed leaders of the medical staff, the clinical
departments, and the nurse executive and other senior nursing leaders,
responsible for coordinating, providing and improving quality health care
services."
Recently, a major hospital in the Washington, D.C. area lost its
accreditation, an indication that JCAHO does act at least in extreme cases.
This decision by "a group that has often been criticized as a rubber-stamp for
the hospital industry" was considered a serious blow, potentially leading to
the loss of the state license and Medicare and Medicaid funding.52 (Of more
than 9,000 hospitals and other health care organizations reviewed, similar
action was taken in 60 instances last year.) In light of the generally observed
resistance of medical staff to submit to some administrative supervision and
control, the impact of corporate liability and the JCAHO standards on quality
of care is questioned. Judicial determinations of the extent to which
48. Today, these members of the now called Joint Commission on Accreditation of
Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO) are the American College of Physicians, the American
College of Surgeons, and the American Dental Association.
49. See ROSENBLATT ET AL., supra note 17, at 918.
50. See id. (quoting Milton Roemer, Jay Friedman, Doctors in Hospitals (1971)).
51. JOINT COMMISSION FOR THE ACCREDITATION OF HEALTHCARE ORGANIZATIONS, 1999
HOSPITAL ACCREDITATION STANDARDS 105 (JCAHO, 1999).
52. Avram Goldstein, Md. Hospital Facing Loss ofAccreditation, WASH. POST, Nov. 16,
1999, at Al. Apparently, the agency was unaware of the conditions at Shady Grove
Hospital-biopsy samples were lost, and one intensive care patient died after having been left
without supervision in another part of the hospital-until the Washington Post publicized
them in an article on October 17. Five days later, JCAHO conducted a surprise on-site
inspection.
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accreditation standards should also be considered legal standards are needed.
"Seriously pursuing the goals of the corporate liability doctrine and the
industry's own JCAHO standards will be a long-term and complex process,
in which malpractice law has played and will continue to play an important
role, both in its own right, and as a stimulus to other regulatory efforts."53
b. Managed Care Organizations
JCAHO, in accordance with its stated mission "to improve the quality
of care provided to the public through the provision of health care
accreditation and related services that support performance improvement in
health care organizations," also accredits managed care organizations. "It is
a natural progression, as health care has evolved to a network structure, to
evaluate delivery systems to ensure that appropriate attention is directed to
patient care.... Accredited networks demonstrate a commitment to the
highest industry standards; the integration of care and services; a
comprehensive review of their administrative and clinical services; the
protection of member/patients rights; the development and use of outcome
data; and continuous quality improvement., 54 The overall approach is
similar to that for the accreditation of hospitals and involves: fostering an
ethical and mutually respectful relationship between the network and its
members; maximizing the coordination of care; health promotion and disease
prevention; network leadership (relying on the leaders of the governing body,
the chief executive officer and other senior officers, the leaders of the
licensed independent practitioners within the network) to ensure the
provision of quality health care services which meet the needs of the
community; appropriate and qualified staffing to meet members' needs;
information management to support member care and governance; and
improving network performance through improved clinical and governance
processes. One of the JCAHO publications offered to accredited MCOs is
the "Abstracts of Clinical Care Guidelines", selected from peer-review
journals, specialty and government agency reports, and covering prevention
and screening, diagnosis, therapy, new technologies, and patient
management.5 5 This indicates the recognition that a MCO is a provider of
medical services and not just an insurer or corporate entity.
53. See ROSENBLATT ET AL., supra note 17, at 934.
54. JOINT COMMISSION FOR THE ACCREDITATION OF HEALTHCARE ORGANIZATIONS, 1998-
2000 STANDARDS FOR HEALTHCARE NETWORKS 1 (JCAHO, 1998).
55. See id. at 332. Recent subjects included Alzheimer's Disease, HIV-1-protease
inhibitors, and the management of patients with acute myocardial infarction.
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But the major instrument for the accreditation and evaluation of MCOs
is the Health Plan Employer Data and Information Set (HEDIS), first
developed in 1993 by a committee of health plan representatives and
corporate purchasers,56 then released as version 3.0 in January 199757 and
succeeded by HEDIS 2000 in 1999.58 Its purpose is to collect and make
available information to assist both private (employers) and public (such as
the Health Care Financing Administration for Medicare and Medicaid)
purchasers in selecting high-quality plans. Specifications for 63 indicators
addressing quality of clinical performance (such as childhood immunization
rates and breast cancer screening), patient access and satisfaction,
membership and utilization, finance, and health plan management are
provided. 9
By holding plans accountable, competition may raise the quality of
care6 ° since "efficient economic markets require good information. 61 One
major shortcoming of the measures, however, is their reliance on self-
reporting. The phenomenon of "social desirability" is well-established in the
field of social psychology as a tendency among test or survey respondents to
self-report only information they believe is socially acceptable. For managed
care organizations, this may be dubbed "economic desirability", potentially
leading them to misrepresent quality-related information in order to become
more attractive to potential purchasers.62 The questionable reliability of the
data obtained, further weakened by variations of the data acquisition
methodology among reporting health care systems, is recognized in the
literature and has led to calls for outside audits, a costly proposition.63 In
addition, the quality of care measures themselves can also be questioned
56. See GAO, supra note 34.
57. In October 1997, data for more than 300 capitated health care systems, covering over
37 million individuals, were published. The most prominent result obtained was the
considerable variation among plan performance. JOSEPH W. THOMPSON, JAMES BOST, ET AL.,
The NCQA 's Quality Compass: Evaluating Managed Care in the United States, 17 HEALTH
AFFAIRS 153 (Jan./Feb. 1998).
58. NATIONAL COMMITTEE FOR QUALITY ASSURANCE, HEDIS 2000 (NCQA, Washington,
D.C., 1999).
59. See GAO, supra note 34, at 5.
60. See THOMPSON ET AL., supra note 56.
61. William L. Roper & Charles M. Cutler, Health Plan Accountability and Reporting:
Issues and Challenges, 17 HEALTH AFFAIRS 153 (March/Apr. 1998).
62. See THOMPSON ET AL., supra note 56, at 155.
63. See Roper, supra note 60.
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because they may not reflect prevailing medical standards, but instead rely
on statistical "evidence" without taking individual needs or circumstances
into consideration.' This raises serious liability issues.
3. Managed Care Organizations: From Vicarious to Direct Liability
For decades, medical care was provided mostly on a fee-for-service
basis and health insurers processed and paid claims retrospectively. The
Health Maintenance Organization Act was passed in 1973 by President
Nixon to promote managed care organizations (MCOs) as a cost-effective
alternative to the fee-for-service system. After the failed health care reform
efforts of the Clinton Administration, managed care corporations began a
consolidation process which has left the country with a limited number of
managed care giants. Today, 170 million Americans receive their medical
services through some form of managed care, the most prevalent system of
health care delivery.
Inherent in the managed care approach to health care cost containment
is the intertwining of medical and coverage decision-making. Since any
resource allocation has medical consequences, MCO cost control strategies
impact on the standard of care and limit or eliminate physician autonomy.
65
MCOs sell medical services to private (employers) or public (such as HCFA)
buyers, limiting care both on a contractual basis (macro-allocation through
the "plan" and its coverage provisions) to a particular group and on an ad-hoc
basis (micro-allocation through prospective or concurrent "medical
necessity" determinations) to individual patients. Often, specific services
and conditions are excluded from the contract: "elective" surgery, in vitro
fertilization, preexisting conditions, and the so-called "experimental
treatments" such as bone marrow transplants and high dose chemotherapy for
cancer. Of particular relevance on a micro-level is "utilization review", a
system of pre-authorization of treatment or diagnostic procedures. Such
decisions are often based on hypothetical "average case" corporate practice
64. See ROSENBLATT ET AL., supra note 17, at 571-572, citing the HEDIS quality measure
for eye exams for diabetics. Since diabetes is the leading cause of adult blindness and can
lead to a rapid deterioration of eyesight, the American Diabetes Association recommends
annual exams. The HEDIS measure asserts that biannual exams are adequate but that patients
need to determine the appropriate interval themselves.
65. "Doctors already face liability, but often their decisions are forced upon them by an
insurance plan. It is only fair that insurance plans be held to the same accountability." Rep.
Merrill Cook, quoted in: Robert Pear, House Passes Bill to Expand Rights on Medical Care,
WASH. POST, Oct. 8, 1999, at Al. Many German physicians share this view. See
Schmidt-De Caluwe, infra note 305.
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guidelines, frequently applied to an individual patient's symptoms by off-site
clerical staff, using a computerized system.
Additional managed care cost containment measures include financial
incentive programs for physicians to refrain from ordering "unnecessary
referrals and diagnostic tests" which shift some of the financial risks to the
providers. "Capitation" is the payment of a flat fee per patient, independent
of treatment, and excluding reimbursement for the cost of procedures beyond
the preset amount. Through "withholds", the MCO retains some of the
physician's income, which is paid out only if certain limits on referrals,
diagnostic tests, or treatment procedures are not exceeded. Bonus or penalty
programs reward or penalize providers according to utilization rates. All of
these mechanisms have the same effect: they provide incentives to under-
treat in order to lower costs. The considerable number of lawsuits against
MCOs attests to the detrimental impact on patients.66 Only recently have
injured patients or their survivors been increasingly successful in holding
managed care organizations liable for the consequences of their allocation
decisions.
a. The ERISA Preemption For Health Care
For many years, ERISA, the Employee Retirement Benefit Act, was an
effective shield from liability for managed care organizations because of its
preemption of state law provisions regulating health care and insurance
through its Sections 514 and 502(a).67 ERISA was passed by Congress in
66. Many other industrialized nations contain health care expenditures through the national
macro-allocation of health care funds, preserving most of their physicians' autonomy of
medical decision making. Physicians may also participate through their organizations in
setting the standard of care on a regulatory level. For further discussion, see infra sections
II.B.2.A.b and c; and I.B.2.B.a.
67. 29 U.S.C. 1001 seq. §514(a) preempts all state tort law claims against employee benefit
plans "relating to" ERISA plans ("conflict preemption"). The expansive interpretation of the
term "relate to" was limited by the Supreme Court in three separate cases: New York State
Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. Travelers Insurance Co., 514 S.Ct. 1671 (1995);
DeBuono v. New York Commissioner of Health, 117 S.Ct. 1747 (1997); California Division
of Labor Standards Enforcement Division v. Dillingham Construction, 117 S.Ct. 832 (1997).
§514(b), the saving clause, saves from preemption any state law regulating insurance while
§514(c), the deemer clause, exempts all self-insured employee benefit plans from state
insurance regulations (for "insurance bad faith", for example) by deeming them not to be
insurers. §502(a), ERISA's civil enforcement section, only allows actions for benefit recovery
and the clarification of current and future rights under the plan. It is often raised as a defense
by managed care companies as it preempts all alternative state enforcement mechanisms (such
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1974 to insure the nationwide uniform administration of employer-provided
pension plans and to curb pension plan mismanagement and abuses. Its
stated purpose was "to promote the interests of employees and their
beneficiaries in employee benefit plans including ... any plan, fund or
program for the purpose of providing medical, surgical or hospital care or
benefits." From the beginning, all ERISA health care cases have been
plagued with semantic difficulties since the Supreme Court never construed
the terms "plan" and "benefit." Is the benefit the payment for the medical
care, or is the benefit the care itself, the membership in the plan, or the plan
itself? The Court ruled in Travelers, one of the three recent Supreme Court
decisions narrowing the term "relate to", 68 that only those state laws should
be exempted which have an effect on the administration of an ERISA plan.
Unfortunately, "administration" has also not been construed: does it refer to
purely business decisions by corporate management, or is every act on the
part of an employee an "administrative decision?" Increasingly, however,
ERISA §514(a) has lost much of its importance as a hurdle to state law
claims by plaintiffs injured by managed care malpractice.
69
Today, most litigation focuses on §502(a), ERISA's civil enforcement
provision. This section was regularly and successfully raised as a defense by
MCOs to achieve the preemption of state law claims for compensatory and
punitive damages in cases of malpractice resulting from "benefit denial." In
Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux,7° the Supreme Court held that all claims for
"improper processing of benefits" were preempted by §502(a). As a
consequence, state tort claims for the recovery of damages incurred due to
as state tort law claims for malpractice) and authorizes removal to Federal Court ("complete
preemption").
On April 20, 1999, in Unum Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 119 S.Ct. 1380, another landmark
decision weakening the ERISA preemption, the Supreme Court restricted the scope of the
saving clause by ruling that California's "notice prejudice rule" regulates insurance and thus
falls outside of §514(b). The Court specified that not all of the three factors enumerated in
the McCarran-Ferguson Act must be met by a business to be considered an insurance
company but that these factors are merely "checking points or guideposts." Managed care
companies can now be found more easily to be "insurance companies," and plaintiffs have
access to remedies formerly not available.
68. See Travelers Insurance, 514 S.Ct. 1671; see also Dillingham Construction, 117 S.Ct.
832; see also De Buono, 117 S.Ct. 1747 (effect on plan administration).
69. Malpractice claims not preempted under §502(a) and remanded by federal courts may
still have to survive a §514 challenge in state court.
70. 481 U.S. 41 (1987). In the course of three years, Pilot Life reinstated and terminated
Mr. Dedeaux's disability benefits several times.
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prospectively denied medical care ("benefits") were dismissed. The Fifth
Circuit in Corcoran v. United Health Care71 took this approach to its extreme
by ruling that MCOs make medical decisions as part of coverage
determinations and, thus, cannot be held liable for lowering the standard of
care when they "deny benefits" through the "administrative" process of
utilization review. This case underlined the fundamental flaw of the
managed care system: the merger of resource allocation with treatment
decisions.
b. The Quality vs. Quantity of Care Distinction
Absent any Supreme Court construction of the terms plan, plan
administration and benefits, courts have been left to their own devices when
applying the ERISA preemption to managed care malpractice. In 1995, the
Court of Appeals of the Third Circuit in Dukes v. U.S. Healthcare2 in a
groundbreaking analysis distinguished between the quality (standard of
health care) and quantity (benefits or coverage) of care. Mr. Dukes, suffering
from several ailments, visited his primary care physician who referred him
to a hospital which refused to perform the recommended diagnostic test.
Even though the test was conducted one day later at another facility, Mr.
Dukes died within three days. The Court concluded that no claims were
made for refusal of care due to USH's refusal to pay (which would
correspond to "improper claims processing" under Pilot Life and concern the
quantity of care) but that all counts exclusively attacked the inadequate
quality of medical treatment as arranged for by USH. Construing ERISA
§502(a), the Dukes Court emphasized that this section simply does not
address the quality of care and that the legislative history is void of any
federal intent to control health care regulation traditionally left to the states.
Medical decisions are, therefore, not preempted by the Act. "Patients enjoy
the right to be free from medical malpractice regardless of whether or not
their medical care is provided through an ERISA plan."
The Court added, however, that "the difference between the 'utilization
review' and the 'arranging for medical treatment' roles is crucial for the
71. 965 F.2d 1321 (5' Cir. 1992). Ms. Corcoran, during her second high-risk pregnancy,
was refused the physician-requested hospitalization (which had saved her first baby's life) by
a plan utilization review nurse and received only home care instead. While the nurse was not
on duty, the full-term fetus went into distress and died. All the Corcoran's state law claims
including malpractice and wrongful death were held to be "related" to the plaintiffs' ERISA
plan and thus preempted, leaving the couple without a remedy.
72. 57 F3d 350 (3d Cir. June 1995).
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purposes of §502(a) because only in a utilization-review role is an entity in
the position to deny benefits due under an ERISA plan." Therefore, lawsuits
based on state law alleging that the organization itself in its utilization review
role refused to authorize and/or pay for treatment are completely preempted
and only the limited remedies and damages provided under §502(a) apply.
But (malpractice and vicarious liability) state law claims addressing
treatment and negligent medical decisions made by physicians affiliated with
MCOs covered by ERISA fall outside the scope of §502(a) and can be
pursued in state court. The Dukes court also addressed a third, increasingly
important issue-the applicable standard of care. It found that in the case at
bar, there was no agreement to replace the common law standard of care with
a contractual one and declined to express a view whether a managed care
organization may "by contract opt out of state tort law."
Within four years, the above analysis of the ERISA preemption
changed the terrain of managed care liability litigation. A solid consensus
has developed among the districts,73 especially over the past two years, that
properly pleaded medical malpractice and negligence claims against MCOs
attack only the quality of care, not the provision of benefits or the
enforcement of rights under the plan and thus escape preemption.7 4 But even
Dukes did not deliver a definitive resolution: when do managed care
decisions amount to benefit denials, or when are they imposing medical
decisions violating the standard of care?
c. Theories of Liability
Today, many courts agree to call a spade a spade: negligent medical
services arranged for or provided by the managed care industry constitute a
breach of the standard of care. MCOs violate the tort standard by
implementing a contractual standard of managed care based on coverage
exclusions and corporate practice guidelines defining "medical necessity"
criteria. Common strategies are the exclusion of preexisting conditions and
"experimental" treatments, primary care gate-keeper refusal to refer to a
specialist, denial of the appropriate treatment setting (home care instead of
hospitalization, for example) or the appropriate provider (a nurse instead of
a physician), denial or delay of diagnostic and treatment procedures, and
73. Herrera v. Lovelace Health Systems, 35 F. Supp.2d 1327, 1332 (D. N. M. 1999).
74. In most of the unsuccessful cases, the claims language tied the court's hand: actions
were not filed as medical malpractice but as benefit denial and left the court no choice other
than to preempt the claims under §502(a) in accordance with Pilot Life, supra note 70.
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phone diagnosis over an emergency hotline before admission to an
emergency room may be authorized.75
Judges in successful cases focus on what the claims are really
challenging and, often looking beyond the claims language employed,
conduct a functional analysis of Congressional intent when adopting ERISA,
thus favoring "function" over "forn. 7 6 Quality of care cases against MCOs
are based on theories of both vicarious and direct liability. Managed care
organizations are held vicariously liable for provider (hospital or physician)
negligence or malpractice according to agency or apparent (ostensible)
agency principles ("holding providers out" as their agents either through
literature or corporate conduct). They are also held directly liable for making
medical decisions, negligent provider credentialing, negligently designed
policies and procedures, and substandard supervision and management of
treatment and medication. Recent cases have also successfully attacked plan
design and the duties of ERISA fiduciaries.
i. Vicarious Liability
In Howard v. Sasson,7 7 the plaintiffs' baby was born with vascular
malformations in his legs, known to the treating providers. The mother
contacted her pediatrician's office when the child developed a high fever, was
advised to administer Tylenol and give the boy a tepid bath, but not to come
to the office or take him to an emergency room. After additional fruitless
calls to the physician's office, the baby began having convulsions. The
mother was now allowed to bring the boy to the office where he was first
examined by a nurse who then called in the physician. He arranged for an
ambulance but an hour and a half after hospital admission, the child was
dead. The court granted the vicarious liability claims against the MCO and
75. German law requires physicians to examine and diagnose patients in person, and phone
diagnosis is expressly prohibited. See infra note 284.
76. Peter D. Jacobson, Scott D. Pomfret, Form, Function and Managed Care Torts:
Achieving Fairness and Equity in ERISA Jurisprudence. 35 Hous. L. REv. 985 (1998). The
authors argue that a "plain language" approach (a "formal" analysis, as espoused so far by the
Supreme Court) to the ambiguous language of ERISA fails and that a "functional" analysis,
centered on the purpose of the act and legislative intent, is more appropriate since judges
should focus on the functions of health care delivery in the ever-changing environment of
managed care. Id. at 993, 994. "Formal" analysis is also considered the cause of the
remaining inconsistency and unpredictability of case outcomes.
77. Howard v. Sasson, M.D., U.S. Healthcare, et al., No. 95-0068, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
14373 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 3, 1995).
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emphasized that they were only based on substandard quality of care
allegations, not on any refusal to authorize and/or pay for treatment under
utilization review procedures.
For almost five years, a girl-eleven years old initially-was treated
by Kaiser's primary care physicians for recurrent headaches, vomiting and
blood-shot eyes with adult-strength pain medication.78 Only once a school
psychologist concerned with Paige Lancaster's deteriorating performance
intervened with the physicians were an EEG and an MRI conducted. The
tests revealed a tumor mass covering 40% of the child's brain. In spite of
several surgical interventions, the tumor could not be completely removed.
The court held that §514 did not preempt state law medical malpractice
claims against the physicians and the corresponding claims for vicarious
liability against the MCO because they did not sufficiently "relate to"
ERISA's underlying purpose. The same claims were also not preempted
under §502(a) because attacks on the quality of care were held to fall outside
the scope of this provision. Even though the plaintiff alleged that Kaiser's
financial incentive program for physicians providing bonuses for "avoiding
excessive treatments and tests" motivated the provider to refrain from
investigating the cause of the child's symptoms, the court held that such
claims do not convert attacks on the soundness of medical decisions into
claims of "administrative benefit denial" for purposes of an ERISA
preemption.
After the managed care company had denied his discharge to a
rehabilitation hospital following an amputation, Mr. Hoose, cared for at
home and receiving improper wound dressing, required a second amputation,
this time above the knee.79 The court refused to preempt vicarious and direct
liability claims against the MCO for malpractice, inadequate selection,
oversight and supervision of medical personnel, and allowed a claim against
a case manager for "inadequate monitoring" of Mr. Hoose's condition. It
rejected the defendant's invitation to label the case manager's denial to
transfer the patient to a rehabilitation hospital as "utilization review."
Instead, the court stressed that the plaintiff had alleged managed care
negligence for "arranging inadequate treatment" and nowhere referred to
improper care because of a refusal to pay.
78. Lancaster v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, 958 F.Supp. 1137 (E.D. Va. 1997).
79. Hoose v. Jefferson Home Health Care, Inc. No. 97-7568, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1369
(E.D. Pa. Feb. 6, 1998).
2000]
N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
In Crum v. Health Alliance Mid- West,8° the federal court ruled that the
plaintiff's claim for vicarious liability against Health Alliance was based on
the quality of medical care, and that the "faulty medical advice" by the phone
nurses was a medical decision. The decedent, 42 years young, had a family
history of heart disease. When he experienced chest pain and vomiting, his
wife called the plan emergency line several times, beginning at 10.50 p.m.
The nurse on duty, having been made aware of Mr. Crum's family history,
insisted that he was just suffering from gastric problems, should drink milk,
would be fine in the morning and did not require emergency intervention.
Mrs. Crum eventually drove her husband to the hospital ER where he was
pronounced dead of acute myocardial infarction at 11.34 p.m.
ii. Direct Liability
MCOs Make Medical Decisions.8 Courts increasingly put the blame
where it often belongs: with the managed care industry and its service
components making medical decisions. In such instances, a malpractice
claim by the injured plaintiff against an individual provider is no longer the
prerequisite for a successful lawsuit. The only issue in Roessert v. Health
Net,82 as the court saw it, was whether the plaintiffs' direct liability state law
claims alleging medical negligence and infliction of emotional distress by
Health Net, the MCO, were based on purely medical decisions, or whether
they related to benefit determinations. The court decided that the MCO was
giving purely medical advice, unrelated to its administrative role of
coordinating benefits and services under the plan. The court referred to
Dukes and ruled that Health Net's alleged decision to commit Ms. Roessert
to a mental institution was a clear medical decision, analogous to the
hospital's decision in Dukes not to perform a blood test.83 In Moscovitch v.
80. Crum v. Health Alliance Midwest, No. 98-CV-2241, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6469
(C.D. Ill. May 6, 1999).
81. In Germany, where budgets administered by the sickness funds increasingly require
physicians to micro-allocate benefits, some authors feel that liability should rest with the
insurers. See infra note 270. This opinion is shared by American commentators as well.
"Doctors can be sued when they make an incorrect medical decision. So should the insurance
company that, for example, denies essential access to a specialist." Battle Lines on Managed
Care, N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 1998, at A20.
82. Roessert v. Health Net, 929 F.Supp. 343 (N.D. Cal. 1996).
83. See Dukes, 57 F3d 350.
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Danbury Hospital8 4 and Plocica v. NYLCare of Texas,85 both mental health
cases involving suicide, the courts found that the plaintiffs were challenging
the "appropriateness of the medical and psychiatric care decisions by the
MCO." Consistent with Dukes, the claims were held to attack only the
quality of the benefits received.
The Snow v. Burden86 court ruled that the action for the MCO's alleged
failure to timely "approve and authorize diagnostic tests and studies
recommended by the attending physicians" for renal cancer, in spite of the
decedent's extreme symptomatology, was exclusively one of inadequate
medical treatment. Since the plan was directly involved in arranging the
patient's entire substandard medical care (including the control of referrals
to specialists), it was therefore directly liable for the patient's death as a
consequence. The court in Blaine v. Community Health Plan87 called the
absence of a physician for diagnosis and treatment a "unilateral
determination of medical treatment" by the MCO. Furthermore, no MRI or
a CT-scan were conducted to determine the nature and extent of Ms. Blaine's
back condition, and she was not advised against a pregnancy. When she did
become pregnant, a discectomy in an attempt to alleviate some of her chronic
pain was required, and future treatment included the surgical fusion of
vertebrae. The court also made a point highly relevant to all managed care
efforts to lower the standard of care: patients such as Ms. Blaine do not know
that they are being denied appropriate care until they have already suffered
an injury."
Ruling in Nascimento v. Harvard Community Health Care Plan,9 the
court emphasized that the only issue of relevance in this case was whether
the treatment provided (failure to properly diagnose and treat the plaintiff's
84. 25 F.Supp.2d 74 (D. Conn. 1998).
85. 43 F. Supp.2d 658 (N.D. Tex. 1999). This action was brought under the Medicare Act
stipulating preemption provisions similar to ERISA. It was the first case under the new Texas
Senate Bill 386, allowing for claims against MCOs in cases of negligent benefits decisions.
"It is not surprising that the first lawsuit would be a psychiatric case. Psychiatric care has
always been the stepchild in terms of benefits and coverage. The patients have always been
discriminated against, and managed care has continued this trend." Bernard Gerber, quoted
in Michael Jonathan Grinfeld, H.MO. Liability: Legal Barriers Are Finally Breaking Down,
PSYCHIATRIc TIMES (January 1999) at http://www.mhsource.com/pt/p990110.html.
86. Snow v. Burden, No. 99-1874, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6932 (E.D. Pa. May 6,1999).
87. 687 N.Y.S.2d 854 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1998).
88. The court reasoned appropriately that such plaintiffs can not be criticized for failing
to "follow any ERISA mandated process for obtaining the medical treatment."
89. 2 Mass. L. Rptr. 568 (1997).
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breast cancer for three years) was consistent with the applicable standard of
care. The plan had promised all "medically necessary treatment" but went
back on the decision for an autologous bone marrow transplant and provided
chemotherapy instead. The court commented that the term "medically
necessary" does not replace the common law standard of care with a
contractual one. It quoted Dukes at length and concluded that, in spite of the
plaintiff's allegation that the ABMT was withheld by the MCO because of
financial considerations, defendant's motives for lowering the treatment
standard were irrelevant and did not convert this malpractice case into one
of "benefit denial." In Newton v. Tavani,9 ° the plaintiffs direct liability
claims of negligent medical care against U.S. Healthcare were considered
quality of care issues and not preempted under §502(a). Mr. Newton,
deceased, was given a FOBT kit (fecal occult blood test) as a screening
device for colorectal cancer by U.S. Healthcare. He never returned the kit
and the MCO did not follow up nor inform the family physician.
iii. Negligent Policies and Procedures
In Kampmeier v. Sacred Heart Hospital,9 a physician-ordered prenatal
ultrasound was delayed "due to MCO regulations," and the baby was born
with severe injuries. The court upheld all counts of direct liability arising
from "faulty policy in arranging for timely medical treatment" and refused
to characterize the test delay as the "benefit denial" claimed by the
defendant. None of the counts for direct liability in Herrera v. Lovelace92
(failure to enforce adequate rules and policies to ensure quality medical care
and to properly select and retain competent physicians, corporate negligence
for improperly overseeing the treatment of patients, asserted violations of a
state statute setting standards of care in medical facilities, and intentional
infliction of emotional distress) were held preempted by §502(a). The court
ruled that the issues in this case concerned exclusively the quality of medical
services provided but not the "administration" of the H.M.O. plan nor any
benefit-related procedures. Without citing any facts, the court in Moreno v.
Health Partners Plan93 concluded that claims for direct managed care
liability for the negligent creation of a substandard care plan (designing and
delivering a procedure which resulted in injury) were not preempted by
90. 962 F.Supp. 45 (D. N.J. 1997).
91. Kampmeierv. Sacred Heart Hosp., No. CIV.A. 95-7816, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5739
(E.D. Pa. May 1996).
92. 35 F.Supp.2d 1327 (D. N. M. 1999).
93. 4 F. Supp.2d 888 (D. Ariz. 1998).
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§§514 and 502(a), and no "benefit denial" defense was available because
"who paid for the procedure [was] inconsequential" as the claims only
challenged the quality of care.
The court in DeLucia v. St. Luke's Hospital94 refused to preempt the
direct liability claims against Aetna/U.S. Healthcare based on the
"adoption/enforcement of rules, regulations and procedures which
established disincentives to doctors to provide complete and proper medical
care under the circumstances of this case." Keith DeLucia was born two
months premature and diagnosed with respiratory distress. After one month
of hospitalization, he was discharged and his mother was advised by a
physician that her child did not meet Aetna's criterion for discharging a
newborn on a breathing monitor. Keith suffered blue spells on a daily basis,
often accompanied by apnea. He died four months later of SIDS (Sudden
Infant Death Syndrome), most likely due to respiratory arrest.
The plaintiff in Ouellette v. Christ Hospital95 was discharged after
removal of her ovaries, even though suffering from severe pain and fever.
Her MCO's policy limited hospital stays as she was told by the nurse on duty
who never informed a physician of the patient's deteriorating condition. In
one of her direct liability counts, Ms. Ouellette alleged that the MCO
breached its duty by "limiting the hospital stays of its subscribers and
enforcing those limitations." The court agreed and ruled that the plaintiff's
claim was not challenging the quantity of benefits, but the quality of service
received.
In McDonald v. Damian,96 the court upheld direct liability claims for
the failure to adopt and enforce adequate rules and policies to ensure quality
control for medical services, to adequately monitor the implementation of
corporate policies for standards of care, to provide after-care quality
assurance, and to disclose financial incentives and arrangements with
providers and facilities. Left without proper diagnostic and follow-up
procedures, the plaintiff had been belatedly diagnosed with metastasized
melanoma, requiring invasive and intensive cancer treatment. The Kapka v.
Hornstein97 court held that claims of direct liability because of improper
supervision and management of plaintiff's medical and dental treatment by
the MCO were not completely preempted by §502(a) and remanded this
94. DeLucia v. St. Luke's Hosp., No. CIV.A. 98-6446, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8124 (E.D.
Pa. May 1999).
95. 942 F.Supp. 1160 (S.D. Ohio 1996).
96. 56 F. Supp.2d 574 (E.D. Pa. 1999).
97. Kapka v. Hornstein, M.D., No. CIV.A. 97-1261, 1997 WL 381762 (E.D. Pa. June
1997).
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"qualitative" action for malpractice to state court. Following Dukes, the
judge concluded that ERISA was not intended to regulate the quality of
benefits received because health care regulation is a traditional area of state
concern.
d. Outlook
The above representative cases elucidate the increasingly refined
distinction drawn between quality and quantity of care introduced by the
Third Circuit in Dukes in 1995. Ruling in In re: U.S. Healthcare,98 the Court
of Appeals seized the opportunity to further clarify when a managed care
organization arranges for medical treatment (not preempted), and when it
engages in administrative activities unrelated to care. The original action,
Bauman v. U.S. Healthcare,99 arose from a "drive-through" delivery with
tragic consequences: the newborn Michelina died the day after her 24-hour
hospitalization of an undiagnosed infection resulting in meningitis. The
District Court had held that the counts alleging negligent and recklessly
indifferent MCO policies concerning hospital utilization (discouraging
physicians from re-hospitalizing a sick new-born) fell outside of the scope of
§502(a). Furthermore, the Court refused to preempt the count challenging
the 24 hour-limit to hospitalization after delivery, ruling it to be a quality of
care issue. Since this decision went directly to a plan "coverage limitation,"
the court clearly rejected the MCO approach to resource allocation replacing
the common law standard with its own contractual standard. The Court of
Appeals of the Third Circuit affirmed and thus addressed the applicable
standard of care issue it had sidelined in Dukes.
The Third Circuit, however, reversed one holding by the lower court.
The plaintiffs had charged U.S. Healthcare with negligence for the denial of
a home visit requested when their daughter fell ill. This service was covered
under the plaintiffs' policy. The District Court had dismissed the claim,
applying the "administrative benefit denial" construction of the ERISA
preemption, and relying on the considerable body of case law preempting
under §502 state law claims for damages by patients injured by the denial of
covered services. The Court of Appeals concluded that this claim only
attacked the adequacy of care the child had received by the MCO acting "in
its capacity as medical provider.... If U.S. Healthcare failed to meet the
standard of care required of health care providers by failing to arrange for a
pediatric nurse in a timely manner, [this count] sets forth an ordinary state-
98. 193 F.3d 151 (3rd Cir. 1999).
99. 1 F.Supp.2d 420 (D. N.J. 1998).
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law tort claim for medical malpractice." This case will further change the
terrain of managed care malpractice litigation because injured patients may
now recover for damages resulting from the denial of covered treatment and
negligent plan design. The Supreme Court denied certiorari on June 19,
2000.100
But without Supreme Court construction of the key terms of the
preemption provisions, every ERISA case equals a semantic balancing act.
Commentators have observed that there is some "confusion as to whether the
tautological ERISA [plan] definition ("any plan, fund, or program established
or maintained by an employer for the purpose of providing its participants
and beneficiaries, through the purchase of insurance or otherwise medical,
surgical, or hospital care or benefits") encompasses H.M.O.s and other
managed care organizations."' 01 In Washington Physicians Service v.
Gregoire,"°2 the court distinguished between the health insurance carrier, the
MCO, offering the "health plan" which was held subject to the state
"Alternative Provider Act" regulating insurance, and the "benefit plan"
offered by the employer, which was not. According to Washington State
insurance law, "A 'health plan' is defined as any, policy, contract, or
agreement offered by the health carrier to provide, arrange, reimburse, or pay
for health care service."' 3 Therefore, the state law was not preempted under
the ERISA saving clause and the MCO was treated like an insurer.
Furthermore, if managed care organizations were ruled to be health
care "products" or "service providers" to employers independent of the
ERISA plan (the contract between the employer and the MCO), they could
be held directly liable for the negligent provision of medical services and for
insurance bad faith. Any benefits or medical decisions, impacting on the
quality of care, made by MCOs or any of their components as health care
suppliers to an ERISA plan, would then be subject to the same relevant state
laws and standards applicable to other "suppliers" of medical services as
well. The court in American Drug Stores v. Harvard Pilgrim Health Care
10 4
ruled that a state law regulating vendors (drug store chains, in this instance)
offering a service to an ERISA plan was not preempted by the act. The court
reasoned that such a sweeping interpretation of the federal preemption could
easily be read to cover state laws regulating the quality of health care which
100. U.S. Healthcare Inc. v. Bauman, 193 F.3d 151 (3d Cir. 1999), cert. denied, No. 99-
1383, 68 U.S.L.W. 3552 (U.S. June 19, 2000).
101. See P. D. Jacobson & S.D. Pomfret, supra note 76.
102. 147 F.3d 1039 (9th Cir. 1998).
103. Alternative Provider Act. RCW 48.43.005(9).
104. 973 F.Supp. 60 (D. Mass. Aug. 1997).
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the Supreme Court has held to be a "traditional area of state concern," and
which should be left to the states. As one forward-looking judge recently
observed in Nealy v. U.S.Healthcare0 5 "We leave for another day the issue
whether [the] U.S. Healthcare [H.M.O.] was even a'plan' within the meaning
of the ERISA preemption provision. The Secretary of Labor... notes that the
U.S. Healthcare H.M.O at issue here is not an ERISA plan at all, but rather
a service provider to the ERISA plan established by the [employer]."
Currently, MCOs also continue to be shielded from liability for
treatment denied through negligent plan "administration," another term left
unconstrued by the Supreme Court but often applied to utilization review
procedures such as treatment preauthorization. Doris Huss, the mother of a
clinically depressed and suicidal sixteen-year old, was covered by Green
Spring, a mental health services administrator under contract with a managed
care company. 10 6 On December 16, 1996, Ms. Huss called for a psychiatric
referral but was turned down as "unknown" to the company. Three days
later, she requested an emergency referral which was refused for the same
reason. Her son committed suicide on December 23, a few hours before
Green Spring finally "found" the proper file and called with an appointment.
Ms. Huss was left without any remedy.
All of the central issues still clouding managed care liability could
have been resolved had the Supreme Court taken a broad approach in
Pegram v. Herdrich,1 °7 argued on February 23, 2000. Ms. Herdrich was
diagnosed with a sizeable inflamed abdominal mass, but an ultra-sound was
delayed by a total of fourteen days so that she could be examined at an in-
network facility 50 miles away. Her appendix ruptured, resulting in
peritonitis, a life-threatening condition. A jury awarded $35,000 for
malpractice but the trial court dismissed her breach of fiduciary duty claim
under §502(a)(3) against the managed care organization. The Seventh
Circuit reversed in Herdrich v. Pegram,°8 basing its ruling on the ERISA
provision that a "plan fiduciary shall discharge his duties with respect to a
plan solely in the interests of the participants and beneficiaries." Since the
managed care plan was owned and managed by the treating physicians, they
were considered the plan fiduciaries. The Court assumed that the physicians
were acting in their own financial interests when making medical decisions
because their year-end bonuses depended on delaying or denying care, a
105. 93 N.Y.2d 209 (1999).
106. Huss v. Green Spring, No. 98-6055, 1999 WL 2225885 (E.D. Pa.) In mental health,
many of the dead patients are children.
107. 120 S. Ct. 2143 (June 12, 2000).
108. 154 F.3d 362 (7th Cir. 1998).
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violation of their fiduciary duties. Citing numerous sources from the
literature and the media, the Court concluded that "market forces are
insufficient to cure the deleterious effects of managed care on the health
industry."
The dissent, however, felt that market forces should be trusted and that
the majority ruling challenging financial incentives as one of the managed
care cost containment features would jeopardize the cost-saving goals of
managed care. A petition for a rehearing en banc1°9 was denied but the
dissent delivered an unusual second opinion: if the above plan design
including financial incentives for providers to contain cost was held to
violate ERISA, all of managed care, the health care delivery system for a
majority of Americans, would be at risk. Since MCOs are already regulated
by federal law, courts should not improperly interpret ERISA and subject
them to state regulation.
During oral argument, the Supreme Court focused mostly on the issue
of fiduciary duty and financial incentives for physicians1 ' as elements of
managed care plan design, presaging a narrow ruling sidestepping the
construction of terms turning any ERISA case into a semantic minefield.
Counsel for respondent argued that financial gains from withholding care
unduly influence physician/owners' clinical judgment, equaling a breach of
fiduciary duty under ERISA. Counsel for petitioner expounded on much of
the dissent's reasoning, arguing for cost containment measures as integral
elements of managed care plan structure (not preempted), but not of plan
administration, and whose implementation would not violate fiduciary duty.
Interestingly, petitioners also considered medical decisions as separate from
plan administration and subject to state law, thus arguing against the ERISA
preemption of state regulation of health care. Petitioners cited recent
109. Herdrich v. Pegram, 170 F.3d 683 (7 ' Cir. 1998), rehearing denied.
110. Courts are split whether the non-disclosure to patients of physician financial
incentives to limit care violates H.M.O. fiduciary duty under ERISA. Shea v. Esensten, 107
F.3d 625 (8' Cir. 1997) cert. denied, 118 S.Ct. 297 (1997) (non-disclosure violates fiduciary
duty); Ehlmann v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, WL No. 98-11020 (5th Cir. 2000),petition
for cert. filed, 68 U.S.L.W. 3726 (May 15, 2000) (No. 99-1828); Weiss v. Cigna Health Care
Inc., 972 F.Supp. 748 (S.D. N.Y. 1997) (rejecting fiduciary duty under ERISA to disclose
financial incentives). Interestingly, Judge Flaum in his dissent in Herdrich v. Pegram, 154
F.3d 362 (7' Cir. 1998), argued for the fiduciary duty to disclose.
20001
N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
Supreme Court rulings1 1' as well as Dukes and progeny narrowing the scope
of the ERISA preemption.
In its judgment of June 12, 2000,112 the Court expanded the reasoning
of the Court of Appeal's dissent, arguing that Congress had intended
H.M.O.s from their inception to be profit-making, that financial incentives
were an indispensable method of cost containment to achieve the "rationing"
of health care, and that to decide otherwise would possibly "portend the end"
of managed care, nonprofit H.M.O.s included.113 Furthermore, since
treatment and eligibility (coverage) decisions were held "inseparably mixed,"
neither H.M.O.s acting through their physicians nor the latter could be
considered ERISA fiduciaries."4 To impose such a fiduciary duty would
convert every claim of breach of fiduciary duty by an H.M.O. physician
making a "mixed decision" into a claim for malpractice, "and the fiduciary
standard would be nothing but the malpractice standard traditionally
applied."' 15 The Supreme Court thus chose not to "broaden" the reach of
federal law by subjecting mixed eligibility decisions to ERISA preemption
and, in the perceived absence of a "clear manifestation of congressional
purpose" to the contrary, preserved the traditional state law regulation of
health care and state court jurisdiction over malpractice claims by injured
MCO patients. 116 Footnote eight (at p.2 154) refers to the potential fiduciary
duty of MCOs to disclose "characteristics of the plan and of those who
provide services to the plan, if that information affects beneficiaries' material
interests," in particular plan aspects subscribers have no control over. '17 But,
as the Court added, the case before it did not actually address this issue, and
since the petition for certiorari in Ehlmann"8 has been withdrawn, the
outcome of future cases claiming a fiduciary duty to disclose remains
uncertain.
111. New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. Travelers Insurance Co.,
514 S.Ct. 1671 (1995); DeBuono v. New York Commissioner of Health, 117 S.Ct. 1747
(1997); California Division of Labor Standards Enforcement Division v. Dillingham
Construction, 117 S.Ct. 832 (1997).
112. See supra note 107.




117. See id. at 2154 &n.11.
118. See supra note 112.
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On June 19, 2000, shortly after the Pegram judgment was handed
down, the Supreme Court vacated the Pennsylvania Supreme Court ruling in
Pappas v. Asbel.119 Basile Pappas was admitted as a neurological emergency
due to an epidural abscess but the emergency room physician concluded that
more adequate treatment could be provided at a university hospital. U.S.
Healthcare's transfer denial delayed the patient's transportation to an
appropriate facility by four-and-a-half hours. As a consequence, Mr. Pappas
became permanently paraplegic. His claims against the attending physicians
were settled but the Pennsylvania Supreme Court ruled that the claims by one
of the physician's liability insurers against the MCO were not preempted by
ERISA §514. This ruling was vacated by the Supreme Court and remanded
for further consideration to the Pennsylvania high court in light of Pegram
v. Herdrich. 20 Pappas turned on a "mixed eligibility and treatment decision"
by a utilization review physician at U.S. Healthcare not engaged in the
practice of medicine, and who refused to speak to the attending ER physician
despite repeated entreaties, and after having been made aware that Mr.
Pappas' condition could worsen or become permanent. The remand may
indicate that, for the time being, the Supreme Court is delegating to a lower
court the difficult task of beginning to square the preempted "pure
eligibility," coverage, and utilization review decisions with the application
of state law to negligence claims under the Dukes quality vs. quantity
distinction.
Are emergency treatment delays as in Pappas, occasioned by someone
acting in an "administrative" capacity, pure coverage decisions protected by
the legal vacuum of the ERISA preemption? Are they mixed eligibility
decision because they concern the delay or denial of needed treatment and
hence subject to state malpractice law under Pegram? Are they quality of
health care decisions regulated by the state, thus implicating direct MCO
liability for negligent treatment decisions? And is it of relevance whether
such decisions are made by physicians or ancillary, possibly non-medical
staff. By denying certiorari in Bauman, with its attack on plan design and
the extension of quality of care standards to covered treatment denials
hitherto shielded by ERISA §502, by vacating the holding in Pappas that
ERISA does not preempt the application of state law to managed care
malpractice, and by fashioning the term "mixed eligibility decisions" subject
to state malpractice law, the Supreme Court has amplified the legal enigmas
119. 724 A.2d 889 (Pa. 1998), rehearing denied (Feb. 12, 1999).
120. U.S. Healthcare Sys. of Pa., Inc. v. Pennsy Ivania Hosp. Ins. Co., 120 S.Ct. 2686
(2000).
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of the American system of health care delivery-while resoundingly ratifying
its domination by private industry.
4. The Managed Care Reform Debate
a. Federal Managed Care Legislation
As managed care organizations continue to control the health care
system and the number of enrollees increases, so do the complaints by both
providers and beneficiaries. On October 7, 1999, the House of
Representatives passed the Bipartisan Managed Care Improvement Act (H.R.
2990) by a majority of 275 votes to 151, including 68 Republicans who had
defected to support the Democratic bill. 21 It guarantees access to and
coverage of emergency room treatment whenever a "prudent lay person"
would consider it necessary, prompt access to specialists, prompt access to
obstetrical and gynecological care as well as to pediatric care without
primary care gate-keeping. It also creates internal and external review
procedures for benefit denials, eliminates "gag clauses" prohibiting providers
from advising patients of treatments not covered by their plan, and grants
patients the right to sue MCOs and other health plans by amending ERISA
§514.
See. 302. ERISA PREEMPTION NOT TO APPLY
TO CERTAIN ACTIONS INVOLVING HEALTH
INSURANCE POLICYHOLDERS.
122
IN GENERAL. Section 514 of the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974 (29 U.S.C. 1144) is amended
by adding at the end the following subsection:
"(c) PREEMPTION NOT TO APPLY TO CERTAIN
ACTIONS ARISING OUT OF PROVISION OF HEALTH
BENEFITS.
"(1) NONPREEMPTION OF CERTAIN CAUSES OF
ACTION.
121. Robert Pear, House Passes Bill to Expand Rights on Medical Care, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
8, 1999, at Al.
122. H.R. 2723, 106' Congress, at 59 (introduced Aug. 5, 1999) (the "Norwood" bill).
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"(A) IN GENERAL. Except as provided in this subsection,
nothing in this title shall be construed to invalidate, impair,
or supersede any cause of action by a participant of
beneficiary (or the estate of the beneficiary) under State law
to recover damages resulting from personal injury or for
wrongful death against any person -
"(i) in connection with the provision of insurance,
administrative services, or medical services by such
person to or for a group health plan as defined in
section 733, or
"(ii) that arises out of the arrangement by
such person for the provision of such
insurance, administrative services, or
medical services by other persons."
With one stroke of the magic wand, this section would preclude any
future damage by a badly written law 12 3 which has wreaked havoc on
American health care for 25 years. It also would eliminate the virtual
deregulation of employee benefit health plans by subjecting all medical,
administrative and insurance services to state regulation. Members or their
survivors could sue for malpractice 24 under state tort law, claiming
compensatory and punitive damages.
Alas, one day before its adoption, another health care bill creating tax
breaks for medical savings accounts 125 and individuals purchasing health
insurance independent of employment was yoked to the Bipartisan Managed
Care Act by the Republicans in order to hobble the Act's progress. Intended
to help those without any medical insurance, it would have a price tag of
more than $47 billion over ten years while the above bill would cost $7
billion over five years. In addition, on November 3, Republican leaders in
the House appointed to the conference committee ten Republican members
who had voted against H.R. 2990, one who had voted for it, and one who had
been absent. Members of the House, in an uproar, called this maneuver
123. As one Supreme Court Justice put it, "The ERISA preemption provisions are perhaps
not a model of legislative drafting." Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S.
724, at 739 (1987).
124. The section of H.R. 2990 defines "personal injury" as physical injury and "including
an injury arising out of the treatment (or failure to treat) a mental illness or disease."
125. A Managed Care Debate. WASH. POST, July 12, 1999. Medical savings accounts are
criticized as favoring healthier, wealthier individuals who can opt out of the insurance pool,
leaving behind the sick and less well-off.
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unprecedented and stacking the deck. 126 The Senate conferees consisted
exclusively of a majority of Republicans (and a minority of Democrats
favoring the House bill) who had voted for the limited Senate bill (S. 1344)
in July which applied to no more than 48 million individuals insured by
government plans (the House bill covered 161 million insureds across the
board), regulated few MCOs, and rejected any attempt at allowing patients
to bring legal action in state court. In early December, after "frantic"
lobbying, the "health industry saw its wish list made into law" when the
budget bill, "packed with provisions sought by lobbyists for drug companies,
hospitals, H.M.O.s and nursing homes" was passed and signed by the
president.1 27 (Even the Medicare law had been tinkered with, raising
payments to managed care organizations.) Democrats complained that "this
is no way to run a Congress," 128 and none of this boded well for the House
Bipartisan Managed Care Improvement Act to be taken up in conference at
the beginning of 2000.
But on March 2, after the first meeting of the conference committee,
chaired by a Republican, both camps seemed to be closer than expected.
Perhaps spurred by patients' rights "becoming hotter as this fall's elections
approach," Republicans expressed a new willingness to consider holding
MCOs liable in state courts for injuries due to the delay or denial of care.
Both House and Senate bills would introduce independent review procedures
for benefit denials. Republicans in the Senate, by limiting the original scope
of their bill, did not want to "usurp the states' authority to regulate health
insurance [since] in general, states have done a good job of regulating.'
' 29
126. David Rosenbaum, Not Quite Business as Usual in House on Managed Care., N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 4, 1999, at Al.
127. A recent attempt by the Secretary of Health and Human Services to cut Medicare
payments for blood glucose strips for diabetics was thwarted, eliminating the Secretary's
authority and subjecting her decisions to congressional review. The new Medicare law also
obliges the Secretary to raise payments to MCOs. See Robert Pear, supra note 121. The
budget bill, passed at the same time as the Bipartisan Act and already signed by the president,
earmarked funds for numerous specific medical projects and institutions in the districts of
influential members of Congress. See Robert Pear, Health Industry Sees Wish List Made Into
Law, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 1999, at Al.
128. See id.
129. See Robert Pear, Negotiations Begin on a Health Care Bill, N.Y. TIMES, March 3,
2000, at Al7. Quoting Senator Don Nickles, chairman of the conference committee, stating,
"My objective is to complete this conference this month and have a bill passed by both houses
of Congress by Easter. We have a much better chance of passing good legislation that's not
so partisan, not so political, if we work sooner rather than later."
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Unfortunately, this seemingly developing rapprochement quickly ran
aground, weighted down by disputes over how many Americans should
benefit from new federal standards, 3' the details of a potential appeals
process in case of MCO benefit denial, and whether patients should be able
to sue MCOs under federal law for injuries resulting from treatment delay or
denial." ' President Clinton invited ten members of Congress to the White
House to impress upon them his preference for the House bill 32 but
congressional negotiations stalled over the issues of legal liability133 and the
"fine print" of the appeals process. 34 Finally, the Senate adopted a new
Republican bill, granting patients a limited right to sue, which was rejected
by the Democrats as a "total sham" since it offered too little to too few
people. Democrats then submitted their own proposal for patient protection,
covering all insured individuals, which was quickly defeated by the
Republican majority.'35 With both parties accusing each other of "shunning
the compromises" needed to make progress in the legislative arena,' 36
prospects for any type of federal managed care legislation before the
elections are dim. Since the Supreme Court in Pegram called upon and
deferred to a stalemated Congress, patients continue to depend for protection
from managed care abuse on lower courts and the states.
130. See Robert Pear, Compromise Is Offered to Break Deadlock over Patients'Rights,
N.Y. TIMES, March 23, 2000, at A18.
131. See Robert Pear, House and Senate Agree On Patients' Rights Plan, N.Y. TIMES,
April 15, 2000, at A7.
132. See Robert Pear, Clinton Sets Meeting to Spur Progress on Patients' Rights, N.Y.
TIMES, May 8, 2000, at A21.
133. See Robert Pear, Negotiators Stall on Patients' Rights Bill, N.Y. TIMES, May 26,
2000, at A15.
134. The Managed Care Deadlock, Editorial, WASH. POST, June 15, 2000, at A32.
135. See Helen Dewar, Senate Passes Patients'Rights Bill, WASH. POST, June 30, 2000,
at A4.
136. See Helen Dewar, In Congress, It's Politics Over Progress, WASH. POST, May 6,
2000, at A12.
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b. State Regulation of Managed Care
The federal H.M.O. Act of 1973137 mandates standards for roughly
those two-thirds of managed care plans which are federally qualified.'38 The
remainder is not subject to federal regulation, and setting standards for such
plans through licensing laws, for example, is left to the states. In the absence
of comprehensive federal legislation, states have also passed statutes
mandating minimum benefits and prohibiting certain managed care practices.
Today, thirty-four states require direct access to ob/gyn services without
primary care gate keeping; thirty-seven states mandate reimbursement for ER
services and thirty-six apply the prudent lay person standard; fourty-two
states mandate inpatient care after childbirth, nineteen after a mastectomy;
fourty-eight states prohibit gag clauses, disallowing physicians to inform
their patients of alternative (potentially more effective but more costly)
procedures not covered under the plan; and twenty-five states ban the use of
financial incentives to providers to lower utilization rates.
139
But the most contentious issue has been MCO liability for the quality,
denial, or delay of medical services rendered. Only three states so far have
adopted laws incorporating the liability provisions which to date have
doomed comprehensive federal managed care legislation. The remaining
states leave managed care malpractice determinations to the courts, as
discussed above. The first state to enact legislation allowing beneficiaries to
sue MCOs for malpractice was Texas in 1997.40 The act imposes "the duty
of ordinary care when making health care treatment decisions on employees,
agents, ostensible agents or representatives acting on its behalf, and over
whom it has the right to exercise influence or control., 141 An MCO is
defined as "any entity which delivers, administers, or assumes risk for health
care services with systems or techniques to control and influence
accessibility, quality, utilization, or costs but does not include an
employer."' 142 The law thus applies to insurance companies as well. It
instituted an appeals procedure for adverse benefit determinations but
exempts beneficiaries who had already been harmed by an MCO and those
for whom the review would not be beneficial. Needless to say, large
137. See The Health Maintenance Organization Act of 1973, 42 U.S.C.A. §300 et seq.
138. See ROSENBLATT ET AL., supra note 17, at 631.
139. PANEL PUBLISHERS, 2000 STATE GUIDE To MANAGED CARE LAW (Aspen Publishers,
New York, 2000) [hereinafter 2000 STATE GUIDE].
140. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 88. 002 (Vernon 2000).
141. See 2000 STATE GUIDE, supra note 139, at 5-30, 31.
142. See id.
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managed care corporations almost immediately challenged the act as
preempted by ERISA.143  The court, however, struck down the appeals
procedure while preserving the patients' right to sue whenever claims are
attacking the quality of care, not benefit determinations.
On June 20, 2000, the Fifth Circuit saved the Texas law from ERISA
preemption,144 allowing patients to sue their MCO vicariously for negligence
by the treating physician. But it refused to read the act as encompassing
claims based on the denial of treatment as not covered, considering coverage
disputes specifically excluded and referring to ERISA §502 as the proper
federally mandated enforcement mechanism for such claims. Any external
review or appeals procedure for adverse benefit determinations was held
preempted for the same reason.1 45  Provisions prohibiting MCOs from
deselecting physicians for advocating medically necessary treatments, and
indemnification clauses in provider contracts holding the MCO harmless for
its own acts were held to fall outside the scope of ERISA. 146 Many states
may have been waiting for the outcome of this appeal to be better able to
avoid ERISA problems when formulating their own managed care statutes.
"If the Texas statute survives, 'there will be a bandwagon effect."' 147 Since
the law was passed two years ago, few actions have been filed, and the dire
predictions of the managed care industry that premiums would rise, triggered
by an avalanche of law suits, have not come true. 148
Georgia, the second state adopting a managed care liability law 149 in
July 1999, mandates ordinary diligence and benefit administration in
accordance with health care provider standards. Injuries due to negligence
are considered torts. California followed suit on September 28, when the
143. See Corporate Health Insurance Inc.; Aetna v. The Texas Department of Insurance,
12 F.Supp. 597 (S.D.Tex. 1998).
144. See Corporate Health Ins., Inc.; Aetna v. The Texas Department of Insurance, 2000
WL 792345 (5t' Cir. Tex. June 2000).
145. See id. This decision does not serve to elucidate the meaning of the Supreme Court's
"mixed eligibility decisions" as created in the Pegram ruling, and seems to afford the
managed care industry an easy retreat behind the intractable overlap between treatment and
coverage determinations.
146. Since they do not "mandate the structure or administration of an ERISA plan", these
clauses were held not preempted under ERISA §514.
147. See Michael Higgins, Second Opinion on H.M.O.s, 85 A. B. A. J. 60, 65 (1999).
148. See Amy Goldstein, Patients 'Rights' Case Study: So Far, Benign; In Texas, Ability
to Sue HMOs Has Prompted Little Litigation, WASH. POST, Sept. 28, 1999, at Al.
149. See 2000 STATE GUIDE, supra note 141, at 5-39 (Amendment to Official Code of Ga.
Relating to general provisions regarding torts, Ch. 1, Title 51, Sec. 1, 1999 Ga. Laws 281.
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governor signed Senate Bill No. 21 granting managed care patients numerous
new rights and allowing claims for compensatory and punitive damages when
the duty of ordinary care has been breached. 50 The Georgia law has not yet
been challenged in court, and the California acts attempt to avoid potential
ERISA preemption by basing the right to sue on attacks on the quality of
care. 5 ' "The enactment of [these] new health care reforms shows that state
leaders are well ahead of Congress in addressing the need for managed care
regulation .... [But] "Americans elsewhere need Congress to enact basic
protections to insure that patients [can] get the care they need."'
' 52
c. Physicians Unite!
By May 1999, more than 35,000 of the 700,000 physicians in the
United States had become union members. 53 Labor experts expect this
number to rise by 15% each year, and more than half a dozen unions are
conducting organizing campaigns. Physicians are growing "angrier over
managed care," 154 curtailing their autonomy to make independent clinical
decisions and exerting financial pressures, often with the purpose of lowering
the standard of care. "Medicine has gone from a mom-and-pop operation to
corporatization, which has left the provider, the doctor, out of medical
decision-making."'' 55 With increasing numbers of patients covered by
managed care plans, physicians are often told by MCOs to "take it or leave
it." Alone, they feel "they don't have a say."'' 56 Many of the recently
unionized doctors are employed by hospitals, for example. However,
physicians in private practice under contract with MCOs (roughly 90 %) have
joined their ranks, often pushing the unions to negotiate with MCOs for large
groups of providers. "The way medicine is going right now and the way
patients are being treated by managed care is just terrible, and someone has
150. Managed Health Care Insurance Accountability Act of 1999, Ch. 536, Sec. 2, 1999
Cal. Adv. Legis. Serv. 536 (Deering).
151. Health Care Reforms in California, WASH. POST, Oct. 1, 1999, at A24.
152. See id.
153. See Steven Greenhouse, Board Denies Doctor's Bid to Unionize at H.M.O, N. Y.
TIMES, May 25, 1999, at B8.
154. See Steven Greenhouse, Angered by H.M. O. 's Treatment, More Doctors Are Joining
Unions, N.Y. TIMES Feb. 4,1999, at Al.
155. See id. (quoting Barry Liebowitz, president of the Doctors Council, a union
representing 3,400 members).
156. Ginger Thompson, Feeling the Push of Managed Care: In Syracuse, Doctors and
Patients Adjust as H.M.O.s Start to Take Hold, WASH. POST, Feb. 12, 1999, at A23.
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to stand up for proper health care." Physicians' unions ... "primarily [serve]
to get the message out that we have to improve health care." '157 In June 1999,
the American Medical Association voted to form a national negotiating
organization, Physicians for Responsible Negotiation, in order to give
physicians "the leverage they now lack to guarantee that patient care is not
compromised or neglected for the sake of profits" ' when negotiating with
managed care plans and insurers. It began its activities in November 1999.
However, the AMA has ruled out strikes, and many physicians consider the
withholding of essential services violations of the Hippocratic oath. German
physicians, in spite of the rhetoric, have not resorted to strikes, contrary to
their French colleagues repeatedly protesting working conditions and
additional demands on the exercise of their profession. However, union
executives-and certainly some physicians as well-feel that it is rather the
working conditions created by MCOs which force physicians to violate their
oath by denying procedures and preventing them from providing the standard
of care they consider appropriate.'59 Psychologists are joining as well. The
New York State Psychological Association is affiliating with the American
Federation of Teachers because, as its president commented, "We want to
maintain professionalism and patients' rights against the inroads of managed
care."
160
Diminishing the power of managed care would restore to physicians
some of their former influence on the provision of medical services. Another
way to regain control has been the creation of Independent Practice
Associations, strengthening physicians' bargaining power while not
restricting them individually to a collectively negotiated agreement they may
disagree with. As one physician commented, "We don't need a middleman
to manage health care. We are smart enough to do it ourselves.'' Managed
care organizations are fighting back by claiming that many of the salaried
physicians voting on unionization are supervisors and, thus, not entitled to
157. See Greenhouse, supra note 154 (quoting Brian J. Moore, Angered by H.M.O. 's
Treatment, More Doctors Are Joining Unions, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 1999, at Al.) For
eloquent examples of managed care malpractice, see supra section II.A.3.
158. See Fitzhugh Mullan, I Joined Once, Now I'm Not So Sure, WASH. POST, July 18,
1999, at B3.
159. See Greenhouse, supra note 154.
160. Joe Volz, Angered by Managed Care, Practitioners Look to Unions. 30(8) THE
AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION MONITOR 1 (Sept. 1999) (quoting Marianne
Jackson, President, New York State Psychological Association).
161. See Thompson, supra note 156.
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join (as at Lincoln Hospital in the Bronx in October 1998)162 or by claiming
that physicians are independent contractors. On May 24, 1999, the National
Labor Relations Board's regional office in Philadelphia rejected the attempt
of 500 physicians in New Jersey to form a union.'6 3 The physicians had
argued that the Amerihealth Corporation of New Jersey, an H.M.O., exerted
so much control over the details of their work that they should be considered
employees and allowed to unionize. The NLRB rejected this argument and
found that the doctors in question were independent contractors, hence,
forming a union would violate antitrust principles.
Antitrust law, together with the deregulation of employer-provided
health insurance and, therefore, of the quality of medical care under ERISA,
has been the driving force behind the transformation of American health
care. 6 4 Over the past years, medicine, increasingly controlled by large
corporations and turned into an industry, has been subjected to unfettered
market forces. Antitrust law supports this development by favoring the
vertical integration of providers in managed care corporations over the
horizontal integration of independent suppliers of medical services.
Physicians traditionally operated small businesses and acted together to have
some influence on fees and the practice of medicine. Antitrust law, however,
mainly seeks to preserve price competition and hence prohibits any such
horizontal arrangements. The Supreme Court inArizona v. Maricopa County
Medical Society165 applied the full force of the Sherman Act to physicians,
focusing exclusively on "horizontal price setting." As the chairman of the
Federal Trade Commission opined in July 1999, "The decision of the
American Medical Association to endorse creation of a bargaining unit that
will allow doctors in the future to bargain collectively with H.M.O.s is the
wrong answer" [to the] "serious problem of H.M.O. interjection into every
detail of medical practice.' 66  Instead, he supported the adoption by
Congress of a strong Patient Bill of Rights in order to return to doctors
control over their professional lives without "giving them a license to do little
more than increase their incomes by engaging in price fixing." In keeping
with this attitude, the Justice Department in August 1998 charged Delaware
orthopedic surgeons with an "illegal boycott and conspiring to raise health
care prices" after they left Blue Cross/Blue Shield and joined a union,
protesting reduced reimbursements. However, its executive director
162. See Greenhouse, supra note 153.
163. See Greenhouse, supra note 154.
164. See ROSENBLATT ET AL., supra note 17, at 647, 662.
165. 457 U.S. 332 (1982).
166. See Robert Pitofsky, Doctors Unite? WASH. POST, July 18, 1999, at B7.
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observed, "Here you have an antitrust law that was passed to control the
Rockefellers and Camegies, but is being used against doctors trying to hold
on to their practices."
'1 67
Doctors in private practice have appealed to Congress to pass an
exemption to antitrust law, 168 granting them the same rights as truck driving
entrepreneurs owning their vehicles while allowed to entrust their union with
bargaining for working conditions and salaries. In October 1999, the
Republican Speaker of the House postponed "indefinitely" a committee vote
on H.R. 1304 (Quality Health Care Act), thus temporarily preventing the full
House from debating the proposed antitrust exemption for physicians.
169
After a change of heart, however, the House, by a vote of 276 to 136 on June
29, 2000, finally approved the bill, sponsored by a Republican member from
California and supported by the American Medical Association. 17 So far, no
senator has introduced similar legislation in the Senate, and the leader of the
Republican majority has vowed to oppose any attempts: "I don't think we
need more labor unions in America., 171 Both the Federal Trade Commission
and the antitrust division of the Department of Justice continue to object to
any bill which would permit physicians to negotiate collectively with insurers
over working conditions and payment. Both have filed cases against
physicians accusing them of "conspiring" to thwart the cost containment
measures of MCOs and "engaging in price fixing."'
172
However, there is another aspect to blindly applying the antitrust
provisions to the medical profession. Physicians, similar to other
"independent competing entrepreneurs," self-regulate their profession
through a code of ethics issued by their associations. The indiscriminate
enforcement of antitrust principles destroys or diminishes these efforts to
167. See Greenhouse, supra note 153 (quoting Jack Seddon, Executive Director of the
Federation of Physicians and Dentists).
168. See id.
169. Hot Doc Topic: Unions, Liability, 5(1) ON MANAGED CARE 2, (Jan. 2000).
170. See Robert Pear, After Doctor's Antitrust Triumph, Lott Puts Up Roadblock in Senate.
N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 2000, at Al. (The bill is also opposed by nurses, nurse practitioners and
midwives who fear a diminished role if doctors negotiated with insurers.)
171. Matthew Vita, House Approves AMA-Backed Bill, WASH. POST, June 30, 2000.
172. See Robert Pear, supra note 170. Hence, both the administration and the Senate
oppose the right of physicians to exercise some control over their profession through
appropriate representation, a right German physicians have had since 1913. Infra section
B.2.A.a.
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protect the public. 173 Assume, for example, that a physician association
issued the rule that surgery should only be performed in the presence of two
surgeons in order to guarantee a certain standard of care. This would be
challenged as a horizontal agreement to raise the demand for surgeons and
thus their fees. But if a MCO, as a cost-control mechanism, issued a
"practice guideline" limiting the number of attending surgeons to one,
antitrust law would remain silent.
174
173. On this basis, the Federal Trade Commission over the past ten years has attacked
associations such as the American Medical Association, the American Dental Association,
the American Psychological Association, and the International Conference Interpreters
Association (AUC), which is based in Geneva and has a total of 80 members in the United
States. Several U.S. associations were forced to sign consent decrees, often including the
elimination of provisions in their code of ethics designed to protect consumers. The
American Psychological Association, for example, was compelled to delete a clause
prohibiting fear-inducing advertising claims that, unless you came in for treatment of your
depression, you might suffer serious consequences including suicide. The FTC argued that
this provision prevented the public from adequate access to information. The only association
resisting the FTC attacks on the self-regulation and consumer-protection efforts of an
independent profession was AIIC which pursued its case by successfully appealing the ALJ's
ruling to the full Commission.
174. See ROSENBLATT ET AL., supra note 17, at 664 (quoting Professor David Frankford).
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B. Germany
175
German providers of medical care and the standards of their conduct
are subject to four different bodies of law: the Federal Constitution, and
social, civil and criminal law. The Constitution and social law protect the
standard of care. Civil and criminal law establish the standard for physician
liability. Conflicts of relevance in malpractice actions may arise between
social law and civil law which overlap, but may result in diverging standards
of care. 176
1. The Constitution and the Standard of Care
Contrary to the U.S. Constitution, the German Federal Constitution of
May 23, 1949, formally recognizes a State duty of care for its citizens.
1 77
How this duty is to be exercised may be determined by the legislator, free to
choose among different means while bound by the principles of social
175. In spite of numerous common problems and avenues pursued to find solutions in both
countries, one of the difficulties when comparing the two health care systems is language.
On both sides of the Atlantic, similar terms and concepts are used but often their similarity
is superficial only because of the diverging underlying philosophies. The American approach
of market-dominated private sector insurance, apart from programs such as Medicare,
Medicaid and health care plans for government employees, grew out of the historical defense
of individual rights and an interpretation of the constitution aimed at protecting "the right to
be let alone", as phrased by Judge Brandeis in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438
(1928). The German universal access/universal coverage social health insurance system with
mandatory membership for most of the population developed as part of a communitarian
approach to society, emphasizing solidarity, and dating back to the 19' century. Because of
these differing philosophies, some of the German definitions of concepts familiar in the
United States as well may sound like euphemisms or sophistry, especially in an era of
cynicism triggered by terms such as medical necessity, "experimental" treatments and
utilization review, commonly used in the world of managed care. Even though both systems
of health care delivery have slowly begun to converge, fundamental attitudes are still
sufficiently diverse to make language a complex and treacherous element when attempting
to transpose the search for solutions to similar problems from one mentality to another.
176. Klaus Engelmann, ArztlicheBerufspflichten im Konfliktfeldzwischen Artzhaftung and
Sozialrecht [Conflicts between Medical Liability and Social Law: Physicians'Professional
Duties]. RICHTERWOCHE, BUNDESSOZIALGERICHT [Presentation on the occasion of the annual
Justices' Seminar at the Supreme Social Court] (Oct. 1996).
177. BVerfG E 15, 121 [133], June 18, 1975. Ruling of the Federal Constitutional Court
(Bundesverfassungsgericht. BVG).
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justice.'78 Article 1(1) of the Federal Constitution'79 (human dignity is
inviolable and to be preserved and protected by the State) in conjunction with
Article 20(1) (the Federal Republic of Germany is a democratic and socially
responsible federal state) imposes on the State the duty to provide the
material minimum for a dignified existence of its citizens. 8 ° To leave those
who have the right to vote and thus participate in the power of the State
without entitlement to support would violate the Constitution. 8' Citizens, as
members of the community, have obligations towards each other as well as
rights, such as the right to life and health, embodied in Art. 2(2).182 This
includes the preservation of health, the control of pain, and the restoration of
health in case of illness.'83 Article 104(1) protects individual physical and
psychological integrity. The statutory system of health care could thus be
considered synonymous with the socially responsible State. 84 The Federal
Constitutional Court has emphasized the constitutional mandate for an
effective statutory health care system.'85 Since this implies an outcome-
oriented approach, the effectiveness of procedures is given high priority.'86
Furthermore, the Constitution recognizes the self-determination of
individuals'87 and, thus, their autonomy as patients. It also guarantees the
178. See id. at 133, 134.
179. GRUNDGESETZ FuR DIE BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND [CONSTITUTION OF THE
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY] (Bundeszentrale ffir politische Bildung, Bonn, July 1998)
[hereinafter Constitution].
180. BVerfG E 7, 187 [228], June 21, 1977. BVerfG E 40, 121 (133); 45, 187 (228); 82,
60 (80, 85).
181. BverwGE 1, 159 [161], June 24, 1954. Ruling of the Federal Administrative Court
(Bundesverwaltungsgericht. B VwG).
182. See id. at 162.
183. Erwin Deutsch, Arztliche Berufspflichten im Konfliktfeld zwischen Artzhafiung and
Sozialrecht [Conflicts between Medical Liability and Social Law: Physicians'Professional
Duties]. RICHTERWOCHE, BUNDESSOZIALGERICHT (Oct. 1996).
184. Gudrun Eberle, Die Entwicklung der GKVzum heutigen Stand [The History of the
Statutory Health Care System]. 47(3) SOZIALER FORTSCHRITr 53 (March 1998).
185. BVerfG E 70, 1, 30.
186. MANFRED KOHLER, SOZIALRECHTLICH GESTEUERTE GESUNDHEITSFORDERUNG IN DER
KASSENARZTLICHEN VERSORGUNG [HEALTH PROMOTION AND THE DELIVERY OF MEDICAL
CARE UNDER SOCIAL LAW] 51 (Erich Schmidt Verlag, Berlin, 1989).
187. See Constitution, supra note 179, at Art. 2 (the right to self-determination, self-
development, physical inviolability).
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free choice and practice of a profession,188 limiting the legislator's options to
restrict physicians' access to" 9 and exercise of their profession, including
their right to independent clinical decision making. 9 '
2. Social Law: The SGB V
a. The Legal Foundations of the Health Care Delivery System
Title V of the Social Code (SGB V), passed in 1988, embodies the
statutory health care system. It was amended in 1992 and 1997191 and is the
most recent successor to the National Health Insurance Act, adopted in
1883192 under Chancellor Otto von Bismarck which was followed by the
Insurance Code of 1914 (RVO).193 Since 1883, membership in originally six
plans (the "sickness funds"'194) has been mandatory. The currently over 600
sickness funds are decentralized and remain subdivided into the six
traditional categories according to profession, industry or locality'95 plus the
"substitute funds" for workers and employees choosing not to belong to any
188. See id. at Art. 12 (the right to freely choose and exercise a profession).
189. According to the SGB V, Arts. 99-105, physician and sickness fund associations, in
cooperation with state agencies, must determine the number of physicians required to ensure
the uniform availability of quality medical care by region. (Bedarfsplanung) This has led to
some restrictions on the number of new practices especially in metropolitan areas. The
constitutionality of this quantitative element of the SGB V is currently contested.
SOZIALGESETZBUCH - FONFTES BUCH, SGB V. BGBL. S. 2477, Bonn, 20. Dezember 1988
[SOCIAL CODE, TITLE V, published in the GERMAN CODE 2477] (Dec. 20, 1988) [hereinafter
SGB V].
190. Therapiefreiheit. Constitution, Art. 12, supra note 179. Also BSG 14a Rka 7/92,
Sept. 8, 1993. "The Amalgam Ruling," leaving the choice of filling with the dentist
[hereinafter BSG 14a Rka].
191. For a detailed discussion of the Act, including benefits and its revisions in 1992 and
1997, see Weide, supra note 12.
192. Krankenversicherungsgesetz, May 6, 1883.
193. Reichsversicherungsordnung, Jan. 1, 1914 (Imperial Insurance Code).
194. Krankenkassen.
195. Betriebskassen (corporate plans). Innungskassen (plans by trade).
Landwirtschaftliche Krankenkasse (agricultural workers plan). See-Krankenkasse (merchant
marine plan). Bundesknappschaft (mine workers plan). Ortskassen (local funds by
municipality or county).
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of the other plans.'96 All funds offer identical coverage by law and,
beginning in 1883, have been self-governed, providing benefits on a prepaid
basis. Premiums are assessed at a universal rate (currently 13.6%) up to a
predetermined maximum level of income,' 97 and shared equally between
employer and employee through a type of payroll tax. Dependants are
covered free of charge. This statutory health care system is an all-payer,198
not-for-profit, universal access/universal coverage system of social insurance.
It covers 90 percent of the population199 and provides comprehensive care,
including prescription drugs, fertility treatment, home care and sick pay,
without lifetime limits or limits for any category of benefits. The sickness
funds are the insurers cooperating with the providers to ensure uniform
access to and delivery of care as stipulated by the SGB V for all members,
independently of geographic location.2"0 The main chapters of the act are: (I)
foundations of the solidarity-based social insurance, (II) universal access,
(III) universal coverage, (IV) services by and the self-governance of plan
providers, and (VI and VII) organizational structure and self-governance of
the sickness funds.
Patients (or "members") have a substantive right under social law to
receive the comprehensive benefits listed in the SGB V2 1 according to the
following standard of care:
"The quality and efficacy of the benefits to be provided by the
sickness funds must correspond to the generally accepted
196. This reflects the historical development of the funds during the 19' century. Under
a 1997 open-enrollment amendment to the SGB V, members can now elect to join any of the
funds and switch on an annual basis.
197. Beitragsbemessungsgrenze. At the current exchange rate, roughly $35,000.
Assessing individuals beyond this level is considered to yield a negative cost/benefit ratio.
198. Uwe Reinhardt, West Germany's Health Care and Health Insurance System:
Combining Universal Access with Cost Control. Report prepared for the United States
Bipartisan Commission on Comprehensive Health Care, August 30, 1989. Revised June 25,
1990.
199. The remaining 10 percent have opted out of the public system, buying private
insurance, because their incomes exceed the statutory income level for mandatory
membership. Benefits by law, however, must be at least equal to the comprehensive coverage
provided by the sickness funds, creating little incentive even for wealthier individuals, who
may become voluntary members of the public plan, to obtain private coverage.
200. See SGB V at Art. 72. Sicherstellungsauftrag.
201. See id. at Art. 27.
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medical standard of care and must be in accordance with the
progress of medical science. 2 °2
"Medical treatment is defined as all adequate and appropriate
procedures performed by a physician as needed for the
prevention, early diagnosis and treatment of illness in accordance
with the current standard of care. Medical treatment includes
procedures performed by providers other than physicians which
were ordered by a physician and performed under her/his
,,211supervision.
Cost containment is to be achieved through the cost-effectiveness2 of
all care: "Benefits must be adequate, appropriate and cost-effective; they may
not exceed whatever is necessary. Members may not claim unnecessary or
not cost-effective treatment, providers must refuse it and sickness funds must
deny reimbursement.,
205
Physicians' independent clinical judgment is protected by the
Constitution but clinical decision-making is not an entirely autonomous
process. Patient self-determination is a protected right as well, and today's
physician-patient relationship has become less paternalistic and more of a
dialogue. In addition, nationally and regionally negotiated budgets macro-
allocate health care funds while national benefit guidelines (social law) 0 6 and
clinical practice guidelines (civil law) set a framework for the quality of care.
Increasingly, the SGB V will not only serve to guarantee benefits and the
quality of medical services but also update the coverage of customary and
innovative procedures by subjecting them to cost/benefit evaluations.
202. See id. at Art. 2.
203. See id. at Art. 28.
204. See id. at Art. 12. Wirtschafilichkeitsgebot (Cost-effectiveness mandate).
205. Preauthorization of benefits is not required. There are, however, retrospective
economic reviews of the claims filed by individual providers. For further discussion, see infra
section II.B.4.a.
206. Richtlinien. Benefit guidelines are adopted by the Joint Federal Committee of
Physician and Sickness Fund Associations (Bundesausschtisse) and approved by the Ministry
of Health. For further discussion, see infra section II.B.2.B.a.
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i. Sickness Funds and Their Associations
According to the SGB V, the sickness funds are autonomous, self-
governed corporate entities under public law.2°7 As statutory insurers, they
provide coverage in accordance with the SGB V and contract with provider
associations for medical services.20 8 Under the National Health Insurance
Act of 1883, sickness fund associations were as of yet nonexistent. In 1894,
however, the first voluntary national association2 9 was founded in Frankfurt
by "local funds," able to exert considerable political influence since a
majority of funds joined. Other sickness fund categories followed suit. With
the approval of employers and employees, jointly funding the health care
system, the Insurance Code of 1914 (RVO) first recognized these
associations under private law and by 1933, legislators had transferred to
them the responsibility for the contracts concluded with the physicians. The
RVO was revised in 1936, turning the sickness fund associations into
corporate entities under public law and making sickness fund membership
mandatory. It also established a "Working Group of Sickness Fund
Associations,"2"0 a national umbrella organization representing all categories
of sickness funds. Its mission was to handle all sickness fund related issues,
and decisions had to be unanimous. After the end of World War II, when
Germany was divided into five occupied zones, regional health insurance
systems were introduced by the allied powers. Sickness funds, once again
voluntarily and under private law, reestablished their regional and national
associations. After the Federal Republic of Germany was founded in 1949,
sickness fund self-governance was restored through legislation in 195 1.211
In 1955, sickness fund associations, both regional and federal, once again
became corporate entities under public law.212
207. See SGB V at Art. 4. K6rperschaften des 6ffentlichen Rechts mit Selbstverwaltung.
208. See id. at Art. 2.
209. Centralverband der Ortkrankenkasssen im deutschen Reich [Central Association of
Local Funds in Imperial Germany].
210. Arbeitsgemeinschaft der Reichsverbdnde.
211. Gesetz iiber die Selbstverwaltung [Sickness Fund Self-Governance Act].
212. Gesetz fiber die Verbdnde der gesetzlichen Krankenkassen und Ersatzkassen
[Statutory Sickness Fund Associations and Substitute Fund Associations Act]. BGBI. I S.
524, 1955 (1 GERMAN CODE 524) (1955).
296 [Vol. 20
HEALTH CARE IN THE U.S. AND GERMANY
ii. Physicians and Their Associations
The National Health Insurance Act of 1883 did not yet codify the
relationship between the sickness funds and the providers. 13 The funds were
free to contract with or dismiss individual physicians, replacing the patient-
physician relationship with a civil law contractual relationship between plans
and providers. Since this amounted to almost total physician dependency on
the sickness funds, frequent friction between the parties ensued, and a
number of physician associations, resembling unions, were created. In 1900,
the private "Hartmann Bund," comparable to the American Medical
Association, was founded. Physicians demanded patient choice ofproviders,
sickness fund contracting with licensed physicians only, collective
agreements to guarantee adequate compensation, and a self-regulated system
of quality control.
The Berlin Agreement of 1913 established a joint committee of
physicians and sickness funds as equal partners and laid the foundation for
self-governance. Compensation and physician licensing agreements were
jointly negotiated and an arbitration procedure was introduced. The sickness
funds made lump-sum payments, calculated according to per capita health
care costs, to the physician associations which compensated individual
physicians on a capitated basis.214 The agreement limited the admission of
physicians to practice within the public system based on a ratio of 1,350
insured individuals per physician. But since the RVO of 1914 did not
regulate the contractual relationship between physicians and sickness funds,
frictions continued, culminating in threats of general strikes by physicians
and the potential collapse of health care delivery.
Considering the varied history of the relationship between sickness
funds and physicians, without government intervention, the system would
have been disabled at numerous stages of its development.2 15 Legislators
213. This section is based on KOHLER, supra note 186. HEINRICH REITER,
ENTSTEHUNGSGESCHICHTE, AUFGABEN UND ORGANISATION DER SPITZENVERBANDE DER
KRANKENKASSEN NACH DEM SGB V [DEVELOPMENT, TASKS AND ORGANIZATION OF THE
NATIONAL ASSOCIATIONS OF SICKNESS FUNDS UNDER THE SGB V] (Hartung-Gorre Verlag,
Konstanz, 1996). HERMANN PLAGEMANN,
VERTRAGSARZTRECHT-PSYCHOTHERAPEUTENGESETZ [SGB V: PLAN PHYSICIAN
SECTIONS-PSYCHOTHERAPY SECTIONS] (Fachholschulverlag, Frankfurt, Sept. 1998).
214. Kopfpauschale. Today, capitated payments are only one element of physician
compensation.
215. See KOHLER, supra note 186 (quoting a contemporary observer when strikes were
likely in 1913: "This strike could have been organized either by the physicians or the sickness
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increasingly accepted government responsibility and acted whenever the
situation required rectification of the organizational framework needed to
ensure adequate care. After a four-week strike over New Years of
1923/1924, the government issued an order for the creation of a plan
physician association 2 6 responsible for physician licensing, contracts with
the sickness funds, compensation and the determination of the number of
physicians required to provide comprehensive care to all member-patients.
Many of the Berlin Agreement institutions and provisions thus became
components of the RVO and received their status under public law.
Physicians were free to conclude either individual or collective contracts with
their local physician associations and choose between case-based or fee-for-
service compensation (the latter subject to some limitations.)
The government also established a National Joint Committee of
Physician and Sickness Fund Associations which issued normative standards
for provider licensing, the cost-effective prescription of medication, and, for
example, the use of "electro-physical" treatments. The latter two were the
precursors of today's SGB V coverage guidelines and, thus, the first attempts
at setting a statutory standard of care. In 1932, these standards were
incorporated into the RVO and became national law. Regional physician
associations responsible for the access to and the provision of medical care
were established, and the contractual provider-sickness fund relationship was
regulated by public law. A mandatory dispute-settlement procedure for
physicians and sickness funds guaranteed the uninterrupted delivery of health
care.
Following the self-governance act of 1951, the Plan Physician Act
217
was adopted in 1955 in tandem with the corresponding sickness funds act,
awarding the physician associations their definitive status under public law.
Membership for physicians practicing within the statutory health care system
(about 90%) is mandatory, but it is voluntary for the remaining physicians.
There are twenty-three regional physicians organizations, 218 each run by an
assembly elected by the physicians and a board elected by the assembly. 219
funds. But the hapless victims would have been the patients-an unacceptable situation for
any responsible government." (at 18)).
216. Kassenarztverein.
217. Gesetz iiber das Kassenarztrecht. The act also provided for additional methods of
physician compensation such as fee-for-service and diagnosis-related payment. BGB1. I S.
513, 1955 [1 GERMAN CODE 513] (1955).
218. Kassenarztliche Vereinigungen. See SGB V at Art. 70(1).
219. See id. at Art. 79.
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All are represented by the Federal Association of Physician Associations.220
The regional associations must guarantee patient access to adequate medical
care in accordance with the prevailing standard of care, its preservation
through physician licensing and continuing education, 221 correct claims
processing (physicians file on a quarterly basis, not patients), and cost-
effective care.2 22 Clinical decision making, however, rests solely with the
providers.
Physicians, once licensed to practice within the statutory system, have
a contractual obligation under civil law to provide medical care for patients
covered by the sickness funds and entitled to such treatment in accordance
with the SGB V. Physicians may refuse to treat (emergencies excepted) in
case of disputes with the patient, repeated patient non-compliance, practice
overload (patient selection is not permitted), and home visits to
geographically distant locations. Even under any of these circumstances,
services must be rendered if no other physician is available.223 If treatment
is denied without a valid reason, civil and criminal procedures can be
initiated.224
iii. The System of Self-Governance
Since 1955, the main players of the current German health care system
have been the regional and federal physician and sickness fund associations.
The SGB V of 1988, following in the tradition of earlier health care
legislation, stipulates their obligation to autonomously but jointly safeguard
the organizational structures required for the implementation of their
mandate as defined by the SGB V: the provision of "adequate, appropriate
220. Kassendrztliche Bundesvereinigung (KBV).
221. See SGB V at Arts. 95, 95(a). The regional physician associations also license
physicians for practice within the statutory system.
222. See id. at Art. 106. Wirtschaftlichkeitspriifung. Physicians' claims are reviewed
retrospectively according to standardized economic criteria.
223. Laws such as EMTALA (The Emergency Medical Treatment And Active Labor Act)
and the hospital "charity care" requirement (for accreditation as Medicare/Medicaid provider
or tax exempt status under the I.R.S. code) are rendered superfluous since all SGB V
providers, hospitals included, have the same contractual obligation to deliver appropriate and
adequate care. For hospitals, this is defined as comprehensive care according to patient need,
including physicians' services. See SGB V at Art. 39.
224. In a medical negligence case, both civil and criminal charges can be filed. Duty,
breach, causation and damage requirements are identical but damages for pain and suffering
are available only in criminal actions.
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and cost-effective treatment corresponding to the generally accepted standard
,~221 ,226of medical care'  in keeping with the "progress of medical science.
Physician associations assume a dual role. They ensure appropriate provider
compensation while preserving the health care delivery system. The regional
physician associations negotiate collective regional agreements 2 17 with the
regional sickness fund associations, detailing the fundamental conditions for
the delivery of health care, quality control and claims processing procedures,
and the fees for individual physician services. These agreements implement
the provisions of the national agreement228 negotiated on the federal level
between the Federal Association of Physician Associations and the Federal
Associations of Sickness Funds. 2 9 Currently, physicians and dentists receive
a combination of fee-for-service compensation for specialized procedures,
capitated payments for basic procedures, and indemnity payments for some
dental procedures.
All methods of payment are renegotiated annually and entered into the
national fee schedule based on relative value units (RVUs).23 ° The regional
physician associations compensate their members with assets received from
the sickness funds, and any disputes over reimbursement are resolved by
physicians and sickness funds. The regional sickness fund associations
231
(assembly members are elected by plan subscribers) also contract with other
providers such as hospitals. In addition, the federal physician and sickness
fund associations sit on a Joint Federal Committee23 2 composed of one
independent chairperson, two independent members, and nine members each
representing the physicians and the sickness funds. This Committee adopts
the national coverage guidelines discussed below.
225. See SGB V at Arts. 70(1), 72(2).
226. See id. at Art. 2(1).
227. See id. at Art. 83. Gesamtvertrdge.
228. See id. at Art. 82. Bundesmantelvertrag.
229. See id. Kassendrztliche Bundesvereinigungen. Spitzenverbdnde der Krankenkassen.
230. See id. at Art. 87. Einheitlicher Bewertunsmafjstab.
231. See id. at Art. 207. Landesverbiinde der Krankenkassen.
232. See id. at Art. 91. Bundesausschu3 der "rzte und Krankenkassen.
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b. Setting the Standard of Care
Coverage is comprehensive, and Chapter III of the SGB V entitles all
members to the prevailing standard of care.233 One normative and one
informal mechanism contribute to the definition of this standard: the national
coverage guidelines of the SGB V,234 and the clinical practice guidelines
(generally accepted treatment procedures) developed by the different medical
231specialty societies.  Originally, the national coverage guidelines were
conceived to guarantee a high standard of care, but the current thirteen
guidelines increasingly serve the macro-allocation of health care resources
by specifying and updating covered benefits. The clinical practice guidelines
are not normative, even though often considered the prevailing standard of
care in malpractice cases, but designed to provide a "corridor" for accepted
clinical decision making, leaving treatment decisions implying "medical
necessity '236 to the physicians. The standard for both coverage guidelines
and clinical practice guidelines is determined by scientific evidence, clinical
expertise, and generally accepted preventive, diagnostic, and therapeutic
practices. The standard changes over time, and adjustments are permissible
whenever required in a patient's individual circumstances.
237
233. Leistungsrecht. See SGB V at Arts. 11-66.
234. See id. at Art. 92. Richtlinien der Bundesausschiisse [Coverage Guidelines adopted
by the Joint Federal Committee]. The Medicare term "coverage determination" is not used
here to underscore the differences between the two systems even though both are "social
insurances."
235. Leitlinien. For further discussion, see infra section II.B.2.B.b. Since SGB V, Art.
76(4), entitles patients to the customary care standard applicable to all service contracts under
the Civil Code, clinical practice guidelines help to determine civil law malpractice liability.
236. "Medical necessity" has differing connotation in both countries. In the United States,
it is best known as one of the managed care concepts used in the micro-allocation of health
care funds through mandatory preauthorization of care for individual patients. (Several states
have also adopted a macro-level statutory definition of medical necessity.) In Germany, the
term is only now becoming popular and may, depending on the context, refer to either the
macro-level standard of care to be guaranteed by social law or treatment decisions in a micro-
allocation context.
237. Dieter Hart, Arztliche Leitlinien - Definitionen, Funktionen, rechtliche Bewertungen
[ClinicalPractice Guidelines-Definitions, Functions, Legal Implications], 1 MEDR8, 1998.
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i. National Coverage Guidelines
SGB V, Art. 92, authorizes the Joint Federal Committee of Physician
and Sickness Fund Associations to adopt the national coverage guidelines
which become binding under the SGB V, once approved by the Federal
Minister of Health and published in the Federal Register.23 8 Two major
coverage guidelines predate the SGB V of 1988: the so-called "Children's
Guideline, 23 9 of 1976 and the "Maternity Care Guideline, 241 of 1985, which
is so detailed that it is also considered a clinical practice guideline, both
amended in 1998. After the adoption of the SGB V, several coverage
guidelines were added because of the recognition that the cost-effectiveness
mandate of Art. 12 may conflict with clinical decisions and the prevailing
standard of care stipulated by Arts. 2 and 72: "Care must be adequate,
appropriate, correspond to generally accepted practices, and be in keeping
with the progress of medical science., 24' Therefore, guidelines have also
been interpreted as practical implementations of the "cost-effectiveness
238. Bundesanzeiger.
239. Richtlinien des Bundesausschusses der frzte und Krankenkassen iber die
Frfiherkennung von Krankheiten bei Kindern bis zur Vollendung des 6. Lebensjahres
("Kinderrichtlinien"). Bundesanzeiger Nr. 159, Aug. 27, 1998 [Guidelines of the Joint
Federal Committee of Physicians and Sickness Funds for the Screening of Childhood
Disorders Until Age Six] Fed. Register No. 159. See SGB V at Art. 26.
240. Richtlinien des Bundesausschusses der4 , rzte und Krankenkassen ziber die drztliche
Betreuung wdhrend der Schwangerschaft und nach der Entbinding
("Mutterschaftsrichtlinie'). Bundesanzeiger Nr. 136, July 25, 1998 [Guidelines ofthe Joint
Federal Committee of Physicians and Sickness Funds for Maternity Care] Fed. Register No.
136. Incorporated into the SGB V as RVO, Art. 196.
241. KARL HAUCK, SGB V: GESETZLICHE KRANKENVERSICHERUNG, KOMMENTAR [SGB
V ANNOTATED] (Sept. 1999) [hereinafter HAUCK]. (This loose-leaf edition is continuously
updated.) "Adequate" procedures are defined as corresponding to a minimum standard, and
"appropriate" procedures must be adequately effective for their diagnostic or therapeutic
purpose. Wolfgang Kemmnitz, Empirische Untersuchungen medizinischer
Normsetzungsprozesse durch drztliche Leitlinien in medizinischen Instituten [Empirical
Evaluation of Normative Procedures Based on Medical Guidelines Developed by Medical
Institutions], at 5 (e-mail edition). In ARZTLICHE LEITLINIEN: EMPIRIE UND RECHT
PROFESSIONELLER NORMSETZUNG [MEDICAL GUIDELINES: EMPIRICAL AND LEGAL
FOUNDATIONS FOR SETTING PROFESSIONALNORMS] (Dieter Hart, ed., Nomos-Verlag, Baden-
Baden, 2000) [hereinafter MEDICAL GUIDELINES].
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2. Screening for early diagnosis
2 45 of:
a. cancer of the reproductive system (beginning at age 20)
b. skin and breast cancer (age 30)
c. colorectal cancer (age 30).
3. Prescription Medication.
2 46





242. See PLAGEMANN, supra note 213. Cost-effectiveness, among other things, also
implies limiting therapy to what is necessary in a particular case when two different
treatments are available. Kemmnitz, id.
243. See HAUCK, supra note 241.
244. Arbeitsunfdhigkeitsrichtlinie. BABI. Nr. 11, Oct. 31,1991 (Federal Labor Law Code
No. 11).
245. Gesundheitsuntersuchungsrichtlinie. BAB1. 1989/10 S. 44, Aug. 24, 1989 (Federal
Labor Law Code 1989/10 p. 44). See SGB V at Art. 25.
246. Arzneimittelrichtlinie. Bundesanzeiger Nr. 246, Dec. 31, 1993; amended
Bundesanzeiger Nr. 182, Sept. 29, 1998 (Fed. Register No. 246, 182). See SGB V at Art. 84
(global budget for pharmaceuticals), and Art. 35 (reference prices for prescription drugs).
247. Hilfs- und Heilmittel-Richtlinien. Bundesanzeiger Nr. 183b, June 17, 199; amended
Feb. 19, 1998 (Fed. Register No. 183b). See SGB V at Arts. 32-34.
248. Richtlinie des Bundesausschusses derArzte undKrankenkassen fiber die Einffihrung
neuer Untersuchungs- und Behandlungsmethoden [Coverage Guideline for Innovative
Diagnostic and Treatment Procedures Issued by The Joint Federal Committee of Physicians
and Sickness Funds]. Bundesanzeiger Nr. 2/91, Jan. 31, 1991 (Fed. Register No. 2/91). See
SGB V at Art. 135. HAUCK, supra note 241, at C-450, p.1
249. Psychotherapie-Richtlinie. Oct. 23, 1998, in HAUCK, C 470, supra note 241. See also
SGB V at Art. 95(10-13). The psychotherapy coverage guideline is unusual in that it
introduces psychotherapy as a covered benefit (psychologists fought for years to be
recognized as providers), both enumerating covered schools of psychotherapy, and stipulating
the professional qualifications of providers. From an American perspective, it combines the
coverage limitations of health care plans and some elements of licensing laws.
250. Richtlinien 6iber kinstliche Befruchtung. Bundesarbeitsblatt Nr. 12, Nov. 30, 1990;
amended Bundesanzeiger Nr. 243, Jan. 1, 1998 (Fed. Register No. 243). See SGB V at Art.
27(a).
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Coverage guidelines are "norms addressing acts or omissions, issued
by a rule-making body as mandated by the SGB V, and violations are
sanctioned., 25 1  Sanctions can range from administrative notice to
suspension. Some guidelines specifically permit adjustments whenjustified
by individual circumstances, and sickness funds may make more liberal
reimbursement decisions. But the guidelines for fertility treatment, screening
for childhood disorders, and covered schools of psychotherapy have the force
of law, potentially creating conflicts between physicians' constitutional right
to freely practice their profession, and their civil (contract and tort) and social
law duties under the SGB V.252 Furthermore, the Constitution protects
individuals' right to health care, and the Supreme Social Court has ruled that
coverage guidelines may not hinder the provision of "adequate and
appropriate medical care" by the treating physician. 253 Hence, the medical
indication must receive priority and the physician may, whenever required
by a patient's individual circumstances, ignore the coverage guidelines
254
which, according to the Supreme Social Court, may also not impinge on the
patient's constitutional right of self-determination. 5  Since guidelines can
not include all potentially acceptable exceptions, physicians, havingprovided
additional treatment in individual cases, may be required to justify their
clinical decisions. Understandably, physicians-and scholars-contest the
above inconsistencies which so far have been addressed only on a case-by-
case basis, and which are amplified by the ongoing health care reform efforts.
Developing the National Coverage Guidelines. All coverage
guidelines must conform to the "generally accepted standard of clinical
practice and be in keeping with the progress of medical science. ' 256
251. See Hart, supra note 237, at 11.
252. Civil courts, in case of malpractice claims, hear experts to determine whether the
standard of care was violated. Providing care according to a social law coverage guideline
does not immunize from tort liability. Courts should, however, first determine whether a
physician was practicing privately or within the statutory health care system, and if a coverage
guideline applied. Thomas Clemens, personal communication by fax (Nov. 17, 1999).
253. See id. BSG 6 Rka 27/87, May 5, 1988.
254. Rainer Pitschas, Beziehungen zwischen Leistungserbringern undKrankenkassen [The
Relationship Between Providers and Sickness Funds] in JAHRBUCH DES SOZIALRECHTS DER
GEGENWART, BD. 17 [17 ANNUAL SOCIAL LAW REvIEw] 267 (Georg Wannagat, Wolfgang
Gitter, eds., 1995).
255. See BSG 14a Rka, supra note 165.
256. See HAUCK, K§92 at 3, supra note 241. See SGB Vat Art. 2. According to the SGB
V Annotated, only the field of medicine itself "is qualified to define, evaluate and assure the
provision of care, not agencies or the courts." Id. K§2, at 21. See also BSGE rulings 73, 271,
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"Generally accepted clinical practice" comprises quantitative, qualitative,
and practical aspects." 7 Quantitatively, it is defined as representing the
opinion of a clear majority of practitioners. 8 Qualitatively, the opinion of
few but renowned experts may actually outweigh the quantitative element
such as the recommendation of a prestigious research institute. On a
practical level, a procedure is generally accepted when it has become the
subject of a clinical practice guideline (CPG). But coverage guidelines are
independent of CPGs because they address the "what" not the "how" of
treatment. Ideally, both should be in agreement, and the SGB V has
established a working group for quality control and harmonization of
guidelines, representing all national associations of physicians, sickness
funds and hospitals.
25 9
The "progress of medical science" criterion recognizes empirical
evidence,26° expert consensus, and clinical acceptance based on "experience
or intuition., 26 1 For "innovative procedures" coverage evaluations under
SGB V, Art. 135,262 the process outlined in Art. 92 relies on scientific
288; 81, 64, 72 (pointing out that medicine is an empirical science). In addition, Art. 5(3) of
the Constitution guarantees the freedom of science and State neutrality in scientific matters.
The State, however, does exert "subtle" normative control, for example, through the SGB V
sections regulating the practice of physicians within the statutory system of health care.
Ruling of the Supreme Constitutional Court (BVerfG E 11, 30, 40). Vertragsarztrecht.
257. See HAUCK, supra note 241, K§2 at 23.
258. Ruling of the Supreme Administrative Court (BverwG ZBR, 1996).
259. See SGB V at Art. 137. Harmonization so far has been difficult because of
disagreement between the different groups whether clinical practice guidelines should include
economic considerations. The participating national physician and sickness fund associations
recently approved their integration into the CPGs. But whether quality-related research
should be subject to economic considerations is questioned, for example, by numerous
medical societies arguing that this would limit a priori the scope of the investigation of the
quality of future medical care. See also Hart, supra note 237, at 12, fn. 32.
260. The SGB V Annotated cites the customary three phases of clinical trials.
261. See HAUCK, supra note 241, K§2 at 24.
262. See SGB V at Art. 135, extends Art. 92 to coverage determinations for "innovative
diagnostic and treatment procedures" not yet listed in the national (outpatient) fee schedule,
and procedures whose indications have changed. The term "innovative" implies that quality
has not yet been shown or is only assumed based on the sickness fund physicians' practices.
Wolfgang Dreher, Thomas Clemens, Zur Leistungspflicht der Krankenkassenfiir alternative
Heilmethoden (bier: Akupunktur bei Neurodermitis) [Sickness Funds' Obligation of
Coverage ofAlternative Treatments (Here: Acupunture for Neurodermitis)]. 5 MEDR 230
(1998).
2000]
N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
evidence indicating effectiveness. Acceptable evidence levels are: (I) at least
one randomized, controlled clinical study, (Ila) evidence derived from other
prospective clinical studies, (lib) well-designed cohort or case-controlled
studies, preferably involving several groups, (IIc) time-series comparisons
with or without clinical intervention, and (III) expert opinions derived from
clinical experience reports by committees of experts and consensus-
conferences.263 For reevaluations of already covered procedures under Art.
135,264 the Joint Federal Committee accepts the clinical practice guideline
standard since, as the SGB V Annotated points out, according to U.S.
surveys, only 4% of all treatments have been proven to be effective subject
to rigorous experimental protocols. Furthermore, the WHO estimates that
only 20% of all common procedures have actually been evaluated.265
Subjects under consideration by the Joint Federal Committee are
published, and comments by any interested party are invited.266 The
Committee can establish working groups which submit recommendations to
the plenary. Since not all members of such groups must have professional
familiarity with each procedure to be evaluated, they may consult experts,
studies and published literature. The working groups must then hear
representatives of professional associations and expert opinions. In the case
of prescription drug coverage guidelines, only medical and pharmacology
experts, pharmacists, experts on drugs for specific treatment approaches, and
representatives of pharmaceutical manufacturers may be heard.267 New
coverage guidelines are adopted by a simple majority vote in the plenary.
Deliberations are not public. Contrary to the Art. 92 process, Art. 135 does
not provide for hearings or the participation of interested parties, only for the
consultation of experts. This has been met with criticism because the
decisions of the Federal Committee under this article, potentially leading to
263. See HAUCK, supra note 241. SGB V, Art. 135. Examples of recently covered
innovative methods include LDL-elimination through hemotherapy, methadone substitution,
treatment of sleep apnea, and bladder calculus lithotripsy. Coverage was denied for
transurethral prostate laser treatment, bioresonance diagnosis and therapy, autologous target
cytokine treatment according to Klehr, hyperbaric and oxygen therapy.
264. In addition, the SGB V revision of 1997 authorized the Committee to reevaluate
already covered, customary procedures. 2. Neuordnungsgesetz NOG. BGB1. S. 1520; Bonn,
30. Juni 1997 (Health Care Code Revision Act I, GERMAN CODE 1520). SGB V, Art. 135.
265. See HAUCK, supra note 241, K§2 at 25.
266. This section is largely based on Kenmnitz, supra note 241. Contributions are
distributed to all Committee members. How to handle the sheer volume of comments and
how to factor them into the decision making process has not yet been resolved.
267. See id.
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coverage exclusions, have a much greater impact on providers and patients
than the coverage guidelines under Art. 92 which rarely exclude benefits.268
Some authors have questioned this standard-setting procedure and the
democratic legitimacy of the Joint Federal Committee itself. First, the
Committee must rely on outside expert testimony when deciding on a new
guideline since it is not composed of experts representing all medical
specialties. 269 Second, the statutory health care system is self-governed by
democratically elected corporate entities under public law. The members
(physicians, sickness funds and insured individuals), however, only elect the
local and/or regional assemblies, which in turn elect the members of the
national assemblies, which then elect the members of the Joint Federal
Committee. At this point, democratic legitimacy may be present only in a
"homeopathic dosage."
270
Depending on the type of guideline issued by the Committee, the
constitutional, or "legitimacy," implications may differ. Guidelines for
internal administrative purposes may be constitutional, coverage guidelines,
however, touching upon the constitutionally mandated "protection of the
citizen's life and health by the state." For as long as coverage guidelines do
not at least correspond to regulations (one normative level above the
decisions taken by the Joint Federal Committee which is not an agency),
certain treatment decisions may best be left to the informed patient. 271 Even
more problematic may be the constitutionality of the innovative diagnostic
and treatment procedures guidelines. The SGB V outlines general approval
methods but delegates the development of coverage guidelines to the Joint
Federal Committee. Its decisions are normative in nature but may conflict
with Art. 80(1) of the Constitution which grants only federal ministers, the
federal and state governments the power to adopt rules and regulations
whose "content, purpose and scope" have already been determined by statute,
here, by SGB V, Arts. 92 and 135. The approval of innovative procedures
268. Karl Jung, Leitlinien aus der Sicht des Bundesausschusses der A'rzte und
Krankenkassen-Rechtspolitische und rechtspraktische Probleme [Clinical Practice
Guidelines Viewed by the Joint Federal Committee of Physicians and Sickness
Funds-Problems ofLaw, Application and Policy] in MEDICAL GUIDELINES, supra note 241.
269. See PLAGEMANN, supra note 213.
270. Thomas Clemens, "Verfassungsrechtliche Anforderungen an untergesetzliche
Rechtsnormen [The Constitutionality of Rulemaking by Non-Legislative Bodies] ", 9 MEDR
432 (1996), at 436.
271. See id. See also BSG 14a Rka, supra note 165.
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by a corporate entity under public law would, therefore, be
unconstitutional.272
Two rulings of the Supreme Social Court, however, have confirmed the
constitutionality of the delegation of rulemaking power below the regulatory
level to the Federal Committee by SGB V, Art. 92.273 These decisions
clarified that innovative procedure guidelines and other coverage guidelines
issued by the Joint Federal Committee are not just internal administrative
SGB V implementing rules for physicians and sickness funds, which would
conflict with the separation of powers since coverage guidelines are binding
for the sickness funds and have an external effect274 on their members but
would have been issued by an administrative body without such external
rule-making power. They are integral elements of the normative contracts
ensuring health care delivery concluded between the physician and sickness
fund associations on state and federal levels, and, thus, are legally binding for
both physicians and sickness funds while impacting on patients. This was
confirmed by the BSG in 1998, specifically rejecting arguments in the
literature questioning the democratic legitimacy of the Joint Federal
Committee rule-making power.275 The final arbiter, however, is the Federal
Constitutional Court which has-not yet had the opportunity to address the
issue.276
272. See Clemens, supra note 270.
273. BSG 1 RK 32/95, Sept. 16, 1997 (clarifying the approval procedure for innovative
procedures). Dreher, Clemens, supra note 262, at 234. BSG 6 Rka 62/94, March 20, 1996
(adoption of methadone substitution as a covered benefit, "The Methadone Ruling").
274. Aufienwirkung.
275. BSG Az B6 KA 37/97 (March 18, 1998). In Martina Boni, Verfassungsmdfjigkeit der
Zulassung zur vertragsdrztlichen Versorgung [The Constitutionality of Limiting The
Licensing of Sickness Fund Physicians], 5 MEDR 232 (1999). Guidelines are norms issued
by the Committee as a corporate entity under public law granted rulemaking authority by its
charter. (German material law comprises the Constitution, statutes, executive regulations,
and, on the lowest level, charters conferring rulemaking power to corporate entities under
public law. Municipalities and counties, for example, as components of the political system
of self-governance, are corporate entities exercising such power.) Delegation to the
Committee is proper under the SGB V and does not conflict with the Constitution, Arts. 20
(establishing the Federal Republic as a democratic system of government based on the rule
of law), 80 (executive agencies may promulgate regulations when authorized by law), 2
(protecting the right to self-determination, self-development, physical inviolability) and 12
(the right to freely choose and exercise a profession). HAUCK, supra note 241, K§2, at 43.
276. Since the SGB V is subject to social court jurisdiction, the Supreme Social Court is
in essence concerned with the "democratic legitimacy" of the legislative delegation of
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So far, judicial review is unavailable to patients, providers, sickness
funds and their associations.277 In particular, courts are prevented by
precedent to examine coverage guidelines according to medical and scientific
criteria."' Only once a guideline has led to controversy such as a benefit
denial or a fine imposed on a physician having exceeded the prescription
drug budget-a violation of a coverage guideline-may an individual sue
before the appropriate court. Third parties, however, such as pharmaceutical
or medical supplies manufacturers may file actions with the social courts
challenging decisions of the Joint Federal Committee to promulgate new
coverage guidelines or expand existing ones.
ii. Clinical Practice Guidelines2 79
Currently, more than 600 clinical practice guidelines have been
published, defined as "systematically developed statements to serve as the
foundation for joint decision making by practitioners and patients about
health care to be provided for specific clinical circumstances., 280 They result
from systematic institutional determinations of best methods and practices,
intended to protect the patient and to ensure the quality of diagnosis and
treatment. Whenever considered reflective of the standard of care, they may,
however, impinge on independent clinical judgment281 calling for an
individualized approach.282
rulemaking power to the Joint Federal Committee. Whether such delegation is in fact
constitutional would have to be decided by the Supreme Constitutional Court.
277. The Social Court Statute (Sozialgerichtsgesetz, SGG) does not provide for judicial
review as confirmed by rulings of the Supreme Social Court (Bundessozialgericht, BSG, E
72, 15, Jan. 13, 1993), and a State Supreme Social Court (Landessozialgericht, LSG, Berlin,
Dec. 5, 1996; MEDR 381 (1997)).
278. See BSGE 81,73 (Sept. 16, 1997).
279. This section also draws on Kemninitz, supra note 241.
280. Ferdinand M. Gerlach, Matthias Berndt, Martin Beyer, Professionelle Normsetzung
durch Implementation medizinischerLeitlinien [Setting ProfessionalNorms by Implementing
Clinical Practice Guidelines] in MEDICAL GUIDELINES, supra note 243. The above definition
corresponds to the guideline definition of the Institute of Medicine (1OM) and the former
Agency for Health Care Policy and Research (AHCPR), now called Agency for Healthcare
Research and Quality (AHRQ).
281. This may conflict with physicians' constitutional right to freely exercise their
profession.
282. See Jung, supra note 270.
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CPGs are issued by several organizations, foremost among them is the
Association of Scientific Medical Societies in Germany (AWMF).283 Its 121
members represent medical specialties from allergology to cytology
("Zytologie") and have produced over five hundred clinical practice
guidelines. Examples are seventy CPGs for pediatric surgery, sixty-six for
oto-rhino-laryngology, and fifty-five for diagnostic radiology. Many more
are currently under development. CPGs provide a range ("corridor") of
diagnostic and treatment options for the attending physician to choose from
in individual cases and are often used by courts as the reasonable
professional standard. The AWMF also issues "Quality
Recommendations, 284 more detailed as to indication, diagnostic equipment
specifications, ranges for diagnostic parameters to be evaluated, treatment
protocols, side effects, documentation, and the specialist's required
qualifications. Both CPGs and Quality Recommendations are available on-
line. The AWMF quality efforts center on the structure, process and outcome
of medical procedures, and individual member societies conduct their own
research programs with the goal of improving care.
According to the AWMF, economic considerations should not enter
into the development of guidelines, exclusively intended to serve medicine
and science.285 Economics do play a part, however, since developing a new
product, drug or technology, and collecting adequate evidence for approval
require major investments. Furthermore, practitioners do not always receive
information on innovations from neutral sources, such as scientific
conventions or journals, but also from companies who finance some of this
research, such as pharmaceutical manufacturers, for example, and from
micro-allocate health care funds when deciding whether the use of available
procedures in individual cases is "medically necessary." The sickness funds
therefore advocate economic aspects as an appropriate element of guideline
development which would also contribute to meeting the cost-effectiveness
mandate of the SGB V.
286
283. Arbeitsgemeinschaft der Wissenschaftlichen Medizinischen Fachgesellschaften
(A WMF). AWMF on-line: <www.uni-duesseldorf.de/WWW/AWMF >(Aug. 1999).
284. Empfehlungen zur Qualitdtssicherung; Qualitdtsleitlinien. One author noted the
"inflation" in the usage of the term "guidelines" (Leitlinien, Richtlinien).
285. Member societies do not accept funding from outside sources.
286. See Christoph Straub, Ziele, Normsetzungsprozesse und Implementation von
Leitlinien in der Medizin: Leitlinien aus der Sicht der Krankenkassen [Goals, Normative
Procedures and Implementation of Clinical Practice Guidelines: The Sickness Funds'Point
of View] in MEDICAL GUIDELINES, supra note 241.
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The Joint Federal Committee of Physicians and Sickness Funds has
established a Medical Clearinghouse for Quality Control287 which has issued
a "Guideline for Guidelines", 288 and evaluates guidelines under agreement
with the federal physician and sickness fund associations and the German
Hospital Society.289 The Clearinghouse has also proposed a multi-stage
procedure for guideline development and a "checklist" to determine their
methodological quality. Its work is based on the review of international
literature, the available results of evidence-based medicine (EBM), and the
participation of experts in the respective working groups. All results are
published. The AWMF does not cooperate with the Clearinghouse and
rejects its efforts to evaluate the quality of all CPGs.29° Some steps to resolve
the conflicts, however, have already been taken. Both organizations consider
EBM a major factor when no agreement can be reached on a particular
guideline because of a respectable minority opinion ("two schools"). How
to weight EBM, however, has not been decided by either organization, and
the AWMF leaves this determination to its individual member societies.
Both entities advocate consultation with outside experts and patient
participation.
iii. Conclusion
Coverage guidelines and CPGs are intended to influence clinical
decision-making, eliminate the use of unnecessary and outdated procedures,
and contain costs. Coverage guidelines must also reflect current and
generally accepted medical practice to meet the social law standard of care
for both sickness funds and physicians. Guideline validity is of great
relevance because of their norm-setting quality and the delegation issues
involved. There is, however, no current uniform methodological approach
to their development which should be transparent and public, based on
287. Arztliche Zentralstellefir Qualitdtssicherung (AZQ).
288. Beurteilungskriterien fir Leitlinien in der medizinischen Versorgung [Evaluation
Criteria for Clinical Practice Guidelines], Beschliisse der Vorstdnde von
Bundesdrztekammer und Kassendirztlicher Bundesvereinigung, [ Board Decisions of the
Federal Association of Physicians and the Federal Association of Sickness Funds] (June
1997), 33 DEUTSCHES ARZTEBLATT A-2154, 1997.
289. Deutsche Krankenhausgesellschaft. This is a voluntary organization of hospitals.
German hospitals are owned privately, publicly (municipalities, counties, universities) and
by charitable organizations, all subject to the same laws and standards.
290. Qualitdtssicherung [Quality Control]. AWMF, supra note 283.
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adequate scientific evidence (content), and reflect scientific minority and
patient opinions through representation in the issuing entities (process).2 91
For coverage guideline development, the Federal Committee depends
on outside expert opinion which could be provided through cooperation
between the Clearinghouse and the Association of Medical Societies. If the
AWMF CPGs became coverage guidelines, their normative value and
influence on the daily practice of medicine would be enhanced. The Federal
Committee, in turn, would benefit from increased scientific evidence
supporting its decisions. Its mandate under SGB V, Art. 135, also includes
updating benefits according to changing standard of care, and such a
collaborative approach would improve the quality of care while controlling
CtS292costs.
29
3. Civil Law: Contract and Tort Law
293
For centuries, illness was considered God-given punishment and fate,
and complaints about malpractice were unthinkable.294 In more modem
times, physicians were considered "demi-gods in white," whose authority and
actions were not questioned. Even in the 1950's, malpractice lawsuits were
extremely rare. Medical negligence law, therefore, is a recent development
and attorneys have been specializing in it for no more than twenty years.
Today, however, as patients are becoming "informed consumers" of health
care, as medical technology and the division of labor have impersonalized the
practice of medicine, as more Germans have obtained insurance coverage for
court and attorneys' fees295, and as the media-and legal journals-are
regularly reporting on malpractice litigation and court rulings, the number of
lawsuits is on the rise.
.Under German civil law, medical malpractice liability is subject to the
same contract and tort norms as other categories of liability. Claims may be
291. Rainer Pitschas, Empirie und Rechtprofessioneller Normsetzung: Perspektiven der
Transformation medizinischer Normsetzung in rechtliche Verbindlichkeit [Empirical and
Legal Aspects of Establishing Professional Norms: Translating Medical Guidelines Into
Legal Norms] in MEDICAL GUIDELINES, supra note 241.
292. See Jung, supra note 270.
293. Arzthaftungsrecht/Deliktrecht.
294. This section is based on Alexander P.F. Ehlers, Einleitung (Introduction) in PRAXIS
DES ARZTHAFTUNGSRECHTS [THE APPLICATION OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE LAWS] 1,
(Alexander P.F. Ehlers, Maximilian G. Broglie, eds., Verlagsgruppe Jehle-Rehm, Munich,
1994) [hereinafter Ehlers, Broglie].
295. Rechtsschutzversicherungen.
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filed in parallel but injury, standard of care, causation and damages will be
adjudicated in almost identical fashion. Damages for pain and suffering are
available for tort claims only, and differing statutes of limitation apply.
Medical negligence law is mainly case law, and the highest court is the
Supreme Court for Civil and Criminal Law.296
a. Contract Law
The relationship between patients (privately or publicly insured) and
physicians is considered a service contract and regulated by the Civil Code,297
which requires customary care in the provision of services29 s and allows
compensatory damages to be awarded for injuries. 299 Patients are entitled to
proper history-taking, diagnosis and treatment by specialists.3 °0 Physicians
are liable in case of positive violations of the contract for the provision of
medical services (violation of duty owed and personal injury). Causes of
action are identical to those arising under tort law (malpractice). 30 1 The
contract to treat is concluded between the (adult) patient or parent of a child
and the physician, and may be inferred from the parties' conduct. Physicians
are liable for damages in case of malpractice, but do not owe the duty of a
successful outcome. Physicians (and hospitals) only owe reasonable care as
even the best practitioners do not control the human body in such a way that
296. Bundesgerichtshof (BGH), Karlsruhe.
297. BGB §§611-620 (service contracts), BORGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [CIVIL CODE]
(Beck Verlag, Miinchen, 44t' edition, 1999) [hereinafter BGB]. It was first adopted in 1896
and become law on Jan. 1, 1900.
298. See id. §276 (liability in case of negligence).
299. See id. §249 (compensatory damages), §823 (liability for damages in case of
intentional or negligent personal injury, damage to health, freedom, property, or the violation
of any other legally protected right). German law does not recognize punitive damages.
300. Both §223 of the Criminal Code and BGB §823 protect the patient's physical
inviolability. Criminal actions can be filed for negligent personal injury and involuntary
manslaughter but such lawsuits are rare because the standard of proof is difficult to meet.
Absence of informed consent and violations of confidentiality (§203) are also matters of
criminal law.
301. WOLFGANG FRAHM, WOLFGANG NIXDORF, ARZTHAFTUNGSRECHT [MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE LAW] 3 (Verlag Versicherungswirtschaft e.V., Karlsruhe, 1996). The authors
support all of their statements with an extensive listing of the relevant court rulings and
citations from the literature.
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an unsuccessful outcome would already indicate malpractice. °2 Since the
contract concerns the provision of medical care, it is mainly intended to
protect the patient's physical integrity, and liability is limited to personal
injury, excluding property. Courts, however, have awarded parents damages
for the care of an injured child.
Some authors have addressed the inconsistency between the liability
arising from the civil law service contract between physicians and patients
and the origin of their relationship in social law. 303 According to the SGB V,
sickness funds must ensure the adequate provision of medical care so that,
it is argued, malpractice liability would rest with the insurers, incurring
"official liability' 30 4 as quasi-governmental bodies, and not their provider-
agents.305 The current prevailing interpretation, however, relies on SGB V,
Art. 76(4), requiring the general negligence standard of customary care under
the Civil Code as of the moment the physician has agreed to provide services
for a patient.30 6
Contracts between patients and hospitals originate at the time of
hospitalization after referral by a physician or in an emergency. These
contracts are "comprehensive, 3 7 requiring the hospital to render all medical
and non-medical services as needed for adequate and appropriate care as a
function of the patient's syndrome, its severity, and hospital facilities and
staffing. The hospital as enterprise is liable for all services including those
provided by its agents.30 8
302. BGH VersR 428 (1980).
303. Reimund Schmidt-De Caluwe, Das Behandlungsverhdltnis zwischen Vertragsarzt und
sozialversichertem Patienten [The Legal Relationship Between the Plan Physician and the
Socially Insured Patient], 4 VIERTELJAHRESSCHRIFT FGR SOZIALRECHT 207,224 (1998). See
also Thomas Clemens, Abrechnungsstreitigkeiten, Wirtschaftlichkeitspriifung,
Schadensgregrejl [Claims Processing Disputes, Cost-Effectiveness Audits, Sanctions] in
HANDBUCH DES SOZIALVERSICHERUNGSRECHTS, BAND 1, KRANKENVERSICHERUNGSRECHT
[HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL INSURANCE LAW, VOL. 1, HEALTH INSURANCE LAW] 894, 971
(Bertram Schulin, ed., Verlag C.H. Beck, Munich, 1994).
304. Amtshaftung. Individuals or entities under public law can be held liable for civil law
damages.
305. See BGB § 278 (vicarious liability for agent); § 839 (liability when exercising a public
function).
306. See Ehlers, Broglie, supra note 296, at 174. SGB V, Art. 76(4). This article also
guarantees patient choice of provider. See also Schmidt-De Caluwe, supra note 305, at 207.
307. "Totaler" Krankenhausvertrag.
308. See Ehlers, Broglie, supra note 296, at 18. BGB §278.
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b. Tort Law309
Because of the rising number of medical malpractice lawsuits, standard
of care determinations have gained considerable importance. The tort
standard of care for acts and omissions is objectively determined by generally
accepted preventive, diagnostic and therapeutic practices, and the state of
medical knowledge at the time of treatment. It is national and uniform,
without allowances for personal factors such as temporary incapacitation of
the provider at the time of treatment or lack of experience (beginner) and up-
to-date expertise (physician close to retirement).31° For diagnosis, physicians
must personally examine patients and make home visits when required. They
may not rely alone on information provided by either patients or their
relatives, and diagnosis by phone is prohibited.31' Physicians are free to
choose a particular course of therapy, and deviations from the standard are
permissible whenever needed in a patient's particular circumstances. In case
of alternative prevailing treatments, practitioners must opt for the safer
approach. "The civil law standard must justify the trust claimed by medicine
as an institution.
' 312
Standards of care and liability, however, should not invariably
correspond to what is technically doable, but must reflect social law cost-
effectiveness requirements, 1 3 and patients cannot expect optimal care and
equipment under all circumstances. 314 The Supreme Civil and Criminal
Court has ruled that hospitals are entitled to some standard of care variance
depending on location and size. "Above an essential minimum level
reflecting prevailing standards, a standard below that of a university medical
309. Standard of care and causation requirements are identical under both contract and tort
law. BGH NJW 767 (1989). Tort damages, contrary to contract damages, may be awarded
not only to the injured party but to third parties incurring loss of financial support or services
due to personal injury or death caused by malpractice. BGB §§ 844, 845.
310. Heinrich Hanika, Patientencharta [A Charter of Patients' Rights], 4 MEDR 159
(1999). Also quoting: BGH, Apr. 24, 1988 (Bundesgerichtshof ruling of the Supreme Civil
and Criminal Court), NJW 2298, 2300 (1988).
311. See Ehlers, Broglie, supra note 296, at 180. See also BGH NJW 1248 (1979).
312. See Erich Steffen, WOLF-DIETER DRESSLER, ARZTHAFTUNGSRECHT [MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE LAW] 50 (RWS Verlag, Kommunikationsforum GmbH, Cologne, 1999)
[hereinafter STEFFEN].
313. For further discussion, see infra I.B.4.a.
314. See STEFFEN, supra note 312.
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center is acceptable foi rural hospitals., 315 Courts differentiate between
routine conditions that may be treated without the risk of malpractice liability
at less than optimally staffed and equipped hospitals and cases requiring
more sophisticated technology and expertise that must be referred to
specialized clinics.3 16 Patients must accept "rationing" of services if hospital
capacity does not allow the use of special diagnostic procedures for all those
who apply or necessitates waiting periods.317 However, clinics equipped with
above-average medical technology must employ it whenever indicated.
The Evidentiary Role of Clinical Practice Guidelines. Clinical practice
guidelines, when adopted, should represent the current standard based on
scientific knowledge, practical experience, and professional acceptance.318
Deviations from the standard of care constitute malpractice, deviations from
a guideline do not automatically imply negligence unless the guideline
represents the standard.31 9 In cases of outdated and not yet officially updated
guidelines, physicians are expected to have acquired current knowledge
through continuing education and awareness of official publications
recommending the reevaluation of CPGs. Guidelines may serve as the basis
for establishing proof in malpractice cases, and judges may apply them to
expert testimony. Testifying experts may rely on CPGs for the evaluation of
treatment in individual cases but also as indication of the generally applicable
standard of care. But standards of care, be they structural (national coverage
guidelines) or clinical (practice guidelines), do not absolve practitioners from
exercising clinical judgment, even though guidelines may be "legal criteria
for what is prohibited and what is permissible." No liability results if the
physician has acted as a prudent professional.
Some authors caution that CPGs should not become the gold standard
for courts since randomized controlled clinical studies are not and can not be
available for every recommended treatment approach. CPGs should also not
315. See BGH VI ZR 201/87 (March 8, 1988) and BGH VI ZR 200/88 (May 30, 1989).
See also STEFFEN, supra note 312, at 51. This corresponds to the American "locality rule."
316. PIA RUMLER-DETZEL, Budgetierung-Rationalisierung-Rationierung, 13
VERSICHERUNGSRECHT 564 (1998).
317. See id. at 548. BGH VersR 88, 155 (a hospital may limit amniocentesis to women
whose age correlates with an increased probability of fetal Down syndrome). OLG Cologne,
27 U 13/91, VersR 93, 52 (the waiting period did not constitute malpractice since surgery was
advisable but not urgent). BGH cert. denied (March 10, 1992). Waiting periods in Germany
are extremely rare, and patients may choose their hospital.
318. Dieter Hart, ArztlicheLeitlinien undHaftungsrecht [ClinicalPractice Guidelines and
Malpractice Liability] in MEDICAL GUIDELINES, supra note 241.
319. See Hart, supra note 237, at 12.
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serve the standardization of diagnosis and therapy, thus becoming
instruments of forensic judgment. They are neither laws nor regulations and
not legally binding. 320 Furthermore, the standard of care may develop
independently of guidelines and their methodological requirements.32'
Guidelines provide quality criteria but appropriate care also depends on
patient preferences and clinical judgment as treatment must be responsive to
a patient's individual circumstances and cannot be standardized.322 The law,
scientifically accepted practices, individual circumstances, and the informed
patient's preferences must be evaluated in combination by the courts or
testifying experts. In addition, clinical practice guidelines do not and should
not, by their existence, introduce strict liability.323 They do, however, result
in a covert reversal of the burden of proof whenever cited by a plaintiff,
forcing the attending physician to justify that a potential deviation did not
violate the prevailing standard of care.324
Economic considerations, if intertwined with the quality aspects of a
CPG, complicate the situation even further. Unless both are kept separate
and made transparent, as laid down in the "Guidelines for Guidelines, 325 a
CPG may not be used to determine liability. "Evaluating the connection
between quality and politically motivated legislation, between standard of
care and costs, between the level of professional prudence required and
financial feasibility, is reserved for liabilityjurisprudence.,, 326 The social and
civil law standards defining patients' claims to coverage should not diverge
whenever physicians' choices are limited by the social law cost-effectiveness
mandate and its enforcement mechanisms (budgets, cost-effectiveness
320. See Albrecht Wienke, Leitlinien als Mittel der Qualitdtssicherung in der
medizinischen Versorgung [The Quality Assurance Role of Guidelines in the Provision of
Medical Care], 4 MEDR 172 (1998).
321. OLG Cologne, 27 U 169/89, May 5, 1990 (in spite of the absence ofa CPG, adequate
published evidence indicated that acyclovir therapy of herpetic encephalitis was a generally
accepted practice and the delayed administration of the drug violated the standard of care).
322. See Gerlach et al., supra note 282.
323. Some physicians, however, already perceive the courts moving in this direction.
Klaus Schnetzer, personal communication by e-mail (Nov. 8, 1999).
324. Robert Francke, Leitlinien drztlichen Handelns und Sozialrecht [Clinical Practice
Guidelines and Social Law] in MEDICAL GUIDELINES 173, supra note 241.
325. ARZTLICHE ZENTRALSTELLE FOR QUALITATSSICHERUNG [CHECKLIST], (Jan. 1998).
326. See Hart, supra note 237, at 14.
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reviews, and penalties).327 Political decisions to ration, leading to deviations
from the medically determined standard of care and applicable to the entire
health care system, should bind liability determinations,3 28 and social law
should preempt civil law.329 However, the coverage guidelines of the SGB
V do not do so because civil law, granting an individual's right to damages,
does not recognize the cost-effectiveness mandate of social law. Hence,
malpractice standards should not be applied in a vacuum, and physicians
should not be held liable for system deficits.
c. Conclusion
The statutory system of health care must allow for rational coverage
decisions in order to maximize the use of available resources. The SGB V
coverage guidelines are increasingly amended to serve this purpose. Clinical
practice guidelines specify treatment options and protocols, and help to
determine the "generally accepted medical standard of care in keeping with
the progress of medical science" as stipulated by SGB V, Art. 2. Whether
they actually correspond to this standard must be evaluated in each individual
case.3 30 In the future, CPGs may be linked in some yet undetermined fashion
with the SGB V through the coordinating activities of the different public and
private bodies involved in their elaboration.33' Clinical practice guidelines
requiring constant updating may eventually serve as guideposts in the face
of increasing efforts to contain health care expenditures and to achieve a
more cost-effective use of scarce resources in an era of rapidly changing
medical technology and patient expectations. "Keeping in mind the first
Hippocratic aphorism "ars longa, vita brevis": standards for care may not
become immutable ars longa as medicine is always concerned with vita
brevis.
332
327. See STEFFEN, supra note 312, at 50.
328. See id.
329. See Dieter Hart, Arztliche Leitlinien undHaftungsrecht (Clinical Practice Guidelines
and Malpractice Liability) in MEDICAL GUIDELINES, supra note 241.
330. See Francke, supra note 324.
331. Seeid. at 173.
332. See Eberhard Buchborn, Arztlicher Standard. Begriff, Entwicklung, Anwendung
[The Medical Standard of Care: Definition, Development, Application], 9 MEDR 328, 332
(1993).
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4. The Allocation of Health Care Funds Through SGB V Reforms
a. The Cost-Effectiveness Mandate
i. History
The cost-effectiveness mandate of the SGB V, Art. 12, reminds
physicians of the traditional micro-allocation function of their clinical
decision-making and provides the normative foundation for the retrospective
economic utilization review of German providers.333 Cost containment,
however, is not a new concept in the history of the German health care
system. In 1887, four years after the prepaid social health insurance system
was introduced by law, a contract between one of the sickness funds and four
physicians (an early form of a "provider network" since the contract was
intended to give patients a choice of physicians so far unavailable due to the
requirement that patients see their "district physician") was published
containing the clause: "The physician, while striving for a successful
treatment outcome, accepts the obligation to prescribe economically,
especially limiting the prescription of champagne and other expensive wines
to the lowest acceptable minimum." '334
In 1924, the National Joint Committee of Physician and Sickness Fund
Associations issued a "guideline" requiring the refusal of unnecessary
treatment, followed by a drug prescription "guideline" in 1925. In case of
excessive care, physicians were held financially liable.335 A clause in the
RVO of 1930 already stipulated physicians' obligation towards the sickness
fund to provide "adequate and appropriate care." The term "cost-
effectiveness," however, was only mentioned in connection with medication
and adjunct treatments. Sanctions were triggered by above-average
expenditures of individual sickness funds which then could terminate
physician contracts. A "cost-effectiveness mandate" for all aspects of care
was first adopted in 1955. As of 1968, fee-for-service compensation became
increasingly common and was later considered one of the elements
333. See SGB V at Art. 12 (see section II.B.2.a. supra for the definition of cost-
effectiveness). See also SGB V at Art. 103 (Cost-effectiveness review for physicians,
conducted by both physician and sickness fund associations). See also SGB V at Art. 116
(Cost-effectiveness review for hospitals, conducted by the sickness fund associations).
334. ERIK GOETZE, ARZTHAFTUNGSRECHT UND KASSENARZTLICHES
WIRTSCHAFTLICHKEITSGEBOT [MALPRACTICE LIABILITY AND THE COST-EFFECTIVENESS
MANDATE FOR PHYSICIANS] 94 (Springer Verlag, Berlin, 1989).
335. See id. at 96.
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contributing to escalating health care expenditures.336 As a consequence,
additional forms of physician compensation, such as fee-capping and
capitation for certain procedures, were reintroduced in 1977. Furthermore,
the rising number of physicians was rapidly inflating the number of claims
filed, requiring regional limitations for new practices by specialty. Physician
associations were held to ensure the economical use of medical technology.
In 1988, the venerable RVO was replaced by the SGB V mandating "cost-
effectiveness" in its current form.
ii. Definition
33 7
The cost-effectiveness concept is not limited to social law but is a
general principle of budget policy on all levels of government-federal, state
and local. It also applies to public education,338 all social insurance and
welfare programs (unemployment, social security, welfare, etc.), and is an
expression of the fiduciary function of the State. It is defined as achieving
the best possible result with the means available or as producing a
predetermined result at the lowest cost possible. Cost-effectiveness has the
dual function of protecting the community as well as the individual member's
interests. It establishes individual entitlement to care, but imposes certain
constraints.339
Accordingly, SGB V, Art. 12, requires the "adequate, appropriate and
cost-effective" delivery of "necessary" health care benefits. These terms are
considered to be general only, requiring interpretation in individual cases.
"Appropriate" as the central concept of cost-effectiveness applies a
qualitative aspect to Arts. 1 and 27, together stipulating the provision of all
care required for the preservation, restoration, or improvement of members'
health. Whether treatment is "appropriate" is judged by its conformity with
the "generally accepted standard of medical care in accordance with the
progress of medical science'"34  and "good medical practice., 34'
"Appropriateness" precludes care which is unnecessary, counter-productive,
or even detrimental, and establishes a member's claim to the benefits needed
336. See id. at 105.
337. This section is based on GABRJELENEUGEBAUER, DAS WIRTSCHAFTLICHKEITSGEBOT
IN DER GESETZLICHEN KRANKENVERSICHERUNG [THE COST-EFFECTIVENESS MANDATE AND
THE STATUTORY SYSTEM OF HEALTH CARE] (Erich Schmidt Verlag, Berlin, 1996).
338. Almost all institutions of learning in Germany are public, including universities.
339. See HAUCK, supra note 241, K§12, at 4.
340. See SGB V at Art. 2(1).
341. See id. at Art. 28(1).
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under specific circumstances to produce a successful outcome. Whether care
is appropriate is to be determined only ex ante, to require otherwise would
imply the physician's ability to predict the exact course of an illness.
"Adequate" care depends on each individual case and denotes the
quantitative aspect of appropriate care. It signifies the minimum standard
for benefits considered "necessary" whenever required for adequate care.
Physicians must decide if the desired treatment outcome could be achieved
without a particular procedure. The term "necessary" sets an upper limit by
precluding excessive procedures. "Adequate and appropriate care"
guarantees the quality of treatment for members, while the term "necessary
care" protects the sickness funds and the community of all insured
individuals.342
"Cost-effectiveness" thus introduces economic considerations into the
choice of treatment. The cost of care (to the sickness fund) must be weighed
against its diagnostic and therapeutic benefits (for the patient). SGB V, Art.
1, however, stipulates the primary purpose of the statutory health care
system: the preservation, restoration, or improvement of health. In case of
a single existing procedure, cost is irrelevant (a life-saving transplant, for
example).343 Whenever several treatments are available, the most promising
one must be provided. Cost-effectiveness only enters into the equation in
case of several equally effective, but more or less costly, customary options.
The least costly procedure should then be chosen.
SGB V, Art. 106, for the first time mandated the retrospective
economic review of physicians' practices to be conducted by joint sickness
fund-physician committees.3 4 4  Taking regional particularities into
consideration, the mean expenditures for medical services per patient by
individual practice are calculated and compared with -other same-specialty
practices.34 It is assumed that all physicians treat in a cost-effective manner
and that overruns are indicative of violations. If the deviation from the mean
342. See NEUGEBAUER, supra note 337, at 68.
343. See HAUCK, supra note 241, K§12, at 7.
344. Wirtschaftlichkeitspriifung. Currently 75% of all health care expenditures are
occasioned by physicians either through out-patient care, referrals to hospitals, and
prescriptions of drugs, adjunct treatments and durable medical equipment. It has been
suggested that this should not exceed 70%. Franz Knieps, Herbert Reichelt, Globalbudget
undArzt-Netzwerk [The Global Budget and Physician Networks], 3 SOZIALE SICHERHEIT 96
(1999).
345. Mean values are applied to medical care (Durchschnittswerte. SGB V, Art. 106),
while the total prescription drug expenditures per practice are capped separately (Richtgrdf3en.
Id. at Art. 84).
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cannot be justified, a certain percentage is deducted from sickness fund
reimbursements. In addition, the law provides for random quarterly audits
of approximately 2% of all practices which can take place either as statistical
reviews or case-specific evaluations. The actual number of reviews leading
to sanctions is quite low and sickness funds provide few statistics.346
Enforcement of sanctions has been fairly lax, and the government has
amnestied groups of providers more than once.
iii. Impact on the Standard of Care
As discussed above, care must be adequate and appropriate (social law)
while also subject to customary (criminal, contract and tort) standards. The
Supreme Social Court has confirmed the priority of clinical judgment over
cost-effectiveness considerations.347 It has also clarified that sanctions for
violations of the cost-effectiveness mandate are inappropriate whenever
clinical judgment is in accordance with criminal and civil law standards of
care. In actual practice, collisions between the cost-effectiveness mandate
and liability standards seldom occur. First, cost-effectiveness (or micro-
allocation) decisions have traditionally been part of medical practice.
Second, liability determinations or individual case audits permit the case-
specific "balancing" of cost-benefit considerations even in cases of injury due
to the omission of special diagnostic or treatment procedures or measures of
"defensive medicine," performed to lower the risk of malpractice actions,
provided they are medically indicated.
3 48
However, numerous physicians object to the economic (social law)
utilization reviews out of concern that they may increasingly be forced to
lower the standard of care, thus raising their risk of committing (civil law)
malpractice. Furthermore, physicians are penalized financially if they exceed
the mean expenditure coefficients for their specialty, but which do not factor
in quality of treatment and outcome sustainability. This could be
accomplished only through a case-based analysis, considered too resource-
intensive in comparison with the potential gains (reduction of reimbursement
to physician).
So far, the social law economic utilization norms are limited to
excessive care, neglecting the added expenses incurred in cases of
insufficient diagnostic evaluations or treatment leading to injury requiring
346. Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Health Care Rationing in the Courts. A Comparative Study.
21 HASTINGS INT'L & COmP. L. REv. 639, 674 (1998).
347. See Clemens, supra note 303. See also BSGE 62, 24, 26 (June 2, 1987).
348. See Clemens, supra note 303, at 916.
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more expensive care and, potentially, to sanctions whenever the civil and
criminal law standards of care have been violated. "In this respect, the term
cost-effectiveness in social law is one-eyed: it is unrelated to general
economic cost-effectiveness. It has become a singular concept resistant to
abstract definition and can be understood only within the SGB V
framework." '349 Current interpretations, however, carefully attempt to
transcend the limited construction of the SGB V by including the "type,
duration, and sustainability of the successful outcome."35 This indicates that
a cost-benefit analysis is not to be merely economic but should also comprise
qualitative medical considerations, touching upon the difficult quantification
of quality of care which may require some, yet undefined, standardization.351
b. National Budgets and Caps
Budgets have become a "paradigm of health care reform policy.
35 2
The SGB V, as adopted in 1988, codified the voluntary spending targets
already in place at that time, some of them negotiated by physicians and
sickness funds. From 1993 to 1995, however, non-negotiable mandatory
sector budgets were introduced for physicians, dentists, hospitals, and
prescription drugs, intended as a temporary emergency measure to contain
the continued rise in health care expenditures since voluntary targets had
failed. As of January 1, 1996, the national fee scale for physicians based on
relative value units (RVUs) 353 was revised, also to provide structural
incentives for a shift towards primary care.35 The sickness funds capped the
global amount of fees to be paid to their providers, but the fee scale
continued to allow mostly fee-for-service billing, resulting in increased
numbers of procedures performed by physicians and,hence a significantly
lower RVU value. This in turn induced additional physicians to inflate their
services in an attempt to preserve their shrinking income and to accelerate
349. See id. at 918.
350. See HAUCK, supra note 241, K§12, at 8. See also BSGE 52, 79, 74 and 134, 138.
351. See HAUCK, supra note 241, K§12, at 8.
352. Josef Dillings, Die Budgetierung des Krankenhaussektors [Budgets for Hospitals],
in VON DER BUDGETIERUNG ZUR STRUKTURREFORM IM GESUNDHEITSWESEN [FROM BUDGETS
TO STRUCTURAL REFORMS OF THE HEALTH CARE SYSTEM] 191 (Josef Drillings, ed., R. v.
Decker's Verlag, Heidelberg, 1996).
353. Punktwerte. This scale was first introduced in 1978.
354. Patients can refer themselves to specialists.
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the downward spiral of the RVU.355 In order to prevent it from spinning out
of control, the National Evaluation Committee, representing physicians and
sickness funds,356 resorted to "partial budgets" for certain benefit groups such
as lab work, outpatient surgery, and preventive measures. Their purpose was
to remove these rapidly expanding services from the overall provider
compensation budgets to eliminate their deleterious effect on the RVU. In
some of these groups, however, the RVU decreased even more rapidly,
seriously threatening physicians' incomes.357
On July 1, 1997, "practice budgets" were introduced, designed as an
incentive for cost-effective care while stabilizing both physician income and
the RVU without compromising the quality of care. A maximum number of
RVUs per office was calculated by the National Evaluation Committee,
based on practice-specific factors such as different operating costs by
specialty and number of patients per office in 1994 and 1995. Only 71% of
procedures considered standard by specialty were covered by practice
budgets so that physicians could still receive compensation by workload
while able to micro-allocate their resources according to clinical judgment.
Additional allowances were made for claims for procedures performed due
to physicians' special qualifications, above-average requirements for
seriously ill patients, regional needs and laboratory usage. No caps applied
to 13% of all services, including the use of high-tech equipment (such as CT-
scanners).358 Whenever physicians exceeded their individual budgets,
additional care was reimbursed at progressively lower rates. 359 The absolute
number of RVUs per budget was subject to judicial review, and the
Evaluation Committee, in case of a complaint, was required to justify the
355. Der Hamsterradeffekt [Treadmill Effect]. Manfred Partsch, Neuorientierung in der
dirztlichen Vergiitung [Physician Compensation - New Directions], 13 DIE
ORTSKRANKENKASSE 421 (July 1997).
356. Bewertungsausschu3. This committee also developed and keeps amending the
national fee scale.
357. Rainer Hess, Angemessenheit der Vergiitung und angemessenes Arzthonorar - aus
der Sicht der drztlichen Selbst-verwaltung [Appropriate Compensation and Appropriate
Physicians' Fees - The Position of the Physician Associations], 5 VIERTELJAHRESSCHRIFT
FOR SOZIALRECHT 367 (1995).
358. Birgit Schauenburg, Die Einfthrung des Praxisbudgets in den EBM [The Introduction
of Practice Budgets as Component of the National Fee Scale], ZEITSCHRIFT DER
BETRIEBLICHEN KRANKENKASSEN 193 (May 1997).
359. See SGB V at Art. 85(4).
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correctness of its calculations.36 ° Complaints concerning the fees for
individual procedures, however, were subject to limited judicial review
only.
361
Hospital compensation was capped as well by substituting budgets
based on prospective utilization rates for uniform daily rates per patient
independent of diagnosis and calculated retrospectively to cover costs.
Individual hospital budgets were (and are) negotiated by hospitals and
sickness funds according to the number of cases per diagnostic category. If
a hospital exceeds the budget by more than 15 percent, reimbursement is cut
in half. Beginning in 1995, payments according to patient management
categories, diagnosis-related fees and fees for excepted special procedures
362
were phased in. Rates are jointly determined by the hospital and sickness
fund associations for each state.
Since controversy has been the hallmark of German health care reform,
a natural side effect of a system evolving through negotiation and consensus-
building, the introduction of practice budgets generated considerable
disagreement. While the sickness funds welcomed them ("Practice budgets
allow the effective limitation of procedures while preserving physicians'
independent clinical judgment" 63), primary care physicians staged protests
in Berlin ("Practice budgets in their current form would end quality primary
care and reduce it to the level of barefoot medicine" 364). German physicians,
unaccustomed to externally imposed constraints, fear that budgets will
fundamentally alter the medical profession and thus destroy the traditional
physician-patient relationship, resting on independent clinical decision
making by the physician and patient autonomy, both protected by the
360. See Thomas Clemens, A'rztliche Berufsfreiheit ausjuristischer Sicht [Implications of
the Constitutional Right to the Independent Practice of Medicine] in DIE ARZTLICHE
BERUFSAUSOBUNG IN DEN GRENZEN DER QUALITATSSICHERUNG [THE PRACTICE OF MEDICINE
WITHIN THE LIMITS OF QUALITY ASSURANCE] 17, 42 (Wienke, Lippert, Eisenmenger, eds.,
Springer Verlag, 1998). BSG SozR 3-2500 §87, No. 16, at 66 (Jan. 29, 1997).
361. See id. See also BSG 79, 239, 242 (Nov. 13, 1996). See also LSG Baden-
Wfirttemberg (Sept. 4, 1997).
362. Sonderentgelte.
363. Bernd Metzinger, Andreas Woggon, Praxisbudgets als Ausweg aus dem EBM-
Dilemma beschlossen! [Practice Budgets Will Resolve the National Fee Scale Dilemma!],
DIE KRANKENVERSICHERUNG 12, 14 (Jan. 1997).
364. Reinhold Schlitt, Einfiihrung der Praxisbudgets: Es bleibt spannend [Introducing
Practice Budgets: The Suspense Continues], 20 DER KASSENARZT 16 (1997).
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Constitution.365 Budgets also create conflict between civil and criminal
liability standards and social law which increasingly requires micro-level
rationing of care while the standard of care patients are entitled to remains
unchanged: according to the SGB V itself, it must be in keeping with
prevailing practices and the progress of medical science. Physicians,
exercising due care and obtaining informed consent, must choose the most
promising treatment according to each patient's individual circumstances. 66
In addition, the Supreme Social Court, despite the recognition that cost-
effectiveness reviews have become more threatening in an era of macro-level
cost containment,367 continues to give civil and criminal law standards
priority over economic considerations, leaving physicians caught between
financial restrictions and unchanged (or even rising) standards of care.
"Budgets shift benefit determinations to providers who must now pitch
in for politicians by making political coverage decisions."3 68 "We physicians
are always focused on the individual patient, unable to send anyone home
who arrives on the hospital doorstep. But the politicians lack the courage to
take responsibility for their reforms and are unwilling to make rationing
decisions. Instead, they leave us holding the bag." '369
These two contributions to a panel discussion reflect the current
thinking about cost containment: most physicians understand and accept the
necessity for reducing benefits, but, used to near-complete freedom in
clinical decision-making, call on politicians to take responsibility for the
slippery slope of rationing37° through more precise legislated ("political")
365. See Laufs, supra note 15, at 2718.
366. See id. Another chapter, left for another time, could be entitled "The Rise of Patient
Autonomy and Informed Consent." Both concepts were close to irrelevant until more
stringent cost containment measures were enacted in Germany, creating numerous conflicts
for physicians as discussed in this article. The more physicians felt that the responsibility for
the consequences of cost containment was passed on to them, the more the patients were
expected to share the responsibility. This was supported by court decisions strengthening
informed consent requirements, due also, in all fairness, to increasing patient self-confidence
and the rising number of malpractice actions.
367. See Clemens, supra note 303, at 917.
368. Christian Freund, Panel Discussionin DIEBUDGETIERUNGDES GESUNDHE1TSWESENS-
Wo BLEIBT DER MEDIZINISCHE STANDARD? [HEALTH CARE BUDGETS-WHAT WILL HAPPEN
TO THEMEDICAL STANDARD OF CARE] 81,82 (Thomas Ratajcak, Gabriela Schwarz-Schilling,
eds., Springer-Verlag, Berlin, 1997) [hereinafter HEALTH CARE BUDGETS].
369. See H.F. Kienzle, id. at 83.
370. Dieter Schfitz, Arzte verschenken Leistung - aber noch sind wir nicht in England
[Physicians Give Away Care - But We Are Not in Great Britain Yet], 220 ARZTEZEITUNG
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coverage determinations. Macro-level definitions of "medical necessity"
correspond to "overt" rationing, excluding from coverage, for example,
dialysis for older patients (as in Great Britain), drugs, adjunct therapies and
durable medical equipment of undetermined effectiveness, or over-the-
counter medication for minor ailments.37 Budgets and caps on physician
compensation, however, lead to "covert" rationing of services by introducing
economic considerations into clinical decision making. 72 Legislators are
therefore criticized as "ignoring the impact of budgets on the micro-level
' 373
and leaving patients bereft of any means to determine whether the services
rendered violate the social law standards of care. But in light of the historical
background of the comprehensive German health care system and recent
German history, engaging in a national debate on the ethics of rationing is a
difficult step to take on the part of any politician. "Politicians currently avoid
discussing our value system. 374 Capping health care expenditures through
legislation is the easier way out.
On the occasion of the 1994 National Physicians' Convention, it was
resolved that:
"Faced with the conflict between the interest of the patient and that
of the community, the physician must protect the patient's interest
and act according to good medical practice. In order to provide
optimal care, medical necessity decisions must be grounded in
medical science, especially when the gap is widening between what
is medically reasonable, humanly appropriate and technically
doable."375
Unfortunately, the question whether the standard of care should include
everything "medically doable" orbe limited to what is "affordable" under the
(Dec. 2, 1999).
371. See SGB Vat Art. 34.
372. See id. Ingwer Ebsen, Ressourcenknappheit im Gesundheitswesen [Scarce Health
Care Resources], in HEALTH CARE BUDGETS, supra note 370, at 112.
373. See id. at 113.
374. Lothar WeiBbach, President of the German Cancer Society, quoted in Michael
Emmrich "Rationierte Medikamentefiir ausgewdhlte Kranke? [Rationed Drugs for Which
Patients?], FRANKFURTER RuNDSCHAU, Oct. 12, 1999.
375. Resolution adopted by the National Physicians' Convention, 24 DELUTSCHES
ARZTEBLATT 1 (Supplement, May 1994).
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budget remains unresolved.376 But physicians and their associations, integral
elements of the self-governed system of health care, wield considerable
influence and will ensure that their voices continue to be heard.
c. Physician Compensation
SGB V, Art. 72, mandates "adequate physician compensation." In
1995, the BSG ruled that the legislative intent was not to guarantee the
adequacy of individual physicians' incomes or individual fees but to ensure
the delivery of health care to the public through the adequate overall payment
of physicians' services. 3 77 The national and regional collective agreements,
negotiated by the federal and regional physician and sickness fund
associations-normative under public contract law--detail all services and
their corresponding number of RVUs, based on the national fee scale.3 78 The
regional physician and sickness fund associations then determine the regional
global amount available for physician compensation,379 factoring in
physicians' office operating costs, working hours, and the type and volume
of services rendered. All agreements are renegotiated annually and the
global payment is adjusted upward but limited to the revenue increases of the
sickness funds (premiums in step with rising incomes). Statistics are
compiled by the Federal Ministry of Health.
The sickness funds make regional global lump-sum payments for all
providers combined to the regional physician associations which in turn
376. The consequences of combining budgets and capitation were addressed in a recent
malpractice action. Because of the capitated payment for routine cases, a urologist failed to
conduct a PSA screening test for a patient whose prostate cancer had already metastasized by
the time of detection. The court acquitted the physician and held that he could have
recognized the condition at a much earlier stage but was not negligent by not doing so. Public
criticism was leveled at the regional physician associations agreeing to payment arrangements
which allow physicians to benefit financially from withholding benefits. Die heimliche
Rationierung bringt A'rzte in die Zwickmihle [Covert Rationing Puts Physicians in a Bind],
220 ARZTEZEITUNG, Dec. 2, 1999.
377. Eckart Fiedler, Angemessenheit der Vergiitung - angemessenes Arzthonorar aus der
Sicht der Krankenkassen [Adequate Compensation - Adequate Physicians 'Fees as Seen by
the Sickness Funds], 5 VIERTELJAHRESSCHRIFT FOR VERSICHERUNGSRECHT 355 (1995).
378. EinheitlicherBewertungsmafistab (EBM). SGB V, Art. 87. The SGB V also provides
for a temporary quarterly flat rate which would "pass on the entire actuarial risk to the
physician." Needless to say, this approach has never been considered in practice. ROLF
LIEBOLD, HANDLEXIKON FOR DEN VERTRAGSARZT [POCKET ENCYLOPEDIA FOR THE PLAN
PHYsIciAN] 103 (Asgard Verlag, Sankt Augustin, 1994).
379. Gesamtvergiitung. See SGB V at Art. 85.
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process the claims filed by their physician members. Allowing for regional
particularities, the physician associations determine the combination of fee-
for-service, capitation and diagnosis-related payments, and the total number
of RVUs to be reimbursed for each medical specialty by office. 8 ° In 1972,
the Supreme Constitutional Court confirmed the general constitutionality of
this procedure because it "does not limit physicians' contractual right to
compensation but is a distribution of the global funds allocated by law within
the social insurance system benefitting the physicians. ' '381 But since the
introduction of regional global payments, the distribution and fee setting
methodologies have gained considerable importance, and more stringent
controls may be advisable, as already envisaged by the Supreme Social Court
in its recent rulings.382
Since overall budgets are set on a federal level and additional
constraints imposed on a regional basis, physicians' incomes were unstable
and even unpredictable when the RVU fluctuated according to the total
number of claims filed (it has been returned to a fixed value). Since then,
"adequate compensation" has become another subject of public debate. The
State as organizer of the statutory health care system must ensure physician
compensation commensurate to the value of the services rendered.383
Physicians' statutory social law obligations are accompanied by their
entitlement to adequate compensation, and to require the delivery of care at
or below cost would also violate their constitutional right to adequate
compensation for services rendered by statute.384 Certainly, efforts to
preserve the viability of the health care system legitimately aim to protect the
community but physician payments may only be predetermined to serve
380. Honorarverteilungsmaflstab (HVM - unterschiedlicher Verteilungspunktwert nach
Facharztgruppe). The mean income by practice should be considered whenever capping
compensation for individual specialties. Clemens, supra note 360, at 44.
381. BVerfG 33, 171 (May 10, 1972).
382. Thomas Clemens, Die Regelungen der Honorarverteilung - Der Stand der
Rechtsprechung des BSG [Determining Physician Payment- Current Supreme Social Court
Authority], I MEDR A 164 (2000). BSG Sept. 9 and Oct. 21, 1998; Jan. 1, and Aug. 25,
1999.
383. Josef Isensee, Das Recht des Kassenarztes auf angemessene Vergiitung [The Right
of Sickness Fund Physicians to Adequate Payment], 5 VIERTELJAHRESSCHRIFT FOR
SOZIALRECHT 352, 355 (1995).
384. Meinhard Heinze, Die rechtlichen Rahmenbedingungen der iirztlichen
Heilbehandlung [The LegalFrameworkofPhysician-ProvidedMedical Care], 6 MEDR 252,
255 (1996). GRUNDGESETZ [CONSTITUTION] Arts. 12 (Professional Independence), 14
(Protection of Property).
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global principles without violating the constitution. 385  Hence, limiting
physician compensation through budgets designed to preserve premium
stability may be unconstitutional since office operating expenditures,
working hours, and scope of care provided can no longer be adequately
factored in as stipulated by the SGB V.386 For example, physicians' global
compensation growth rate in 1999 may not exceed that of sickness funds'
revenues in 1998 over the 1997 baseline.
387
In addition, physicians are considered self-employed, further
strengthening their constitutional right to adequate payment without which
the participation of self-employed individuals in the statutory system of
health care would violate the Constitution.388 But whether physicians are
truly "self-employed" and properly treated as such by tax law is questioned
by many since their professional activity is subject to numerous social law
provisions. The issue remains hotly debated, yet unresolved. It is not just an
academic subject since social law limits or prohibits practices such as
balance billing for care covered by the national fee scale, delegation of
procedures to qualified staff, delegation to another physician in case of long-
term illness, patient selection, and cost accounting according to business
management principles.389
Physicians object to the current compensation system which permits
the sickness funds to meet their cost containment goals, but the system is said
to force some groups of physicians to provide medical care below cost or, for
some, to eliminate any type of physician "income.,, 390 But the BSG recently
ruled that individual items of the national fee scale as negotiated by both
physician and sickness fund associations are not subject to judicial review
385. Isensee, supra note 356, at 352.
386. See SGB V at Art. 85.
387. Otto Ernst Krasney, Das neue Gesetz zur Stdrkung der Solidaritdt in der gesetzlichen
Krankenversicherung [The New Law on Strengthening Solidarity within the Statutory Health
Care System], 24 NJW 1745, 1750 (1999). GKV-Solidarititsstdrkungsgesetz [Law on
Strengthening Solidarity within the Statutory Health Care System), BGB1. 11998, 3857, Dec.
19, 1998.
388. See Heinze, supra note 384, at 256.
389. See Clemens, supra note 303, at 918, 919.
390. Raimund Wimmer, Rechtsschutz gegen Honorarbescheide muff in Deutschland
verbessert werden [Legal Protection Against Sickness Fund Reimbursement Decisions Must
be Strengthened], ARZTEZEITUNG, article name 124a1401 (July 6, 1999) (quoting Fritz
Ossenbiihl) (1998). Even though the practice of medicine today is subject to formerly
unknown constraints, physicians are still among those in the highest income brackets.
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since the schedule is considered a coherent rate system.39' Furthermore, how
the global payment is distributed among physicians by their regional
associations is subject to no more than limited judicial review by the social
courts, as the associations are entitled by law to a certain degree of rule-
making discretion. It is argued, however, that the judiciary must safeguard
the constitutional rights of all components of the statutory health care system
which, as a whole, does not enjoy the protection of the Constitution. If the
BSG agreed, this would mean full judicial review of all fee-setting
mechanisms, and the norm-setting entities, in case of violations, would have
to "redo their homework, only better this time."'3 92
d. Prescription Drug Spending Controls
Prescription drug spending controls have been and continue to be
another contentious issue of German health care reform. SGB V, Art. 35,
introduced "reference prices" 393 for pharmaceuticals, capping the amount
covered per prescription drug ("innovative" and recently patented drugs are
excepted). SGB V, Art. 84, mandates annual global budgets 394 for drug
expenditures. In case of budget overruns, the amount is deducted from the
lump-sum compensation for all physicians by the sickness funds, making
physicians collectively liable. In addition, claims filed for prescriptions by
individual physicians are subject to retrospective cost-effectiveness
(economic prescription utilization) reviews, 395 based on "standard prescribing
391. BSG Az B 6 KA 46/97 (January 20, 1999).
392. See Wimmer, supra note 390.
393. Festbetrdge. These became law with the adoption of the SGB V in 1988 despite
heavy lobbying by domestic and international pharmaceutical manufacturers.
394. The Federal Minister of Health may raise the budget any time should unusual
circumstances unexpectedly increase demand for prescription medication.
395. In 1992 all sectors of health care, including pharmaceuticals, became subject to
mandatory, non-negotiable budgets (intended as a three-year emergency measure). Savings
through both reference prices and budgets were achieved due to fewer prescriptions for drugs
with questionable therapeutic effects and a shift to generics. Current cost control provisions
not only limit physicians' former discretion to prescribe any drug on the market, including
OTC preparations, but exact contributions from pharmacies (contractual providers under the
SGB V) and the pharmaceutical industry as well. Before regulation, pharmaceutical
manufacturers supplying the German market had some of the highest profit margins in the
world. In 1988, German per capita expenditures for prescription drugs exceeded those in the
United States where health care spending per person is almost double that of Germany.
GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GERMAN HEALTH CARE REFORMS (GAO/HRD-93-103,
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amounts, 396 by office and medical specialty, negotiated jointly by the
regional sickness fund and physician associations. In the case of a 15 percent
overrun, a practice will be reviewed individually. Whenever overruns exceed
25 percent, physicians are financially liable for excess expenditures unless
justified due to practice-specific factors or circumstances. Statistical
comparisons must be followed by an "intellectual" check before a decision
may be rendered. Physicians' efforts to stay within the budget are
complicated by the fact that sickness funds are no longer required by law to
provide physician-specific prescribing data to the physician associations.397
Once an individual physician's budget has been exhausted (commercial office
software is allegedly available to correlate prescriptions and budgets),
physicians' contractual obligations to provide services continue. There have
been reports, however, that patients were inappropriately refused treatment
or practices closed. More subtle methods to beat the budget are patient wait-
listing, for example, or the pretense of practice overload. It has been
suggested that medication for seriously ill patients should be excluded from
the standard prescribing amounts in order to eliminate any disincentive to
treat such patients.398 Chronic pain specialists have demanded a waiver from
budgets because newer, more effective-but costlier-pain medication and
opioids had not been considered when the budgets were introduced.3 99
Global drug budgets and standard prescribing amounts have been in
force concurrently for several years now, triggering protests by prescribing
physicians who feel in double jeopardy. The new Social Democratic
government continued this approach under the interim amendment to the
SGB V,400 adopted in December 1998, but limited total physician liability for
budget overruns to 5 percent of the budget. Still, physician representatives
protest that practitioners remain in double jeopardy for penalties, and that
promises to eliminate the budget and to return the morbidity risk to the
1993)).
396. See Richtgr~f3en. SGB V at Art. 84(3).
397. Sabine Gl6ser, Kassendrzte zwischen Budget und Richtgrjfen [Sickness Fund
Physicians Stuck Between Budget and Standard Prescribing Amounts], 5 DEUTSCHES
ARZTEBLATTC-191 (Feb. 1999).
398. Wolfgang Spellbrink, Rechtsfolgen der Budgetiiberschreitung nach §84 SGB V [Legal
Consequences of Budget Violations under SGB V, Art. 84], 2 MEDR 65 (1997).
399. Medizinerfordern mehr Geldfiir Schmerztherapie [Physicians Demand More Funds
for Pain Control Medication], HERSFELDER ZEITUNG, Oct. 20, 1999.
400. See Krasney, supra note 387.
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sickness funds have not been kept.4°' In 1998, some regional physician
associations had already calculated a new standard prescribing amounts
designed to replace the budgets. The reference price system was also
preserved by the Social Democrats who added provisions requiring that an
adequate variety of drugs for appropriate treatment be available, and that
reference prices "should" not exceed a certain range, thus allowing
exceptions in order to ensure sufficient supplies. 2
As an added cost-saving measure, SGB V, Art. 92, calls for a new
prescription drug coverage guideline to be issued by the Federal Committee
of Physician and Sickness Fund Associations. Such a guideline was first
promulgated in 1993 and last modified in September 1998. It reiterates
patients' right to drug treatment according to the prevailing standard of care
in keeping with the progress of medical science, but also incorporates cost-
effectiveness (utilization) considerations. It lists general groups of (mostly
over-the-counter) items not covered for minor ailments, groups to which
indication-dependent coverage may apply (appetite suppressants, vitamins),
and groups of medication to be prescribed only when alternative approaches
alone have failed (diet, exercise) and need to be supplemented. This
coverage guideline does not correspond to a drug formulary and preserves
discretion for clinical judgment.
A recent, unique case illustrates the quandary resulting from spending
controls for physicians, patients, and sickness funds.40 3 A general
practitioner, prescribing three drugs for a 90-year old women suffering from
multiple conditions, was fined by her physician association and warned by
the local social court that she would lose her license to practice as a sickness
fund physician unless she discontinued the "inappropriate and wasteful"
treatment, considering the patient's age and the redundant therapeutic effects
of the drugs. According to expert testimony, the treatment was appropriate
and corresponded to the standard of care. The expert noted that withholding
the medication would increase suffering, and the physician added that she
was unwilling to deny care to someone who had raised eight children,
numerous grandchildren and great-grandchildren, merely because of age and
diminished capacity to produce. The physician, pointing to the apparent lack
of pharmacological expertise on the part of the physician association medical
review committee, sued the committee for solicitation to commit battery and
401. Wolfgang Brech (Board Member, Federal Association of Physicians), Nachgefragt
[Interview], 5 DEUTSCHES ARZTEBLATT C- 191 (Feb. 1999).
402. See Krasney, supra note 387, at 1747. See SGB V at Art. 35(1),(5).
403. Klaus Schnetzer,personal communication by e-mail (Sept. 9, 1999). Lawsuit-related
documents on file with the author.
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murder, to violate the duty of care, and misrepresentation of scientific facts.
The case is still pending and is a poignant illustration of the unresolved
conflict between the increasing tendency of the social courts to implement
social law cost containment measures and the tort standard of care.
e. The Coverage of Innovative Treatments
The recently amended SGB V, Art. 135,404 authorizes the Federal
Committee of Physician and Sickness Fund Associations, upon application
by one of the federal or regional physician or sickness fund associations, to
evaluate "innovative"' diagnostic and treatment procedures for coverage.
Approval depends on diagnostic and therapeutic usefulness, medical
necessity, and cost-effectiveness compared to traditional methods.
"Usefulness" is defined as effectiveness for a particular indication, a positive
cost/benefit analysis, and usefulness compared to other methods designed to
achieve the same goal. "Medical necessity" denotes the relevance of the
procedure for care, the epidemiology of the illness and its spontaneous
course, and the availability of diagnostic and therapeutic alternatives. "Cost-
effectiveness" covers the estimated expenditures per patient, the cost/benefit
analysis per patient and for the community including follow-up costs, and the
comparative cost/benefit analysis in relation to other methods. "Art. 135 thus
becomes the "eye of the needle" for medical progress and an element of
health care rationing."" Critics interpret recent BSG rulings4 °7 in support
of this procedure as a "comprehensive denial of coverage of innovative
procedures with the proviso of future approval," thus subjecting the progress
404. Richtlinie fiber die Einflihrung neuer Untersuchungs- und Behandlungsmethoden
(NUB-Richtlinie) [Coverage Guidelinefor Innovative Diagnostic and Treatment Procedures]
(amended Jan. 1, 1998), supra note 250.
405. Procedures so closely related to already prevailing practices that they can not be
considered to be innovative are excepted. Wolfgang Spoerr, MedizinischerFortschritt unter
Verbot mit Erlaubnisvorbehalt? [Medical Progress Excluded from Coverage Unless
Approved by Administrative Decision?], 24 NJW 1773 (1999). BSG 1 RK 14/96 at 6 (Sept.
16, 1997). Currently in the United States, the emphasis of cost containment efforts is on
coverage exclusions and benefit denials. Even though cost containment is also a German
goal, the SGBV continues to stipulate patient entitlement to care and protection as an integral
element of all reform efforts.
406. See id. at 1773.
407. BSG 1 RK 28/95 (Sept. 16, 1997), BSG 1 RK 14/96 (Sept. 16, 1997).
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of medicine to administrative decision making by the Federal Committee
whose capacity to be the sole arbiter of medical progress is questioned.4 8
Claims for innovative procedures will be reimbursed by the sickness
funds only if a corresponding guideline has been issued but a denial can be
appealed based on "system failure." If it can be shown that the Federal
Committee failed to rule on an innovative procedure, that a ruling was
unduly delayed or questionable, the patient (and provider) may legitimately
claim coverage. One of two conditions, however, must be met: (1) the
procedure must have been proven effective, or (2) must be common practice.
The assumption is that successful treatments will become integral elements
of physician training and customary care. A customary procedure is covered
even if not proven effective according to the empirical criteria of Art. 135.
This appears circular since innovative procedures not covered will not
become common practice4 9-90% of all patients and physicians participate
in the statutory system-and whenever a procedure has been shown to be
effective it is irrelevant whether it has also become prevailing practice.
The Art. 135 process, contradicting precedent, and current
interpretation in the literature also touches on patients' yet unresolved
entitlement to coverage under the SGB V in the light of rapid medical
progress. Entitlements are phrased in general terms ("the right to the
prevention, early diagnosis and treatment of illness") and given particular
meaning by innovative procedure coverage guidelines which are subject to
limited judicial review only.4 0 The evaluation of innovative diagnostic and
treatment procedures for coverage will remain controversial for as long as
doubts concerning the legitimacy of the legislative delegation of rule-making
powers to the Federal Committee, the constitutionality of its rulings, its
decisional criteria and the gap between these criteria and those applied by the
courts persist.
411
408. See Spoerr, supra note 405.
409. The same "Catch-22" concern is shared in the United States: "The refusal to
reimburse at the outset will greatly slow the dispersion of new technology." Mark A. Hall,
Gerard F. Anderson, Health Insurers'Assessment of Medical Necessity. 140 U.Pa.L. Rev.
1637, fn. 158 (1992), quoted in ROSENBLATT ET AL., supra note 17, at 269.
410. See Spoerr, supra note 405, at 1774.
411. See id.
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5. The Health Care Debate: Legislative Reforms
The health care reform debate continued when the newly elected
German government, a coalition of the Social Democratic Party and the
Greens, was sworn in on October 27, 1998. Reform legislation had already
been a campaign subject, and a major revision of the SGB V was announced
immediately by the new government. Interim provisions became law on
January 1, 1999, capping expenditures in all major sectors of the health care
system, lowering co-payments for prescription drugs, eliminating some of the
recent dental benefit exclusions, and expanding coverage for the chronically
ill. The draft "Health Care Reform Bill of 2000 ',412 of May 25, 1999,
emphasized the current adequate funding of the health care system (operating
funds and reserves of 7.5 billion Deutschmark) but considered the premiums
of 13.6 percent and higher co-payments a burdensome legacy of the prior
Christian Democratic government.4 3 In addition to introducing global
budgets in order to stabilize or lower the premiums, the bill was intended to
further the integration of office-based and hospital care (strictly segregated
for decades), strengthen the role of primary care physicians, expand quality
management and preventive dental care, promote more economical drug
prescribing practices while broadening access to effective medication, ensure
adequate investments for hospital maintenance, improve health promotion,
rehabilitation, self-help options and the evaluation of therapeutic and
diagnostic procedures, expand patients' rights and protections, strengthen the
system of self-governance, eliminate cherry-picking by private insurances
(covering 10 percent of the population), and limit the number of practicing
physicians, for example, through "golden handshakes" for those willing to
close their offices in regions with disproportionately high numbers of
practitioners.
a. The Global Budgets
One of the most far-reaching components of the reform bill was the
proposed global budget for health care expenditures, defined as the sum of
all individual "global budgets" made available for the sickness funds under
412. REFERENTENENTWURF ELNES GESETZES ZUR REFORM DER GESETZLICHEN
KRANKENVERSICHERUNG AB DEM JAHR 2000 (GKV-GESUNDHEITSREFORM 2000) [DRAFT
BILL, REVISION OF THE STATUTORY HEALTH CARE LAW FOR 2000] (Bonn, May 25, 1999).
413. Chancellor Kohl's government of Christian Democrats and Free Democrats was
reelected three times and held office for four consecutive four-year terms from 1982 until
1998.
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SGB V, Art. 142. Each sickness fund thus disposed of an annual budget for
all sectors of care combined, permitting the flexible allocation of funds
according to need while controlling expenditures and preserving premium
stability. Adjustments based on demographics were permissible, and budgets
could be balanced through cuts in other areas if providers, for example, faced
unforeseen events inflating expenditures. Sickness fund associations were
to advise their sickness funds in case of budget overruns which were to be
offset within two years. Global budget increases were linked to growth in
member family income and thus sickness fund revenues (expected to rise by
DM 1.3 billion in 1999 and DM 2 billion in 2000) based on statistics
calculated by the Federal Ministry of Health.
As each and every amendment to the German consensus-based health
care system is accompanied by a detailed and polemic public debate among
all participating players (the federal government practicing more restraint
than physicians and sickness funds), the global budgets were extensively
dissected and analyzed. Physicians predicted dire consequences since
optimizing outcomes with limited means would lower the standard of care,
and called for quality assurance measures to prevent medical care from
deteriorating into "barefoot medicine." Some observers warned that such
measures would become meaningless if budgets were restricted to the point
of rendering more complex procedures unaffordable. 4  One federal
physician association official concluded that the main purpose of all budgets
since the SGB V reform of 1993, instead of furthering the optimization of
individualized treatment plans, had been to lower the standard of care, "an
automatic occurrence as soon as the budget has been spent.,
415
Physicians also saw the Reform of 2000 intent on shifting the balance
of power in favor of the sickness funds,4 16 while the German Hospital
Association perceived it as a threat to uniform nationwide access to hospital
care. 417 The Association further predicted that the global budget, only
allowed to rise proportionately to members' income, would bear no relation
to the actual cost of needed care and would transfer the morbidity risk to the
hospitals, inescapably leading to "rationing" of necessary care and the loss
414. Wilhelm Bulk, Globalbudgets senken das Qualitdtsniveau [Global Budget Lower the
Quality of Care], 9 ZAHNARZTLICHE MITTEILUNGEN 26 (May 1999).
415. Sabine Gl6ser (quoting Lothar Krimmel (Vice President of the Federal Association
of Physician Associations) in Globalbudget weckt keine Zuversicht [Physicians Weary of
Global Budget], 18 DEUTSCHES ARZTEBLATT C-834 (May 1999)).
416. See id.
417. See FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU, supra note 6.
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of jobs. 4 18  Employers (who pay half of their employees' insurance
premiums) questioned whether the reform would even attain one of its
fundamental purposes-stable premiums. They proposed uprooting the
system altogether by reducing universal coverage to a basic package for all
and severely restricting employer contributions.
But all federal sickness fund associations welcomed the global budget
and called for strict adherence despite concerns that the prohibition of
member selection might unfairly skew the actuarial risks for some of the
individual funds.4 19 Since growing health care costs were seen as mainly
"supply-induced"-physicians have more freedom to determine the quantity
and quality of their services than any other service providers-, sickness
funds supported the budgets as the singularly effective means of cost
containment: a well-designed budget concept would ensure financial
predictability while generating desirable pressure on all participants to
implement indispensable structural reforms and stabilize premiums.420
"What ails our health care system is not inadequate care but an excess of
it.
'421
Eulogy. After the Reform 2000 passed the Lower House dominated by
the Social Democratic majority on November 4, 1999, the bill was submitted
for ratification to the Upper House on November 26.422 It was defeated by
the Christian Democratic majority, resulting from recent gains in state
elections, which objected to the "rationing" of health care, the presumed
effect of the global budget. The Minister of Health, assured of a Lower
418. See id.
419. See Anton Engels, Globalbudgets und Vertragsgestaltung [Global Budgets and
Contracting with Providers], DIE KRANKENVERSICHERUNG 202 (July/Aug. 1999).
420. See Raimund NeuB, Referentenentwurf zur Gesundheitsreform: Wer soil das
bezahlen? [Health Care Reform Draft Bill: Who Can Afford It?], DIE
KRANKENVERSICHERUNG 173 (June 1999).
421. See Christian Korbanka, Weiterentwicklung der sozialen Krankenversicherung -
Globalbudget: Chancen und Risiken [The Evolution of the Social Health Insurance -
Opportunities and Risks of Global Budgets], DIE KRANKENVERSICHERUNG 166 (June 1999)
(quoting Rolf Stubbard (Chairman of the Board of one Federal Association of Sickness
Funds)).
422. Bundesrat. The Upper House members (representing states not constituencies, similar
to the U.S. Senate) are not elected but appointed by the state legislature majorities. Only bills
impacting on individual states must be ratified by the Bundesrat, including some components
of the health care reform legislation.
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House... majority after re-submission following conference proceedings,
immediately amended the bill. She replaced the global budget with sector-
specific budgets, and separate budgets for hospitals, physician compensation,
and prescription drugs, and eliminated the physician associations' rights to
object to sickness fund selective contracting with individual providers and to
call for arbitration procedures. Both items would have required Upper House
approval and would have led to another stalemate between both chambers.424
b. Drug Spending Controls
Physicians protested the prescription drug budgets, feeling forced to
shoulder the burden for medical progress, demographic changes, increased
morbidity, and coverage decisions on the part of the sickness funds.425
Efforts to stay within the budgetary limits were compared to "flying without
visibility" since the practice-specific prescription statistics compiled earlier
by the sickness funds were no longer made available to the physician
associations.426 Physicians also predicted that the budget would be depleted
in the five new states by October 1999.427
Furthermore, SGB V, Art. 92 was amended to include the
establishment of a National Institute for Prescription Medicine, to be run by
a commission. Commission members, all of them physicians or pharmacists
(three experts on clinical practice, two on pharmacology and clinical
pharmacology, one on clinical statistics, and one expert each on
phytotherapy, homeopathy, and anthroposophy-three covered alternative
specialties) were to draft a "reimbursable drug list '' 428 of pharmaceuticals for
the "appropriate, adequate and necessary treatment, prevention and diagnosis
423. Bundestag.
424. See Marc Hujer, Fischer schrdnkt Rechte der A"rzte weiter ein [Minister of Health
Fischer Further Limits Physicians'Rights], SUDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG, Nov. 30, 1999, at 6.
425. See Gliser, supra note 415.
426. See Gl6ser, supra note 397, at C-191.
427. Health care expenditures in the former east Germany have consistently exceeded those
in the west since unification in 1989, due to the lower quality of care under the now-defunct
communist regime.
428. Positivliste. Before the passage of the SGB V in 1988, more than 60,000 preparations
were available, many of them combining several active ingredients ("combination drugs"),
often not all of them needed for a particular indication. Today, many of these drugs have
been taken off the market. Medication excluded from coverage under SGB V, Art. 34, such
as OTC preparations for minor ailments or of uncertain therapeutic value, would still be
reimbursed if included on the Art. 92 list.
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of illnesses." Inclusion criteria reflecting the state of scientific knowledge
were to be adopted by the Federal Ministry of Health, and the list was to be
continuously updated according to new scientific developments while
excluding outdated drugs. Medical and pharmaceutical experts were to be'
consulted-that is, representatives of physician, pharmacist and sickness
fund associations, of the pharmaceutical industry, and representatives of the
different medical specialty societies (welcoming the appreciation of their
independent scientific expertise and knowledge of the current state of
medical practice4 :9). The reimbursable drug list was hailed as a road map
through the drug market thicket, identifying drugs with questionable
effectiveness, and improving the quality of care when combined with the
standard prescribing amounts and broader access by physicians to official
sources of pharmaceutical information.43° By specifying covered prescription
medication, the list would also shift some of the responsibility for decision-
making from physicians to legislators.431 Whether it would actually contain
expenditures was questioned by some as physicians might replace
questionable drugs with more expensive effective medication.
432
But until the SGB V amendments would become law, an interim
solution was required. For 1999, a drug budget of DM 39 billion was
appropriated, but considered insufficient by physicians who viewed the
standard prescribing amounts as adequate for cost containment. The ensuing
public debate typified the struggle over the proposed Health Care Reform of
2000. Physicians threatened to implement an "emergency program": patients
would be "wait-listed" for prescriptions, receive generics or "out-of-pocket"
prescriptions only. They also emphasized that the social law global budget,
subjecting expenditures to "medical necessity" criteria, created a liability
dilemma since patients would continue to be entitled to the tort standard of
429. Arbeitsgemeinschaft der Wissenschaftlichen Medizinischen Fachgesellschaften,
Stellungnahme der auj3erordentlichen Delegiertenkonferenz der A WMF zur GKV-
Gesundheitsreform 2000 [Communique of the Extraordinary Assembly of the Scientific
Medical Societies Concerning the Health Care Reform Of2 000] (AWMF online, Frankfurt,
June 26, 1999). Supra note 283.
430. Rolf Rosenbrock, Das Globalbudget - Chancen und Risiken fir die
Versorgungsqualitat [The Global Budget - Opportunities and Risks for the Delivery of
Health Care Quality], DIE KRANKENVERSICHERUNG 174 (June 1999).
431. See Gl6ser, supra note 397, at C- 191 (quoting Wolfgang Brech, Member of the Board
of the Federal Association of Physician Associations).
432. See Neul3, supra note 420.
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care.433 One day before the health care debate in the Federal Parliament, six
thousand East German dentists and their assistants took to the streets in
Berlin while one thousand physicians, pharmacists and physical therapists
(all contractual providers under the SGB V) demonstrated in Wiesbaden.
434
Fundamental questions were at issue: how to avoid the inflation of services
in a fee-for-service system while ensuring adequate provider compensation
under a global budget, how to preserve the health care system built on
solidarity in the face of government plans to strengthen competition among
sickness funds, 435 and how to define "medical necessity" on a macro-level at
times of budgetary constraints.
In order at least to resolve the drug budget problems, the Federal
Association of Physicians entered into negotiations with the Federal Minister
of Health and the Federal Sickness Fund Associations. After "tedious
semantic fine-tuning," a joint action program was adopted outlining
"recommendations" how to support physicians in their efforts to "prescribe
economically" to prevent budget overruns and penalties. Major elements of
the program were the shift to lower-priced generics, 436 the prohibition of
OTC prescriptions for minor ailments (which had already been in effect but
was widely ignored by physicians), and recommendations not to prescribe
drugs with questionable effectiveness nor "new" products marginally
different from already available pharmaceuticals.437 Second opinions were
433. Many physicians therefore chose to grant what their patients asked for. Heidrun
Graupner, Geteiltes Leid in der Gesundheitspolitik [Sharing the Suffering Inflicted by the
Health Care Policy], SODDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG Aug. 18, 1999, at 4.
434. Protestformiertsich [Protesting Health Care Reforms], HERSFELDERZEITUNG, Sept.
9, 1999, at 2. American physicians, increasingly closing ranks, have also begun to resort to
collective action. The Federation of Physicians and Dentists called for a boycott of Merck
products which was followed by hundreds of physicians across the country and caused quite
some corporate anxiety. Merck had opposed the bill pending in Congress granting physicians
a waiver from antitrust provisions prohibiting them from collectively negotiating with
managed care organizations. Robert Pear, Doctors in Antitrust Fight Boycott Merck
Products. N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 2000, at A21.
435. See SGB V at Art. 1 (solidarity and individual responsibility). "Solidarity means the
protection of those at high risk of illness. Any government wanting to preserve this principle
must prohibit cherry-picking." Graupner, supra note 433.
436. Generics often are still called "imitation products" (Nachahmerprodukte), a term
harking back to the polemics by both physicians and pharmaceutical manufacturers in
Germany fighting the approval of such products.
437. Numerous "me too" products are on the market whose active ingredients differ only
slightly from already available drugs with almost identical therapeutic effects but command
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recommended in case of unusually expensive treatments. The Federal
Physician Association president praised the negotiations since the sickness
funds had conceded publicly for the first time that coverage in a particular
sector had to be limited. "We succeeded in getting our political opponents
who have been threatening us with penalties into the same boat with us:
everyone, including the Minister of Health, was forced to admit that benefits
must be cut. 438 But it almost cost him his job since his colleagues from the
regional physician associations condemned his willingness to "compromise"
with the government and the sickness funds.439 At one point, the Minister of
Health refused to continue negotiations after the regional associations had
threatened to reduce patient services in protest of the agreement concluded
on the national level. 40 Their demands included exceptions to the drug
budget for regions with a known increased demand for prescription drugs
(such as in east Germany) and cross-subsidization among regions.441 Even
though the action plan eventually was approved, the reimbursable drug list,
just as the global budget, did not survive the vote in the Upper House.
Currently, work on a "negative list" is being completed, listing all
preparations of questionable effectiveness. 442
much higher prices.
438. Marc Hujer, Die Gesundheitsgesetze dfirfen nicht exekutiertwerden [Do Not Execute
Our Health Care System]. Interview with Winfried Schorre, Chairman of the National
Physician Association, SUDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG, Sept. 16, 1999, at 27.
439. His deputy was fired from the Board because there was disagreement even within the
Federal Association itself. Marc Hujer, Konfuse A'rzte [ Physicians Confused],
SUDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG, Sept. 11/12, 1999, at 25. Since then, Mr. Schorre himself, the
Federal Physician Association president, has resigned.
440. Andrea Fischer bricht Dialog mit den Arzten ab [Minister of Health Ends Dialogue
with Physicians], SODDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG, Sept. 23, 1999, at 1.
441. Medikamente notfalls auf Privatrezept [Nothing but Out-of-Pocket Prescriptions if
Budget Inadequate], SODDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG, Sept. 22, 1999, at 23.
442. In spite of the success in controlliig expenditures for office-based medical treatment
and hospitals in 1999, costs for medication rose by 8 percent. See Andreas Hoffmann, supra
note 9.
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c. Quality Assessment
The revised SGB V443 now holds all contractual providers responsible
for the scientifically up-to-date quality of services, relying on yet-to-be-
developed valid quality assessment criteria for "appropriate and cost-
effective" diagnosis and treatment, including a macro-level definition of
"medical necessity." Internal quality control measures are to be introduced,
increasingly based on clinical practice guidelines, subject to guideline
development approval procedures to be adopted by the federal associations
of physicians, sickness funds and hospitals, and followed by normative Art.
92 guidelines for quality assessment." The Federal Committee of Physician
and Sickness Fund Associations, in consultation with independent experts,
must prioritize guideline promulgation by focusing on "those groups of
patients whose morbidity and mortality is expected to change through higher
quality care." Quality management is extended to hospitals, covering the
assessment of diagnostic and treatment methods, inpatient and outpatient
preventive care, and rehabilitation. 445 A new "Working Group for the
Promotion of Quality Control" will create a uniform approach to all sectors
and professions of the health care system. 46
Since such comprehensive assessment and quality control measures
constitute uncharted territory, all parties concerned are called upon to
cooperate and contribute their expertise to guideline development, a process
expected to become increasingly evidence-based.447 One example of such
cooperation was the recent attempt at establishing a clearinghouse for cancer
treatments to be staffed with experts from the German Cancer Society, the
Cancer Foundation,448 the medical societies, the Federal Ministry of Health,
the sickness funds and their medical services divisions.4 49  But the
443. See SGB V at Art. 136.
444. See SGB V at Art. 136(a).
445. See SGB V at Art. 137(c), (d).
446. See SGB V at Art. 137(b).
447. See Jung, supra note 270.
448. Die Deutsche Krebsgesellschaft. Die Krebshilfe.
449. "Innovative" treatments for cancer, commonly excluded from coverage by U.S.
managed care companies, continue to be reimbursed in Germany-but not in any consistent
nor official fashion. Sickness funds, in the absence of national coverage guidelines, often
deny autologous bone marrow transplants (ABMT) because of the low statistical probability
of successful outcomes. On the other hand, high dose chemotherapy and immune therapies
(such as interleukin) are reimbursed at hundreds of millions of Deutschmark every year while
their effectiveness is considered equally inconclusive. Since the SGB V expressly permits
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clearinghouse failed at the very last minute because one of the sickness funds
balked and argued that such a body would only duplicate the efforts of the
Federal Committee under Art. 92. The president of the German Cancer
Society observed, however, that evaluating cancer treatments, a complex
procedure, would overtax the limited capabilities of the Federal Committee.
Attempts at resuming the negotiations are currently under way. Until a
national quality assessment program is implemented, truly necessary
treatments continue to be funded through the reallocation of funds within the
global budgets. The difficult debate of how to define medical necessity on
a macro-level and how to ration health care resources according to outcome
probabilities has begun, but quietly.45°
d. Sickness Funds: Selective Contracting and Provider Networks
"Whenever politicians are clueless how to resolve their self-made
problems, they call on the system of self-governance."45" ' Selective
contracting with providers known to deliver cost-effective services
("economic credentialing") would shift the responsibility for cost
containment to sickness funds and physicians. Sickness funds may also
contract with integrated provider networks of primary care physicians and
specialists,452 considered to be more cost-effective than a system of
individual practitioners only. While benefits would remain uniform
according to law, selection by the sickness funds would most likely follow
economic ("cost-effectiveness") criteria, inducing providers in turn to engage
in patient "cherry-picking." Since only physicians with comparatively
favorable practice morbidity structures might then form networks, cost
savings would flow from the reduced actuarial risks, but not from any
improvement in health care delivery. 3 One of the leading Social
Democratic members of parliament has proposed that all providers should be
experimental treatments in individual cases, the sickness fund medical services divisions,
known for their generous decisions, often preauthorize such treatments on a case-by-case
basis and have required sickness funds to reimburse "experimental" treatments in life-
threatening situations. Numerous American courts have ordered insurers to pay for such
treatments as well. See ROSENBLATT ET AL., supra note 17, at 275.
450. See Michael Emmrich, RationierteMedikamenteflfr ausgewihlteKranke? [Rationed
Drugs For Which Patients?], FRANKFURTER RuNDscnAu, Oct. 12, 1999.
451. See NeuB3, supra note 420.
452. See SGB V at Art. 140.
453. See Knieps, Reichelt, supra note 344, at 99.
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permitted to form integrated delivery systems which could manage their own
budgets and redistribute surpluses to both providers and patients. 4
Once again, physicians and sickness funds are of a different mind.
Physicians perceive a threat to the social law guarantee of a universal health
care system and the solidarity it is based on. Selective contracting would
also bypass their associations, strengthening the sickness fund influence and
weakening the system of self-governance. The sickness funds, however,
welcome the "competition for more innovative delivery systems., 455 To what
extent there will be experimentation with new delivery systems and how they
may impact on patients, physicians, and health care expenditures remains to
be seen.
e. Discovering the Patients
"What about the patient?, 45 6 As the "myth of the white coat" has
receded and passive patients have metamorphosed into informed consumers,
challenging physicians' clinical judgment and requesting particular
procedures or prescription drugs, this question is voiced more frequently.
But as abundantly clear from the above health care reform debates, patients
do not participate. They remain administered, cared for and paternalistically
protected objects of the health care system while almost 50% have grown
uncomfortable with the practice of "school medicine," resorting to
alternative approaches. 457 Patients pay the piper without picking the tune.
But patient autonomy or "self-determination" is protected under the
Constitution.458 On May 8, 1998, the Social Democratic members of the
German parliament submitted the issue of "patient autonomy and patient
protection in case of malpractice" for debate.459 Calling for a "patients'
rights charter," the Social Democrats emphasized the heavily skewed
relationship between physicians and patients, the lack of enforcement of
454. Gudrun Schaich-Walch, spokesperson for health care of the Social Democratic Party,
quoted in Korbanka, supra note 421.
455. See FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU, supra note 6.
456. Alexander Hoffmann, Wo bleibt der Patient? [What about the Patient?],
FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG, Nov. 13, 1999, at B 1.
457. See id.
458. See Constitution, supra note 179 Art. 2. "Each person is entitled to life and physical
inviolability. Each person's freedom is inviolable."
459. GroJfe Anfrage der Fraktion der SPD vom 8.5. 1998 zum Thema
Patientenselbstbestimmung und Patientenschutz beifehlerhafter medizinischer Behandlung,
BT-Drs. 13/10701, S. 1-16. 8 MEDR 359 (1998).
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informed consent, and the difficulty of the injured party to overcome the
standards of proof and causation in medical negligence cases. In October
1999, one of the federal physician associations submitted such a charter to
be publicly debated and ratified in 2000. In keeping with tradition,
immediate protests arose: the Federal Minister of Health objected because
her ministry had just met with the states and consumer protection
associations to discuss strengthening patients' rights. In June of 1999, the
state ministers of health had published a lengthy paper on.patients' rights in
Germany, declaring their intent to establish "independent patient counseling
offices" on the state level, a proposal derided by physicians as devoid of any
"medical credibility., 460
The courts, mindful of the unequal patient-provider relationship, have
already strengthened patients' rights, in particular, ruling on informed
consent intended to off-set physician authority, and defined the permission
to treat as valid only after the patient has been adequately informed.
Informed consent, however, does not relieve physicians of the need to
exercise responsible clinical judgment as they retain their "therapeutic
privilege." The information imparted need not enable patients to make a
medical decision, but is considered adequate when they are advised of the
kind and degree of risk involved and can assess the impact on their individual
circumstances. 46' Patients must be made aware of alternative procedures
offering an equal likelihood of success but entailing different types of risks.
They may also not be persuaded nor may the physician assume that the
patient is aware of the risks.462 Informed consent may not be obtained shortly
before surgery after administration of a sedative.463 Consent and medical
indication combined form the basis for treatment of the patient as an
individual who is the subject, not the object, of care.
To date, the Supreme Civil and Criminal Court has not ruled on
informed consent in cases of coverage exclusions for socially insured patients
when the procedure is available if paid for out-of-pocket. 4' This is currently
460. 4rzte legen "Charta der Patientenrechte vor" [Physicians Submit "Patients 'Rights
Charter"], HERSFELDER ZErrUNG, Oct. 10, 1999.
461. BGH VI ZR 178/93 (June 14, 1994). Since informed consent is subject to civil and
criminal law, the jurisdiction lies with the Supreme Civil and Criminal Court.
462. BGH VI ZR 260/93 (June 14, 1994).
463. BGH VI ZR 42/97 (Jan. 17, 1998).
464. In the United States, it has been suggested that plan beneficiaries might want to have
the choice to buy coverage for "experimental" treatments by paying a higher premium. See
ROSENBLATT ET AL., supra note 17, at 276. In numerous managed care malpractice cases,
courts have emphasized that the injured plaintiffs were never given the option of paying for
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interpreted as implying the physicians' right, but not their obligation, to
inform the patient.465 One of the Court's Justices, however, recently urged
physicians to disclose to patients all available alternatives. 466 Informed
consent will assume even more relevance as physicians, subject to new cost
containment requirements, feel ever more cornered between the need to
micro-allocate services and the tort standard of care.
German courts have also been keenly aware of the steep hurdles faced
by plaintiffs in malpractice suits (such as the "code of silence" and the
difficulty of finding expert witnesses willing to testify), and have lowered the
standards of proof for medical negligence and proximate cause to redress the
patient-physician imbalance. Physicians must document all treatment details
and keep files for ten years, which often makes medical records the most
important source of evidence. Gross negligence by a physician reverses the
burden of proof.467 In case of reasonable certainty that an omitted diagnostic
procedure would have indicated a condition requiring treatment, the standard
of proof is lowered to restore the injured party to the position in which she
would have been with proper diagnosis. 468 Causation standards are also
reduced in cases of negligent omission of diagnostic procedures, especially
if the mis-diagnosed condition was so serious that non-treatment would have
been grossly negligent.
469
procedures or hospitalization denied by their MCO. See Bauman v. U.S. Healthcare,
KennedyMemorial Hospital, 1 F.Supp.2d 420, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4110 (D. N.J. March
1998), supra note 99.
465. See STEFFEN, supra note 312, at 133-172, listing all relevant Supreme Civil and
Criminal Court Rulings (BGH).
466. Hagedom, BehandlungsstandardsundBehandlungsleitlinienzwischenIndividualitit
und Wirtschaftlichkeit aus haftungsrechtlicher Sicht [Liability Implications of Treatment
Standards and Guidelines - Clinical Judgment vs. Economic Considerations]. 3 BONNER
ARZTLICHE NACHRICHTEN 28 (1999) (quoting Justice Dressier).
467. Andrea Nasemann, Grenzenloses Miftrauen [Unlimited Distrust]. SUDDEUTSCHE
ZEITUNG, May 5, 1998, at 706.
468. BGH VI ZR 253/97 (Nov. 11, 1998), 12 NJW 863 (1999).
469. BGH VI ZR 239/97 (Oct. 6, 1998), MEDIZINRECHT36 (1999) (Goodpasture syndrome
resulting in kidney failure was misdiagnosed in an accident victim with some renal injury.)
BGH VI ZR 253/97 (aneurism undiagnosed because of omission of CT-scan).
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. Ii. Conclusion
Numerous issues are shared by the two very different systems of health
care delivery, and many of the solutions proposed or implemented indicate
a slow trend towards conversion.
Regulation vs. the Market. After almost 120 years, the German
statutory system is highly complex, and efforts to innovate and deregulate to
achieve the needed gains in efficiency are under way. German legislators,
revising the SGB V, have already introduced a number of market elements
such as the new period of open enrollment and selective provider contracting
intended to stimulate competition among plans.47° However, as a
consequence, sickness funds might begin to offer "low cost" and "luxury"
coverage plans and, just as every manufacturer of consumer products, would
then be able to squeeze the market for more profit, raising health care
expenditures. Since this would destroy the foundation of the current health
care system whose premiums are already considered barely acceptable,47" '
observers warn that only universal coverage based on solidarity can
guarantee the survival of the German system. The trend towards loosening
the strictures of social law, however, is expected to continue.
Health care for most Americans is still subject to the dictates of the
market, but legislators increasingly recognize their responsibility. All states
by now have adopted more or less stringent managed care acts mandating
minimum benefits, prohibiting certain practices,472 and defining "medical
necessity" on a macro-level 473 while Congress has passed several
contradictory "patients' rights" bills.474 State regulation, however, may be
nothing but a "subterfuge designed to deter the needed movement toward
coverage for all Americans." '475 There are also indications that state managed
470. Coverage by law is universal, however, and plans were able to compete only by
offering a limited number of additional optional benefits. Furthermore, cross-subsidization
among funds with differing demographics achieved the government goal of roughly
equalizing the so far diverging premiums, reducing their importance as an element of
competition.
471. Marc Hujer, Kein Allheilmittel zur Kostenddmpfung [No Cost-Containment
Panacea]. SUDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG, Jan. 28, 2000, at 27.
472. See STATE GUIDE 2000, supra note 141, appendix C.
473. Twenty-one states have defined "medical necessity" on a macro-level. Id. at 5-4.
474. As one commentator observed, "You can't litigate your way to quality health care."
Stephanie Kanwit, quoted by Michael Higgins, supra note 147.
475. See N.Y. TIMES, supra note 81.
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care bills of rights have not had much of an effect on managed care abuses
because of ineffectual state enforcement agencies.476
Is the Practice of Medicine an Independent Profession? So far,
American physicians have not been able to convince the National Labor
Relations Board, the Federal Trade Commission, and the Senate that MCOs
exercise a degree of control over their professional practices which turns
them into part-time employees and, thus, should have the right to unionize
and collectively defend the standard of care and their working conditions.
Whether German physicians truly are "independent practitioners" is not only
questioned by physicians, but by scholarly authors as well. Social law
regulates the practice of medicine in numerous ways, and social law cost
control measures impact on clinical judgment. So far, however, sickness
funds do not directly interfere with clinical decision making, contrary to
managed care organizations in the United States, and physicians, represented
through their associations, negotiate with them the framework for the
delivery of health care. But physicians in both countries struggle with
external interference with the "independent" exercise of their profession,
pressuring them to provide medical services below the standards they
consider appropriate.
Physicians' Roles in Negotiating Contracts with Insurers. James S.
Todd, then Executive Vice President of the AMA, observed: "One of the
main strengths of the German system is the presence of formalized medical
input.... Such formal roles for medicine in the decision making process in
this country are badly needed, particularly in areas such as reimbursement,
appropriateness of fees, and the review of the quality and the appropriateness
of services." '477 The German system of "self-governance" relies on
physicians' quasi-regulatory input into budget implementation and the
development of treatment standards in cooperation with the sickness funds.
Nevertheless, German physicians complain of losing their traditional, almost
unlimited freedom in clinical decision-making since the increased emphasis
on cost-effectiveness and the introduction of budgets force them to make
476. Randy Kennedy, Long Delays by H.M.O.s Cited in New York Report, N.Y. TIMES,
June 6, 1999, at A 18. State agencies have "allowed themselves to become so ineffectual as
to become anticonsumer." Many aspects of the New York law, such as mandatory response
times for preapproval of end stage cancer patients' pain management treatments and
colonoscopies for cancer diagnosis are routinely ignored while fines are minimal. Physicians
have reported that patients were forced to wait for hours on operating tables for preapproval.
In addition, MCOs create "such a confusing and frustrating gauntlet for obtaining permission
that medical providers are often discouraged from trying."
477. Quoted in John K. Iglehart, Health Policy Report: Germany's Health Care System,
Part 1. 324 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1750 (June 1991).
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micro-allocation decisions they are unaccustomed to. In the United States,
physician unionization has recently gained momentum as physicians feel the
need to combine their resources to better confront the giant corporations
currently undermining the standard of care and their clinical autonomy.
Collective bargaining would publicize doctors' concerns and capture the
media's attention similar to the often colorful, very public and detailed
German health care debate.
Physician Compensation. As payment would be one subject of
collective negotiations, American physicians expressed the desire that their
future leadership will first and foremost be committed to patient care, not the
"protection of [physicians'] presumed Lexus entitlement." '478 Bargaining for
income should not be seen as the profession's main focus,479 and physicians
will have to face the test whether they can be public advocates without
primarily promoting their self-interest. German sickness funds have already
questioned physicians' motives behind their seemingly increasing willingness
to take to the streets. "When arguing over health care reforms, we must be
quite clear whether the issue is optimizing our health care delivery system or
preserving the income of a rather well-off segment of our population.
480
Payment is, however, an important element of any quality health care
system. In both Germany and the United States, incomes of physicians have
dropped considerably over the past few years as either legislated or private
industry cost control measures have taken effect. "Adequate compensation"
is a subject of scholarly debate in Germany because physicians' entitlement
to it is protected by both the Constitution and social law, and little or no
odium is attached to physicians' participation in this discussion. But what
represents an "adequate" level of payment may remain unanswered until
brought before the Supreme Social Court with jurisdiction over the subject
matter.
The optimal method of compensation is another yet unresolved issue.
German physicians today receive a combination of fee-for-service, case-
based, and capitated payments, and the recent practice budgets were
calculated to preserve incentives for productivity. But urologists have
submitted their own model fee scale, and the McKinsey consulting firm has
proposed a health care delivery system of multi-disciplinary practice
associations, receiving lump sum payments, indication and diagnosis-related
478. See Mullan, supra note 158.
479. Darlene Lawrence, The Pros and Cons, in Physicians'Own Words, WASH. POST, July
18, 1999, atB3.
480. See Korbanka, supra note 421, at 166.
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fees, and some fee-for-service compensation.481 There is agreement in both
countries that financial incentives undermine the trust between patient and
physician.482 Financial conflicts have always been part of medical decision-
making, but physicians generally have succeeded in preserving patient
welfare. "However, incentives to limit care are more problematic than
incentives to provide care.',483 In the United States, a quality-oriented
approach is advocated to reward excellence, but, considering that financial
incentives do impact on quality of care, "whether and how this force can be
harnessed in the service of quality improvement is unanswered. ' 48 4 Over
time, German experimentation with different methods of compensation may
yield at least a partial answer.485
The Impact of Cost-Containment on the Quality of Care. Physicians
in both countries are troubled by the impact of resource limitations on the
standard of care, whether through national budgets, managed care cost
containment techniques or changes in physician compensation. "The micro-
allocation of health care funds by physicians imposed by the financial crisis
of the health care system would change the medical profession and destroy
the freedom and privacy of the physician-patient relationship.' '486 German
physicians, even though increasingly dissatisfied with their micro-allocation
role, retain most of their autonomy to exercise clinical judgment since
utilization ("cost-effectiveness") reviews are merely economic and
retrospective. American physicians, by nature averse to collective action and
a universal health care statute in a nation built on individualism and the
481. Birgit Schauenburg, Die Einfiihrung von Praxisbudgets in den EBM [Integrating
Practice Budgets into the National Fee Scale], 5 ZEITSCHRIFT DER BETRIEBLICHEN
KRANKENKASSEN 193 (1997).
482. See Rumler-Detzel, supra note 316. In the United States, numerous actions against
managed care organizations allege malpractice resulting from financial incentives for
physicians. Courts, including the Supreme Court (Pegram v. Herdrich, supra note 107, at
2154, fn.8), currently struggle to determine whether such arrangements must be disclosed and
whether they violate fiduciary duty.
483. Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs (AMA), Ethical Issues in Managed Care.
273(4) JAMA 330, 335 (Jan. 1995) [hereinafter Council Report].
484. Mark R. Chassin, Assessing Strategies for Quality Improvement. 16 HEALTH AFFAIRS
151, 154 (1998).
485. Comprehensive statistics documenting changes in the health care system are
maintained by German sickness funds and the Ministry of Health.
486. See Laufs, supra note 15.
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defense of individual rights,487 are rallying to defend their right to
independent clinical judgment against managed care organizations usurping
medical decisions. "The duty of patient advocacy is a fundamental element
of the physician-patient relationship that should not be altered by the system
of health care delivery. 488 The recently announced United Healthcare move
to eliminate preauthorization procedures and "return medical decision
making to physicians" seems to amount to little more than a subterfuge
aimed at shifting malpractice liability back to physicians while still retaining
considerable control over the standard of care through other means.489
Physicians in both countries are prepared to accept some form of health
care cost containment but feel unfairly held liable for the inevitably lower
standard of care. "Managed care organizations must take full responsibility
for the decisions they render-just like the rest of us." '490 German physicians
are calling for macro-level, regulatory definitions of "medical necessity."
However, such legislative interventions could curtail clinical autonomy to a
greater degree than German physicians currently may be able to foresee.
Practitioners in both countries agree that statistical averages or standardized
clinical guidelines, ignoring patient differences, have no place in the practice
of medicine. "The standard patient with a standard illness curable by
standard treatment administered by the standard physician does not exist. '491
But MCOs, often applying "average case" utilization and corporate practice
guidelines, opt out of the common law reasonableness or professional
standard.492 "Physicians should ... advocate for guidelines that are sensitive
487. For a more detailed discussion of the differing philosophical approaches to access to
and distribution of health care in the United States and Germany, see Ursula Weide, supra
note 12.
488. See Council Report, supra note 483, at 334.
489. Financial incentives, publishing "provider profiles" rating physicians according to
their adherence to corporate practice guidelines and utilization rates, at-will contracts, and
"deselection" in case of non-compliance, exert pressure on physicians to acquiesce to
managed care norms. David Hitzenrad, H.MO. to Leave Care Decisions Up to Doctors,
WASH. POST, Nov. 9, 1999, at Al. Milt Freudenheim, BigH.M.0. to Give Decision on Care
Back to Doctors, WASH. POST, Nov. 9, 1999, at A1.
490. Mohammad Saeed, Meeting Needs of Providers: A Request to Managed Care. 17(1)
PSYCHIATRIC TIMES 78, 79 (Jan. 2000).
491. Adolf Laufs, Zur Freiheit des Arztberufs [The Independent Practice of Medicine], in
FESTSCHRIFT FUR ERWIN DEUTSCH [HONORING ERWIN DEUTSCH] 625, 626 (Heymanns
Verlag, Cologne, 1999).
492. See Dukes, supra note 72. The court, ruling on the ERISA preemption of state laws
regulating the quality of care, observed that "we leave for another time the issue whether an
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to differences between patients. 493 Many American physicians, however,
faced with managed care control over the exercise of their profession,494 have
been forced to "internalize" managed care clinical practices and norms, often
unrelated to a patient's individual circumstances and based on actuarial
calculations. German physicians confront similar conflicts arising from more
stringent social law restrictions and evolving civil law standards. Scholars
have warned that social law cost-effectiveness requirements may result in
"clinical self-restraint," negatively affect the standard of care, and preordain
the quality of future research by introducing economic considerations into the
development of quality criteria for diagnosis and treatment.495 But some
standardization through practice guidelines based on scientific evidence and
medical expertise may be unavoidable in order to achieve the needed
efficiency gains in the provision of health care. German physicians, equal
partners of the sickness funds, will continue to influence the standard of care
in accordance with the SGB V process while their American colleagues are
still lacking any mechanisms of formalized input.
Health care delivery will continue to undergo major transformations in
both countries, searching for a middle-of-the-road solution acceptable within
their respective philosophical frameworks. Both will most likely come to
rely on some form of contractual (macro-level) standard of care, deviating
from the professional standard and reducing physician autonomy. But to
determine what is medically doable and economically feasible while
protecting patient welfare will be fraught with difficult choices, and who
eventually will make these determinations remains unanswered.496 In the
absence of national legislation, American efforts to free medicine from
market domination, to limit the deregulation of the health care "industry,"
and to restore some of the autonomy in clinical decision making to
H.M.O. should be permitted to opt out by contract of the common law standard of care."
493. See Council Report, supra note 483, at 334.
494. See Hitzenrad, supra note 489.
495. See Laufs, supra note 466, at 493.
496. In the United States, few seem to question the validity of both MCO-internal and
external appeals procedures in the case of treatment denial. An internal appeals process
would leave treatment decisions with the insurers while an external review process would rely
on outside "experts." In both instances, to determine what is "medically necessary" in an
individual patient's case is no longer left to the attending physician's hands-on clinical
judgment. "Only by restoring the intimate bond between doctor and patient can Congress
return free-market principles to an industry that in many ways resembles an arbitrary and
inefficient Soviet-style economy." Rep. Tom A. Cobum (Oklahoma), Patients 'Rights, Done
Wrong, N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 1999, at A23.
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physicians and patients, may succeed only through the "commodification" of
medicine: by turning it into a "product" or "service" subject to state
regulation.497 Germany, with its recent statutory revisions adding market-
oriented elements and more stringent cost-benefit evaluations, is embarked
on a similar path, in contradiction with traditional ideals. "Every law
regulating the practice of medicine should recognize that its foundations are
love and charity."'4 98 American authors emphasize patient trust and physician
trustworthiness as anchors of the patient-physician relationship so that the
sick can "take comfort and draw strength from their doctors during their most
anxious and fearful moments., 499 They also point to the growing number of
uninsured Americans for whom charity care provided by physicians and
hospitals is dwindling following the "managed care revolution."5 °
Confronted with the painful necessity of health care cost containment,
it is tempting to succumb to economic dictates. However, the preservation
of human dignity in times of need, whether we help safeguard it for others or
claim it for ourselves, is prime among the duties owed by any modem
industrialized society.
497. Alternatively, and in the absence of congressional action, citizens, physicians and
some state politicians may increasingly resort to "self-help" such as holding referendums on
universal health care. In both Washington and Massachusetts, such popular initiatives are
under way, and Maryland is beginning a similar "push." Carey Goldberg, State Referendums
Seeking to Overhaul Health Care System. N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 2000, at Al.
498. See Laufs, supra note 15 (quoting Kiichenhoff, regretting that this philosophy seems
to have receded into the past. But we should at a minimum try to remember that "such laws
embody the promise that individuals will wholly serve others in their being and their
suffering.").
499. Jay Katz, The Silent World of Doctor and Patient (1984), quoted in Brief of Health
Law, Policy, and Ethics Scholars as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent, at 15, Pegram
v. Herdrich, cert. granted (U.S. Sept. 28, 1999) (No. 98-1949).
500. "Until we have some form of universal [health insurance] coverage, the
expectation that organizations can provide free care to 40 or 50 percent of the people
who walk in their door is unrealistic." See David Brown, Medical Safety Net Seen in
Peril, WASH. POST, March 31,2000, at A2 (quoting John Billings, New York University,
member of the Institute of Medicine committee, reporting on the consequences of health
care cost control efforts in the 1990s). "But [charity care] is a real safety net that allows
our country to have humane qualities even at the same time we have 45 million people
with no health insurance." See id. (quoting Stuart Altman, Brandeis University, IOM
committee chairman). John Kenneth Galbraith, in support of the Massachusetts drive
for universal health care, has expressed "grave doubts whether health care can be a
business enterprise, where one saves money by cutting back care." Quoted in Goldberg,
supra note 497.
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